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Complete Specification with Shape Inference
Abstract
To achieve the highest Evaluation Assurance Level, mission-critical software
components are required to be specified by formal specification and be verified
by a proof system [3]. However, existing verification systems focus mostly on
good (safe) scenarios of functional properties (nothing bad will happen), while
real world programs often contain bad scenarios. To bridge this gap, the thesis
presents a solution for specifying, verifying and synthesizing both good and bad
scenarios of heap-manipulating programs.
In the first part of this thesis, we present a complete specification mechanism
that can specify both good and bad scenarios of program executions. A good
execution is one that takes any permitted input and produces the expected
output without any errors. A bad execution is one that takes some input but
leads to some unexpected error. We present a verification system that supports
complete specification. Our proposed system is capable of ensuring good
scenarios (from safety proving) and detecting bad scenarios (from errors
validation). A key principle of our proposal is a lattice of program status at the
logic level, that is used to denote good and bad program states, and a new
calculus to support systematic reasoning in the presence of errors.
In the second part of this thesis, we propose to automate verification system
with specification inference. In the context of heap-manipulating programs,
specification inference captures the analysis of shapes to describe abstractions for
data structures used by each method. While previous shape analysis proposals
rely on using a predefined vocabulary of shape definitions (typically limited to
singly-linked list segments), our approach is able to synthesize, from scratch, a
xi
set of shape abstractions that is needed for ensuring memory-safe operations.
The key concept behind our novel proposal is a second-order bi-abduction
mechanism. With bi-abduction, we infer missing information that helps verifiers
to either prove memory safety (for the good scenarios) or disprove it (for the bad
scenarios). In this second-order mechanism, we use unknown predicates (or
second-order variables) as place-holders for shape predicates that are to be
synthesized. Our second-order bi-abduction generates missing information as a
set of relational assumptions on the unknown predicates that are obtained
directly from proof obligations gathered by our verification process.
We next propose a transformational approach on each gathered set of
relational assumptions. Our approach includes derivation and normalization
steps. While the derivation infers sound definition for each unknown predicate,
the normalization step further simplifies those definitions into a more concise,
understandable and re-usable predicate form.
We have implemented the proposals in a prototype system and evaluated
them by using the system to specify, verify, and synthesize specifications of
programs with complex data structures. The experimental results demonstrate
the viability of our proposals in inferring memory-safe specification and the
verification of programs with complete specifications.
Keywords: Second-Order Bi-Abduction, Specification Inference, Complete
Specification, Shape Analysis, Shape Synthesis, Separation Logic.
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Reliable software, especially safety critical systems found in aeronautics, avionics
and banking, should meet safety requirements that conform to regulation
standards [53]. To uphold these standards, the software should be verified by
automatic software verification systems. Software verification is a long-standing
and important problem. Recently, software verification has received much
attention with a number of commercially viable systems, such as Infer [22] at
Facebook, Astree [15] at Airbus, Codesonar [75] at GammaTech, Dafny [96] and
Slayer [13] at Microsoft and Parfait [34] at Oracle.
Software verification is the art of using formal mathematics to prove or disprove
the correctness of a given program with respect to certain formal specifications.
Software verification can be classified into two major flavors: static analysis and
deductive verification. Static analysis automatically computes properties about
the behavior of a program without (or with little) users’ guidance. An important
foundation of static analysis is the abstract interpretation framework proposed by
Cousot and Cousot [39], which is a framework for sound and terminating analyses
based on partially ordered set and fixpoint computation. Static analysis can be
fully automatic and scalable. However, it is typically not very expressive; as it
is designed to work on a predefined set of properties over a fixed set of abstract
1
domains. In the literature, static analysis has been studied to compute reachability
property [34], points-to property [71], shape of pointers [128], termination [37], and
so on. This technique has also been used to prove the absence of some classes of
errors, such as division-by-zero [59], out of bound [40], and memory errors (e.g.
null dereference and leaks) [13, 22]. The techniques have been well studied over
several abstract domains such as linear equalities [84], linear congruences [63],
octagons [109], octahedra [35], polyhedron [41], and string manipulations [56].
Deductive verification is the art of generating mathematical proof obligations
from program and its annotated specification, based on a set of deduction rules.
The truth of those obligations guarantees the conformance of the program to its
specification. The obligations are discharged by either automatic theorem
provers (e.g. Omega [125] and Mona [85]), or satisfiability modulo theories
(SMT) solvers (e.g. Z3 [45]). Design by Contract [108] is a good representative
of deductive verification. It provides a good design for deductive verification
systems and requires software designers to specify requirement formally and have
method’s correctness checked by an automatic proof system. Deductive
verification approach is quite expressive since the properties that need to be
analyzed are not hard-wired. Instead, they are flexible and are meant to be
guided by user-provided specifications.
The main disadvantage of the deductive approach is that it typically requires
users to understand the targeted software in detail and to manually provide
specifications for each software component or method. However, writing
specifications is typically avoided by developers [117]. This is mostly due to the
high cost and time consuming nature of writing and maintaining up-to-date
specifications. For new and especially legacy systems, it may be too much work
to write functional specifications for every method. Even when a system has
been developed with a set of written specifications, software maintenance efforts
2
may require each affected specification to be refined to reflect its improved
functionality. Automating or semi-automating the specification writing and
maintaining processes would be much desired.
As a solution for automating deductive verification, specification inference is a
technique that uses static analysis to synthesize specifications in order to guarantee
the absence of some kinds of errors [27, 40]. In the context of heap manipulating
programs, specification inference relies on capabilities of shape analysis. Given
a program, shape analysis infers shapes of pointers at program locations that
are required for memory safety. For recursive methods, existing shape analyses
typically require shape annotations on inputs and outputs. The past decade has
seen rapid development of shape analyses in automatic verification systems. Based
on abstraction domains, the analysis on shape can be divided into three major
groups: (1) three-valued Logic (TVLA) [81, 133], (2) graph types [86, 110, 85],
and (3) Separation Logic [9, 20, 57, 73, 130]. TVLA, pioneered by Sagiv, Reps and
Wihhelm, is one of the earliest shape analysis framework which used very generic
and powerful abstractions based on three-valued logic. Graph types together with
pointer assertion logic, invented by Moeller and Schwartzbach, provides a highly
expressive mechanism to specify and verify invariants of complex data structures.
Separation logic, proposed by O’Hearn and Reynolds [115, 116], has been recently
established as an excellent abstraction to reason on heap-manipulating programs.
Shape analysis on separation logic can efficiently handle a wide range of data
structures, from simply-linked data structures (variants of lists and trees [9, 20])
to complex nested data structures [68, 73], and can be extended to handle pure
properties [14, 28, 70, 102, 105, 107, 135].
Although specification language and automatic verification have been well
studied, it is still far from the expectation of the software community. We shall
discuss several challenges that are faced by software verification systems next.
3
1.1 Challenges of Automated Verification
Systems
As shown in the previous section, three main components of a deductive
verification system are specification, verification, and inference. In this section,
we highlight limitations of existing systems over these components towards
completeness and automation. We also outline two key challenges from dealing
with these limitations.
(1) Specifying and Reasoning about Errors.
Although there are numerous specification and verification systems, existing
systems focus on expressing good (safe) scenarios of functional properties and
missing out on potential bad scenarios (errors) since they use the idealistic
assumption that analyzed programs should be safe. However, real world
programs often contain errors. For example, methods of Linux kernel
Application Programming Interface (API) contain both safety and errors. They
typically return outputs with explicit status through numbers, non-negative for
safety and negative for errors. For reasoning on errors, there are static analyses,
like [67, 87], that detect bugs on handling those returns of the Linux kernel-level
and OpenSSL code. In the deductive verification approach, there are verification
systems, like those based on JML [19] and Spec# [8], that attempt to indirectly
specify and verify bad scenarios via exception mechanism. However those
exception-based approaches are neither general nor effective. They currently
handled bad scenarios at the program level that are supported by program
verifiers, but they have not been integrated into entailment procedures. Hence,
they can neither handle sophisticated errors that arise from entailment checks,
nor support error explanation, nor capture dead code, nor handle
non-terminated loops. Designing and implementing a specification and modular
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verification for both good and bad scenarios are important and represent the
first step towards handling real world programs.
(2) Inferring Specification of Heap-Manipulating Programs.
Specification inference of heap-based programs relies on shape analysis.
Current shape analysis mechanisms typically infer specifications for memory
safety with a predetermined set of shape predicates [13, 20, 28, 105]. However,
discovering arbitrary shape abstractions can be rather challenging, as linked data
structures span a wide variety of forms, from singly-linked lists, doubly-linked
lists, circular lists, to tree-like data structures. Furthermore, such abstractions
would also need to cater to various specializations, such as strictly non-empty
structures or segmented structures (e.g. list/tree segments) with outward
pointing references. It is interesting and challenging to develop a mechanism
from first principle that would be capable of inferring complicated shape
specifications, from scratch, directly from heap-manipulating programs. We shall
show how this can be done in this thesis.
1.2 My Thesis
This thesis proposes solutions to overcome the above challenges for automated
deductive verification systems. The thesis has been developed in the context
of a specification and verification system for heap-manipulating programs. Our
technical starting point is a semi-automatic verification system presented in [33,
114] where users provide formal specification for each method with the correctness
of each method certified by an automatic verifier. On dealing with error scenarios,
we propose a novel mechanism towards complete specification and verification. On
automated inference, we first describe a principled shape analysis as a first step
towards the discovery of shape specifications that can be used by our automated
verification system. After that, we present a transformational approach to the
5
inferred shape predicates to obtain concise and usable specifications.
Towards Complete Specification.
We propose a stronger specification language for expressing functional
requirements. Regarding complete specifications, while authors in [123] aim to
express all properties of class invariants in good postconditions, our approach is a
complement to theirs; as we aim to express both good and potential bad scenarios
in preconditions. Furthermore, we shall provide a verification system to support
this new specification mechanism.
In order to specify and verify programs with both good and bad scenarios, we
will introduce new notations at the logic level that are used to distinguish good and
bad program states. We will also provide a calculus to determine program states
during verification. We will show how to integrate the calculus into a separation
logic entailment procedure and extend it to verify heap-manipulating programs
and to support error explanation.
Towards Specification Inference.
We propose a solution for specification inference that can support a wide
range of programs that manipulate complex data structures. Our core proposal
is an entailment procedure with second-order bi-abduction mechanism used
within a modular verification framework that can support shape abstraction
discovery. With second-order feature, we introduce an entailment procedure that
can support unknown predicates using second-order variables as place-holders.
Through bi-abduction, we incorporate capability of abduction and frame
inference into the entailment procedure. The abduction capability helps our
procedure to infer missing information of antecedent in order to either prove or
disprove entailment. The frame inference capability helps the entailment
procedure discover part of antecedent which is not required in consequent of the
current entailment. Furthermore, such frame inference capability is critical to
6
support modular verification systems that are expected to work on a per method
basis.
More concretely, we propose an entailment procedure that can generate
missing information as a set of relational assumptions over the unknown
predicates to either prove (i.e. in inferring specification of good scenarios) or
disprove (i.e. in inferring specification of bad scenarios) proof obligations. We
also propose a modular verifier that accepts the unknown predicates in program
states, generates proof obligations for memory safety, invokes the above
entailment procedure to discharge the obligations, and accumulates the set of
relational assumptions over the unknown predicates. For soundness, the truth of
each set of relational assumptions inferred can guarantee the conformance of
input program to the correctness of its memory safety proof.
Our proposed entailment mechanism works with pointer-based programs to
support inference of shape specifications that ensures memory safety. This yields
a novel approach to shape analysis that works on arbitrary data structures and
provides direct support for recursive procedures. We present a bi-abductive
entailment procedure in separation logic that supports unknown shape
predicates. A key part of our proposal is the capability for generating a set of
relational assumptions over the unknown predicates. These assumptions are then
refined into predicate definitions, by a follow-up predicate derivation and
normalization steps.
Using abduction for inference is not new, as it was deployed in [48, 61] to
generate missing preconditions and in [49] to infer inductive invariants. However,
those proposals were limited to numerical domains. In the shape domain,
bi-abduction was described in [20] for generating missing assumptions in a
modular shape analysis algorithm. However, this algorithm uses a fixed set of
shape predicates based on variants of list data structure. In contrast, we propose
7
second-order variables to support arbitrary shape predicates. Thus, our proposal
propels automated verification systems to a higher level of both automation and
expressiveness. The closest to our proposal is a shape analysis presented in [16].
This analysis proposes a novel way to synthesize inductive predicates by ensuring
both memory safety and termination. Unlike ours, this proposal is based on
cyclic proving mechanism and is currently limited to a simple imperative
language with only loops but not methods.
Transformational Approach to Shape Predicates.
Shape analysis, which naively follows the structure of programs, may produce
predicates that are overtly complex. As an intermediate output of shape
analysis, the inferred set of relational assumptions, is not immediately usable by
automated verification systems. We proceed to derive definition for each
unknown predicate and further normalize these definitions into more concise and
re-usable form. Our design considers soundness and usability. For soundness, the
derivation should distinguish shape predicates in pre-conditions from those in
post-conditions; since the former may be safely strengthened, while the latter
may only be safely weakened. For usability, the normalization should transform
inferred shape predicates into a fragment whose expressiveness is as close as
possible to the capability of existing verification systems.
Our fragment of shape predicates was adapted by those presented in
[33, 76, 114]. This fragment requires all predicate parameters to be involved in
the predicate definition, and each predicate to have a single root pointer. As
such, we shall syntactically detect the violation of the above form and provide a
semantic-based mechanism for its normalization.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes three technical contributions.
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Complete Specification with an Error Calculus.
We present basic mechanisms that could be used to support the verification of
complete specifications. These can be used to uniformly specify and verify both
safe and unsafe execution scenarios. Our key research contributions are:
• We propose a novel calculus, based on a four-point lattice domain, for
verifying safety and/or the absence of must/may errors.
• We extend this calculus to support concise error explanation that gives
priority to must errors.
• We design a specification mechanism for error-based scenarios
• We provide an implementation of the error calculus in separation logic with
support for user-defined predicates and lemmas, so as to support verification
for functional correctness with error validation.
Shape Analysis via Second-Order Bi-Abduction.
We propose a shape analysis via the second-order bi-abductive mechanism. We
make the following contributions.
• We design a novel entailment procedure in separation logic to support
inference via bi-abduction which uses a combination of abduction and
frame inference. This procedure performs abduction to infer missing
information in antecedent that is required for the validity of entailment. It
also infers residual heaps that are not needed for the entailment to hold.
More concretely, this entailment supports unknown shape predicates
(second-order variables) and builds relational assumptions (over the shape
predicates) that are required for the validity of entailment. We also present
two novel features, guarded context and a scheme for instantiation, that
are used to guide this bi-abduction mechanism.
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• We develop a sound and modular shape analysis that is applied on a per
method basis. Most existing shape analyses require global analyses or re-
verification, as they are unable to directly infer memory-safe (or sound)
heap preconditions. For example, bi-abduction in [20] requires its method’s
inferred pre-condition to be re-verified due to the use of over-approximation
on heap pre-condition.
• We provide an implementation of the second-order bi-abduction mechanism
within a modular shape analysis.
Transformational Approach to Shape Predicate.
We present an approach to deriving and normalizing shape predicates from a
set of relational assumptions. Our technical contribution includes:
• We propose a set of sound derivation rules for solving each set of relational
assumptions. This helps to derive suitable definition for each unknown shape
predicate.
• We describe a set of normalization operations to transform predicate
definitions into simplified and re-usable form. Those operations include (1)
detecting and eliminating dangling predicate, (2) detecting and eliminating
useless parameters, (3) predicate splitting, and (4) predicate reuse. The
first operation detects unaccessed pointers through the identification of
dangling predicates. The useless parameter elimination operation removes
unused parameters of predicates. The splitting operation decomposes
complex predicates into multiple simplier predicates. The reuse operation
semantically matches inferred shape predicates with existing predicates.
These operations will help reduce the complexity of predicates and can
enhance the usability for automated verification system.
• We give a preliminary discussion on inferring complete shape specification.
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• We provide an implementation and experiments on shape inference, that
has been systematically integrated into an existing automated verification
system.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 gives background information that forms the basis of our research.
It introduces literature review, specification language, entailment procedure,
and a motivating example.
• Chapter 3 presents a novel specification mechanism that forms the basis for
a complete verification system. The main contribution of this chapter is
a lattice domain with four status values that are combined with program
states.
• Chapter 4 proposes a mechanism for shape analysis. The main contribution
of this chapter is a novel second-order bi-abductive entailment procedure of
separation logic. This entailment takes antecedent and consequent as inputs
and produces residues states and a set of relational assumptions.
• Derivation and normalization approaches to shape predicates are introduced
in Chapter 5. The main contribution of this chapter are sets of rules and an
algorithm to derive sound but concise and usable shape predicates.
• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of our research achievements





First, we review several known automatic verification systems. After that, we
describe a specification language and entailment procedure used in this thesis.
Finally, we illustrate our contributions through a motivating example.
2.1 Existing Verification System
2.1.1 Specification Language
Formal specification languages at the method level have been well studied. There
are several well known specification systems, such as Java Modeling Language
(JML) [19], Spec# [8], Larch/C++ [93], Alloy [79], and Vienna Development
Method (VDM) [4, 82]. Those specification systems provide notations for
formally specifying behaviours and interfaces of methods. Their syntax can
express safety scenarios with normal and exception-oriented
pre-condition/post-condition, object-oriented features (modifiers, visibility,
inheritance), frame and case specifications. In the following, we discuss in detail
JML [19] and Spec# [8] specification systems.
JML.
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JML [19] is a specification language used to specify interfaces and behaviors
of Java programs. JML is a comprehensive modelling language. It provides
notations for standard pre- and post-conditions, frame conditions (with
Assignable clause), both normal execution (with normal behavior clause) and
abnormal execution (with exceptional behavior clause and ensure false), and
multiple specification cases. However, exceptions are not technically the same as
errors since the former may be handled but not the latter. Besides, JML provides
pure method that helps to leverage on its underlying programming language.
While this mechanism is powerful, it is not totally side-effect free since new heap
nodes may be allocated by such pure functions. We note that such pure methods
are not classified as pure formula in the domain of separation logic.
Spec#.
Spec# [8] is a specification language that is built on top of the Boogie
automatic program verifier. Spec# specification language provides notations to
specify standard pre- and post-conditions, exceptions and constraints on data
fields of objects for C# programs. In particular, Spec# presents a hierarchical
design on exceptional specifications towards modular reasoning. For example,
exceptional specifications are categorized according to preconditions proving
(client failures) and postconditions proving (provider failures). Like JML, it also
provides programmers with a mechanism to declare classes of exceptions as
either checked or unchecked. Spec# supports the otherwise keyword to capture
the rest of input domain [6]. However, this notation was mainly used to denote
unchecked exceptions (rather than complete preconditions).
2.1.2 Automatic Verification System
Recently, research in verification has achieved several important milestones.
Verification systems can automatically verify large and real-world source code,
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such as Linux kernel (Forester [57, 73]), and Windows drivers (Slayer [9, 13]).
They can also support various programming languages (C [33, 36], Java [29] and
C# [40]), handle a large range of input programs (such as complex data
structures [13, 33], and concurrency - VCC [36]), and targeted at a large range of
defects (type error [101], null dereference [13, 33, 34, 74], functional correctness
violation [13, 33, 96], and deadlocks [88] without running the program).
In the following, we discuss three verification systems that are capable of
reasoning about heap-based programs.
Dafny.
Dafny [99] is an automatic program verification that can be used to verify
functional correctness of heap-manipulating programs. It includes a specification
language which is based on JML [19] and Spec# [8], and a program verifier which
supports pointer-based programs. The specification language consists of standard
pre- and post-conditions, (explicit) framing constructs and terminating metrics.
Especially, Dafny specification language supports ”ghost” mathematical functions
(like pure methods in JML and Spec#). These functions use the same syntax
as its programming language and thus can be deployed for both verification and
program code. Furthermore, the functions can be used to construct concise and
modular pre-, post-conditions and assertions.
Dafny follows the approach of modular verification and relies on Boogie system
[7] to verify programs. It does this even to establish proof of lemma which is
encoded as a kind of method verification. Dafny transforms input program into
the Boogie intermediate verification language. The soundness of Dafny verifier
is reduced to the soundness of the Boogie verification system. Dafty system can
be used to specify and verify some challenging algorithms, including Schorr-Waite
algorithm [99].
Dafny system is still actively being developed and is a good tool for ensuring
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reliable software. Recently, the system has been extended with two important
and challenging features: induction [97] and co-induction [98]. These new features
enhance the expressiveness of Dafny verification system.
Smallfoot.
Smallfoot [12] is one of the first verification system based on separation logic.
It was incrementally developed based on separation logic [115] with strong
semantic foundations [10, 11, 20, 25] and an evolution of practical tools
[9, 12, 13, 23, 24, 50, 138]. Smallfoot verification system consists of three key
components: specification language, proof obligation generation and decision
procedure. Specification language of Smallfoot is based on a practical and
decidable fragment of separation logic with spatial conjunction predicate (∗),
points-to predicate ( 7→), and list segment predicate [10]. The decision procedure
of Smallfoot has been proven to be both sound and complete, and can infer
residual heap of entailment check [12]. Smallfoot analyses program based on
symbolic execution paradigm and generates proof obligations for modular
reasoning that is potentially scalable [11].
For better automation, Smallfoot was latter extended with some techniques
on shape analysis over the above fragment [50]. This shape analysis infers
heap-based invariants on program pointers that guarantee the absence of
memory errors. The same shape analysis was further extended to the abstract
domain with pointer arithmetic [23]. Later, its abstraction operation was
improved to provide better scalability [9, 138]. Finally, to fully support modular
shape analysis, it was integrated with abduction to obtain a combined
mechanism, called bi-abduction [20]. The scalability of this technique was
confirmed by the experimental results in [57]. Recently, there have been several
important improvements to this fragment. For example, decision procedure via
graph technique [38, 69], decision procedure via superposition [118, 119], and
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GRASS reduction [120].
Smallfoot is not only an excellent verification platform for reasoning with
complex heap-based programs, as it has pioneered a new research direction on
the use of separation logic.
HIP/SLEEK.
HIP/SLEEK [33, 114] is a deductive verification system in separation logic.
It consists of a specification language, the entailment procedure SLEEK and the
modular verifier HIP.
HIP/SLEEK introduced an expressive specification language. This is one of
the first automated verification system that directly reasons with user-defined
predicates in separation logic. This system also supported separation logic
reasoning with non-heap pure domains; HIP/SLEEK proposed a fragment of
separation logic that combined standard heap features with pure constraints on
Presburger arithmetic, polynomial real arithmetic, and monadic bag/set
domains. This combined domain was beyond the (dis)equality domains used by
prior work [12, 118]. The specification language was enhanced (i) to be more
complete with multiple pre- and post-conditions [30], and (ii) to be even more
concise, precise and efficient with case specification [60] and immutability
annotation [44].
SLEEK is one of the first entailment proving procedures for separation logic
with frame inference capability. For entailment checking of inductive shape
predicates, SLEEK introduced a procedure based on unfolding and folding
operations. 1 The entailment check proves that (i) all matching models of the
antecedent would be subsumed by models of the consequent; and (ii) irrelevant
part of the antecedent will be inferred as residual frame. Firstly, the matching of
heap part is performed until heap in the consequent is empty. After that, the
1More detail about SLEEK entailment procedure will presented in section 2.3.
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entailment in separation logic is reduced (or approximated) to a sound
implication in pure logic. Finally, the implication of the pure part is checked
semantically through external SMT solvers and theorem provers. For efficiency, a
technique for pruning unfeasible disjuncts to enhance the unfolding on inductive
predicates was proposed [32].
SLEEK was also one of the first system to make extensible use of lemma
mechanism [113], a semi-automatic mechanism for induction proving in
separation logic. This mechanism allows users to declare lemmas manually and
SLEEK will apply those lemmas automatically during proof search. Lemmas
may be used to relate abstractions, i.e. relate different predicates so as to
provide more comprehensive reasoning. These lemmas are also considered as
induction assumptions and are automatically deployed to support inductive
proofs. The automation of induction proving, without explicitly supplied
lemmas, was later proposed through the cyclic proving mechanism [17].
HIP is a modular verifier. It transforms imperative program based on
symbolic execution and automatically generates sound proof obligations for
checking correctness of the input program against user-provided specifications.
In turn, those obligations are discharged by the SLEEK entailment procedure.
Beside a core imperative language [114], HIP was also extended to object
oriented language [31].
Recently, the fragment of separation logic with user-defined predicates has
been the focus of active research. There are many new emerging studies, both
theorically and practically, on the logic fragment, including issue of completeness
of the fragment [134], techniques based on cyclic proof [17, 18], DRYAD [126],
GRASS approach [120, 121, 122], and techniques based on automata [76, 77].
This thesis aims to enhance the HIP/SLEEK system to an automated
verification system for complete specification. First, HIP/SLEEK system will be
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Disj. formula Φ ::= ∆ | Φ1 ∨ Φ2
Formula ∆ ::= ∃v¯·(κ∧π)
Spatial formula κ ::= emp | x 7→c(fi : vi) | P(v¯) | κ1∗κ2
Pure formula π ::= b | α | i | ϕ | ¬α | π1∧π2
Boolean formula b ::= true | false | v | b1=b2
Ptr (Dis)Equality α ::= v1=v2 | v=NULL | v1 6=v2 | v 6=NULL
Linear arithmetic i ::= a1=a2 | a1≤a2
a ::= kint | v | kint×a | a1+a2 | −a
| max(a1,a2) | min(a1,a2)
Bag constraint ϕ ::= v∈B | B1=B2 | B1⊏B2
B ::= B1⊔B2 | B1⊓B2 | B1−B2 | {} | {v}
P ∈ Pred c ∈ Node fi ∈ Fields v, vi, x, y ∈ Var v¯ ≡ v1. . .vn
Figure 2-1: Fragment of Separation Logic
supported with a complete specification mechanism to capture both good and
bad scenarios (see [91] and Chapter 3). After that the system will be empowered
with second-order bi-abduction for heap-based specification inference (see [90],
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).
2.2 Specification Language
Syntax. Our specification language is based on separation logic [78, 127]. We
restrict our interest to a practical fragment of separation logic with spatial
conjunction operator (∗), points-to predicate ( 7→), and user-defined predicate
[114]. Currently, our system does not support the separating implication
operator (−∗) since it is based on a forward reasoning system which does not
usually require this operator. Note that −∗ has been mainly used to express the
weakest preconditions for backward reasoning systems [78, 115]. We have thus
omitted −∗ for simplicity.
The fragment of separation logic used in this thesis is presented in Figure
2-1. A formula (symbolic heap) ∆ consists of spatial formula and pure formula.
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Separation logic introduces two core features: spatial conjunction (∗) predicate to
express two disjoint heap regions; points-to ( 7→) predicate to express a heap with
one memory cell. The points-to predicate x 7→c(fi : vi) asserts that x points to
an object of data type c with fields fi and their downstream pointers vi. Each C
data structure has a corresponding points-to predicate that expresses an allocated
object. Furthermore, the logic also supports user-defined predicates P(v¯) which
denotes a set of (unbounded) objects. Those predicates help to concisely express
complex heap-based data structures. Pure formula is in the form of first-order
logic of a combination of (dis)equality α (on pointers), linear arithmetic i and bag
ϕ domains. Note that v1 6= v2 and v 6= NULL are just short forms for ¬(v1 = v2)
and ¬(v = NULL), respectively. To express different scenarios for shape predicates,
the fragment supports disjunction Φ over formulas.
Semantics Concrete heap models assume a fixed finite collection Node, a fixed
finite collection Fields , a disjoint set Loc of locations (heap addresses), a set of
non-address values Val , with NULL ∈ Val and Val ∩ Loc = ∅. With this, we define:
Heaps
def
= Loc⇀fin(Node → Fields → Val ∪ Loc)}
Stacks
def
= Var → Val ∪ Loc
where dom(f) returns the domain of function f . e is the empty heap that is
undefined everywhere.
In our system, pure domains include integer domain (Ints), bag of Val (2Val),
and boolean. The evaluation for pure expressions are determined by valuations as
follows:
s(a) ∈ Ints s(B) ∈ 2Val s(b) ∈ {true , false }
The semantics is given by a forcing relation: s, h |= Φ that forces the stack
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s and heap h to satisfy the constraint Φ where h ∈ Heaps, s ∈ Stacks, and Φ is a
separation logic formula.
The semantics is presented as in Figure 2-2.
s |= π1∧π2 iff s |= π1 and s |= π2
s |= v1⊘v2 iff |= s(v1) ⊘ s(v2), where ⊘ ∈ {=, 6=}
s |= a1⊘a2 iff |= s(a1) ⊘ s(a2), where ⊘ ∈ {=,≤}
s |= B1⊘B2 iff |= s(B1) ⊘ s(B2), where ⊘ ∈ {∈,=,⊏,⊔,⊓,−}
s, h |= emp iff h = e
s, h |= v 7→c(fi : vi) iff l=s(v), dom(h)={l → r} and r(c, fi)=s(vi)
s, h |= p(v¯) iff (s(v¯), h) ∈ 〚p(v¯)〛
s, h |= κ1 ∗ κ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1#h2 and h=h1·h2 and
s, h1 |= κ1 and s, h2 |= κ2
s, h |= true iff always
s, h |= false iff never
s, h |= ∃v1, ..., vn·(κ∧π) iff ∃α1...αn · s(v1 7→α1∗...∗vn 7→αn), h |= κ
and s(v1 7→α1∗...∗vn 7→αn) |= π
s, h |= ¬Φ iff s, h 2 Φ
s, h |= Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff s, h |= Φ1 or s, h |= Φ2
Figure 2-2: Semantics of Specification Language
As pure formula is independent from heap, semantics of pure formula only
depends on stack valuations. The model relation for pure formula s |= π denotes
that the formula π evaluates to true in s.
Note that h1#h2 denotes that heaps h1 and h2 are disjoint, i.e. dom(h1) ∩
dom(h2) = ∅; h1 · h2 denotes the union of two disjoint heaps. emp asserts that h
is empty. With points-to predicate v 7→c(fi : vi), h is a singleton heap function.
Set of models of a shape predicate p(v¯) is interpreted as its least fixpoint set [18].
2.2.1 User-Defined Predicate




(∃w¯i · ∆i) inv: π;
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where
• P is predicate name.
• v¯ is a set of formal parameters including pointers to heap and pure
parameters for expressing structural properties (size, bag of values).
•
∨n
i=1 ∃w¯i · ∆i = (∃w¯1 · ∆1) ∨ ... ∨ (∃w¯n · ∆n) is a definition. ∃w¯i · ∆i (i ∈
1...n) is a branch of the disjunction.
• π is predicate invariant. π expresses superset of all possible models of P via
a pure constraints on stack.
Predicate invariants are over-approximation and are used in checking
entailment among formulas. Users can choose not to supply predicate invariants
as our systems can infer those automatically too.
Branches containing (mutually) recursive user-defined predicates are called
recursive branches. Otherwise, they are base branches.





(∃w¯i · ri1 7→c(v¯i1) ∗...∗ rik 7→c(v¯ik) ∗ P1(w¯i1) ∗...∗ Pj(w¯ij) ∧ πi) inv: π;
A parameter r ∈ v¯ is a root if for all i from 1 to n, one of following four conditions
holds:
• r points-to an allocated heap: r ∈ {ri1, ..., rik}.
• r equals to NULL: πi contains r=NULL formula.
• r equals to another parameter: πi contains r=s formula, where s ∈ v¯.
• r is a root parameter of another shape predicate: ∃m ∈ 1...k · r ∈ w¯im and r
is a root pointer of the predicate Pm.
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For example, we define the lsegn predicate to describe a list segment with
length property as follows:
data c1 { c1 next; }// data structure declaration
pred lsegn(root, s, n) ≡ emp ∧ root=s ∧ n=0
∨ ∃ q,n1 · root7→c1(q)∗lsegn(q,s,n1)∧n1=n−1 ∧ root6=s
inv: n≥0;
The first parameter of lsegn is a root parameter.
Our specification language is expressive enough to describe complex data
structures, e.g. binary search trees, balance trees [114], trees with parent pointer
and tree with linked leaves [76, 90]. For example, we define balance trees as
follows:
data c2 { c2 left; c2 right; }// data structure declaration
pred avln(root,n,h) ≡ emp ∧ root=NULL ∧ n=0 ∧ h=0
∨ ∃ l,r,n1,n2,h1,h2 · root7→c2(l,r)∗avln(l,n1,h1)∗avln(r,n2,h2)∧
n=n1+n2+1∧h=1+max(h1,h2)∧−1≤h1−h2≤1
inv: n≥0 ∧ h≥0;
Note: It is required that mutually recursive predicates have at least one base
branch each. Reasoning on mutually recursive predicates without any base
branch required co-inductive proofs [98], which is beyond scope of this thesis.
For example, our current system cannot handle the following infinite predicate:
I(x) ≡ ∃ q · x 7→node( , q)∗I(q)
Unfolding User-Defined Predicate. The function unfold(∆, P, t¯) unfolds once
the first user-defined predicate P with actual parameter t¯ of the formula ∆. The
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step is formalized as follows:










unfold(∃w¯0 · P(t¯)∗κ0∧π0, P, t¯)❀
∨n
i=1(∃w¯0 ∪ w¯′i · κ0 ∗ κ′′i∧π0∧π′′i )
In the first line, the function looks up the definition of P, refreshes the existential
quantifiers. In the second line, formal parameters are substituted by the
corresponding actual arguments. Finally, substituted definition is combined (and
normalized) with residual formula as shown in the RHS of ❀.
Implicit Heap Constraints. Our language does not allow dereference pointers
on pure constraints, e.g. x.p 6= NULL, lsegn(x, NULL, n)∧x.p 6= NULL. This kind of
pure constraints implicitly captures constraints on heaps. We require the explicit
form, e.g. x 7→c1(p) ∧ p 6= NULL, x 7→c1(p)∗lsegn(p, NULL, n1)∧p 6= NULL∧n1=n−1,
which can mostly be obtained by unfolding relevant predicates.
2.2.2 User-Defined Lemma.
Nguyen et. al. [113] proposed a mechanism that allows users to interact with the
entailment procedure. Users can provide lemmas to express predicates
relationships and a procedure automatically applies those lemmas as alternative
predicate unfolding, where possible. Moreover, this is done as a proof search.
Lemma can be defined as either weakening or strengthening as follows:
Lemma ::= Weakening Lemma | Strengthening Lemma
Weakening Lemma ::= κ1∧π1 → ∃w∗·κ2∧π2
Strengthening Lemma ::= κ1∧π1 ← ∃w∗·κ2∧π2
For weakening lemma, it requires that κ1∧π1 must contain a user-defined
predicate with an explicit root pointer. Similarly for strengthening lemma, it
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requires that κ2∧π2 must contain a user-defined predicate with an explicit root
pointer.
For instance, user can define the lemma to express a relationship between list
segment lseg and acyclic list lls, as follows:
lemma lseg(root,p,n)∧p=NULL↔ lls(root,n)
where the definition of the acyclic list lls
pred lls(root,n) ≡ root=NULL∧n=0
∨ ∃ q, n1 · root7→c1(q)∗lls(q,n1)∧n1=n−1
(↔ is a shorthand of both weakening and strengthening lemmas.)
Nguyen et. al. [113] also proposed an approach to proving user-defined lemmas.
That can be encoded as a lemma proving step, named lemma check. For example,
to denote the proving of the above lemma, we capture it as follows:
lemma check lseg(root,p,n)∧p=NULL↔ lls(root,n)
2.3 Entailment Procedure of Separation Logic.
2.3.1 Overview
There are large number of proposals on entailment procedures for separation
logic. We shall now highlight some state-of-the-art procedures in the literature.
Smallfoot [11] is the first practical entailment procedure for separation logic.
This solver was customised to work with variants of linked list, supports frame
inference, but not induction proving. Some optimization on segment feature for
the fragment of Smallfoot [11] was presented in [38] (using graph technique),
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[118] (using superposition calculus), and [111] (using SMT reduction). However,
those proposals did not show how to infer frame (as in [11]) and thus cannot
work with modular verification mechanism for heap-manipulating programs.
More specially, GRASS-based decision procedures support all shape predicates
that can be reduced to some special predicates in GRASS logic, such as SLLB
for list segment [120], and GRIT for tree data structures [121]. This reduction
approach is promising; as it can check both valid and invalid entailment, support
frame inference, abduction and combination of shape and pure properties.
However, this approach has not supported induction proving and currently works
with just a predefined set of shape predicates.
To handle the combination of heap and pure domains, DRYAD [103, 126] and
GRASS approaches [122] make use of the combination capability of SMT-solvers
(i.e. Z3 [45]). Also SLEEK [114] employs proof slicing technique [92].
For more expressive predicates, the decision procedures presented in [77, 114,
126] make a good effort to enhance the power of separation logic solvers. Solvers
presented in [114, 126] support a combination with the pure domains, but they are
not complete. Recently, Iosif et. al. [76] presented a neat proposal for a decidable
fragment of separation logic with user-defined predicates. They also provided an
implementation together with a sound and complete decision procedure in [77]. It
is interesting to see how further this procedure can be extended to handle pure
constraints and inductive proving in future.
The cyclic prover [17] showed how to perform automatic induction for the
entailment procedure of separation logic. This prover can support fairly expressive
shape predicates in separation logic. Unfortunately, this technique has supported
neither pure constraints, nor show how frame inference can be done. Hence, cyclic
technique is not applicable for general-purpose program verification.
In the following, we discuss in detail SLEEK entailment procedure that is used
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ρ=[v¯/w¯] πeq = freeEQ(ρ, V )
κ1∧π1∧πeq ⊢κ∗r 7→c(v¯)V−w¯ ∆2[v¯/w¯]❀ΦR
r 7→c(v¯)∗κ1∧π1 ⊢κV r′ 7→c(w¯)∗∆2❀ΦR
[ENT−PRED−MATCH]
π1 =⇒ r=r′
ρ=[v¯/w¯] πeq = freeEQ(ρ, V )
κ1∧π1∧πeq ⊢κ∗P({r,v¯})V−w¯ ∆2[v¯/w¯]❀ΦR
P({r, v¯})∗κ1∧π1 ⊢κV P({r′,w¯})∗∆2❀ΦR
[ENT−UNFOLD]
∆u1 ∨ ... ∨∆un = unfold(P(v¯)∗∆1, P, v¯)










r) ∆r∧πa⊢κrV (κ2∧π2∧πc) ∗Φ







∃v ·∆1 ⊢κV ∆2❀ΦR
[ENT−RHS−EX]
∆1 ⊢κV ∪{w} (∆2[w/v])❀∆i
ΦR=∃ w ·∆i
∆1 ⊢κV (∃ v ·∆2)❀ΦR
Figure 2-3: Basic Inference Rules for Entailment Checking
SLEEK is an entailment procedure of separation logic that supports user-
defined inductive shape predicates and frame inference.
As separation logic is a sub-structural logic, we have to account for heap
memory as a resource. Thus, entailment in separation logic is typically supported
with a frame inference capability [33, 116], similar to the following format:
Φ1 ⊢ Φ2 ❀ Φ3
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whereby antecedent Φ1 entails Φ2 with a residue frame captured by Φ3.
Logically, the above entailment is equivalent to Φ1 =⇒ Φ2∗Φ3 where Φ3 may
contain existential variables that have been instantiated and pure formula that
were already established in Φ1.
For each entailment check, our procedure proves that (i) all matching models
of the antecedent would be subsumed by models of the consequent; (ii) irrelevant
part of the antecedent will be inferred as residual frame. Firstly, the matching of
heap part is performed until heap in the consequent is empty ([ENT−∗−MATCH],
[ENT−UNFOLD], [ENT−FOLD] inference rules). After that, the implication of the
pure part is checked semantically through external SMT solvers and theorem
provers ([ENT−XPURE] inference rule). The inference rules are presented in
Figure 2-3. Typically, an entailment is performed as follows.
• Matching. This matches up identified heaps of LHS and RHS. Starting
from identified root pointers, the procedure keeps matching all their
reachable heaps with both points-to (with [ENT−PTO−MATCH] rule) and
user-defined predicate matching (with [ENT−PRED−MATCH] rule). The
former (latter) matches two points-to (user-defined, resp.) predicates in
antecedent and consequent if they have identified root and stores matched
points-to predicates in a footprint heap. After that, it unifies the
corresponding fields of matched roots by using auxiliary function
freeEQ(ρ, V ): freeEQ([ui/vi]
n
i=1, V ) =
∧n
i=1{ui = vi | vi /∈ V }.
• Unfolding-Folding. This derives alternative heap chains, connected
points-to or user-defined predicates. When the procedure is unable to make
any progress on matching, it will look up alternative chains for matching
through unfolding heap predicates. For termination, SLEEK restricts
user-defined predicates to within a well-founded form. For unfolding in the
antecedent ([ENT−UNFOLD] rule), the unfolding performs a case split in the
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proof. For unfolding in the consequent ([ENT−FOLD] rule), instead of
unfolding the RHS and doing proof search over case split, SLEEK performs
folding in the LHS. This helps instantiate existential parameters for better
completeness. The unfold operator is defined in section 2.2. The fold
operation is defined next.
• Over-approximate Reduction. We reduce entailment checking on
separation logic to implication checking on first-order logic. When the
consequent becomes an empty heap, the procedure performs a sound
reduction to transform the entailment to an implication on first-order logic,
i.e. πa =⇒ πc. Technically, to perform such implication checking, the
following satisfiability check is performed: sat(πa ∧ ¬(πc)). If it returns
unsat, the result of the implication is valid; otherwise, the result of the
implication is unknown.
Folding User-Defined Predicate. The formalism of the fold function on
predicate P is as follows:
P(v¯)≡∨ni=1(∃w¯i · κi∧πi) ρ0=[t¯/v¯]
κ∧π ⊢κ′t¯
∨n
i=1(∃w¯i · κi∧πi)[ρ0] ❀ {∆i, κi, Vi, πi}ni=1 Wi=Vi−t¯
foldκ
′
(κ∧π, P, t¯)❀ {∆i, κi, ∃Wi · πi}ni=1
First it looks up suitable branches of the predicate P via entailment checks.
These checks require a special revision of the entailment procedure which returns
three more components: consumed heap nodes (κi), existential variables used (Vi),
and final consequent πi.
When folding a user-defined predicate P(v¯), pure constraints related to v¯ are
important. The constraints related to parameters of v¯ that are free will be
moved to LHS of the entailment as it can help support instantiation of
existential variables. Otherwise, they are kept in the RHS. This processing of
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2.2.4 lsegn(q2, NULL, n2)∧n>0∧p=q3∧n2=n−1 ∧ q3=v
⊢κ2
∅
emp❀ (∆2, valid) EMP
2.2.3 lsegn(q2, NULL, n2) ∧ n>0 ∧ p=q3 ∧ n2=n−1 ∧ q3=v ⊢κ2∅ emp MATCH
2.2.2 p 7→c1(q2)∗lsegn(q2, NULL, n2) ∧ n>0 ∧ p=q3 ∧ n2=n− 1
⊢κ1
∅
q3 7→c1(v)❀ (∆3, valid) RHS−EX
2.2.1 p 7→c1(q2)∗lsegn(q2, NULL, n2) ∧ n>0 ∧ p=q ∧ n1=n− 1
⊢κ1
∅
∃q · (q 7→c1(v)) LHS−EX
2.2 ∃q1, n1 · p 7→c1(q1)∗lsegn(q1, NULL, n1) ∧ n>0 ∧ p=q ∧ n1=n− 1
⊢κ1
∅
∃q · (q 7→c1(v)) UNFOLD(Ind)
2.1.1. false ⊢κ1
∅
∃q·(q 7→c1(v))❀ (∆1, valid) EMP
2.1 p = NULL ∧ n>0 ∧ p=q ∧ n=0 ⊢κ1
∅
∃q · (q 7→c1(v)) UNFOLD(Base)
1 lsegn(p, NULL, n)∧n>0∧p=q ⊢κ1
∅
∃q · (q 7→c1(v)) MATCH
0 x 7→c1(p)∗lsegn(p, NULL, n)∧n>0 ⊢emp∅ ∃q·(x 7→c1(q)∗q 7→c1(v))
❀ (∆1 ∨∆3, valid)
Figure 2-4: SLEEK Entailment Procedure: An Example.
pure constraints was implemented through the function split [33].
Example. We illustrate the entailment procedure through the example shown
in Figure 2-4. In the proof, the LHS of the entailment has been performed
bottom-up while the result in RHS is computed top-down. For simplicity, we
discard some intermediate RHS, and write UNFOLD instead of [ENT−UNFOLD] to
annotate rule applied at each step. The steps from 2.1* correspond to base case
of the unfolding over predicate lsegn(p, NULL, n). The steps from 2.2*
correspond to the inductive case of the unfolding over predicate
lsegn(p, NULL, n). The footprints accumulated during this checking are
κ1=x 7→c1(p), and κ2=κ1 ∗ q 7→c1(NULL). The residual heap in two cases of the
unfolding is: ∆1=false , ∆2=lsegn(q1, NULL, n2)∧n>0∧p=q∧n2=n−1, and
∆3 = ∃q ·∆2.
2.4 A Motivating Example
We present a motivating example to highlight our contributions. We employ the
fragment of separation logic in section 2.2 to express heap abstraction.
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1. struc node { struc node ∗next };




6. return get last(x->next);
7. }
8. }
Figure 2-5: Motivating Example: Code of get last Method.
We illustrate our proposal through the get last method presented in Figure
2-5. The get last example is to get the last element of a singly-linked list x.
2.4.1 Complete Specification with an Error Calculus
Specification is used to describe the relation of input and output in a program. The
get last method has two return points at lines 4, and 6. Both the returns describe
explicit normal execution. Besides, the program contains an implicit assumption
at the memory dereference on the pointer x at line 3. That is, for memory safety,
the input linked list x must have at least one element. Otherwise, the program
raises a runtime error as an abnormal execution.
We classify the former (normal) execution as good scenarios and the latter
(abnormal) execution as bad scenarios. We expect that users would like to
capture both these scenarios in the same specification and be able to verify its
implementation against the expected specification. We would like to emphasize
that existing specification approaches focus on only specifying good scenarios of
functional properties and typically ignore bad scenarios. For example, existing
separation logic approaches would declare abstraction for the data structure node
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and the linked list lseg, as follows:
data node { node next; }// data structure declaration
pred lseg(root,s) ≡ (emp ∧ root=s)
∨ (∃ q · root7→node(q)∗lseg(q,s) ∧ root6=s);
and capture the functional specification of the get last program as:
requires lseg(x,NULL) ∧ x 6=NULL
ensures lseg(x,last) ∗last 7→node(NULL) ∧ res=last ∧ x 6=NULL;
(1)
where res is a reserved variable to denote the result of the method.
For bad scenarios, the basis of our proposal is the identification of a lattice
domain with four points (that are partially ordered) and a calculus, called error
calculus. While the four-point domain is used to capture the status of each program
state, the calculus is meant to combine and capture program states during symbolic
execution. The four points that are used to characterize program status are as
follows:
• ⊥: denotes dead code or non-terminated loops of execution.
•
√
: denotes normal program execution.
• ℧: denotes expected abnormal execution.
• ⊤: denotes unknown execution. That is, it could either be ⊥, or √ or ℧.
As such, to capture the requirement on the erroneous execution of the get last
method, the user can provide the following specification:
requires x=NULL ensures (true ) ℧;
To express a complete specification for both good and bad scenarios, we
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integrate the four-point status into the structured specification presented in [60].
For example, the specification of the get last can be constructed as in Figure
2-6.
case {
x=NULL → ensures (true ) ℧;
x 6=NULL →
requires lseg(x,NULL)
ensures lseg(x,last) ∗last 7→node(NULL) ∧ res=last √;
}
(2)
Figure 2-6: Complete Specification of get last Method.
Moreover we also propose a verification mechanism to support this complete
specification language. The proposal provides an entailment procedure on pure
logic to determine the status of each implication. This is being also tightly
integrated into a separation logic entailment procedure and a forward symbolic
reasoning mechanism based on a set of Hoare triple rules.
2.4.2 Shape Analysis via Second-Order Bi-Abduction
A main disadvantage of deductive verification systems is the need for manually
writing methods’ specification. To overcome this, we will highlight specification
inference in the next two subsections. In the context of pointer-based programs,
we propose the second-order bi-abduction for shape analysis. That analysis will
help to infer shape specifications for error-free programs.
Current shape analysis mechanisms [13, 20, 57] using list segment abstraction
are unable to capture the pre-condition for the get last method under which
memory-safe operation could be carried out. In this thesis, we propose a shape
synthesis to infer shape specification that guarantees memory safety. In the
context of the get last method, our shape analysis would introduce the
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following unknown predicates as input:
requires H(x) ensures G(x, res);
whereby res is a reserved keyword to represent the return value of the method.
Our shape analysis shall be supported by a separation logic verifier that is
able to collect and solve the proof obligations involving the unknown predicates
that must hold in order to guarantee memory safety. The analysis can infer the
A1. H(x) ⇒ x 7→node(q)∗U(q)
A2. U(q)∧q 6=NULL ⇒ H(q)
A3. x 7→node(q)∗G(q, res)∧q 6=NULL ⇒ G(x, res)
A4. x 7→node(q)∗U(q)∧q=NULL∧res=x ⇒ G(x, res)
Figure 2-7: Result of the Shape Analysis on get last Method.
set of four relational assumptions (in separation logic) form as in Figure 2-7;
where U is new unknown predicate that was introduced during the synthesis.
These four assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4 have been inferred while the proposed
second-order bi-abductive entailment procedure discharges the proof obligations
generated for safety. More concretely, A1 has been generated at right before line
3 to ensure absence of null-dereference at line 3; A2 has been generated right
after return statement at line 4 to ensure postcondition; A3 has been generated
right before line 6 to meet pre-condition of the function call at line 6; and A4 has
been generated right after return statement at line 6 to ensure postcondition.
This set of assumptions indirectly expresses the expected shape abstraction of
predicates. Its validity guarantees the safety of the get last program.
The use of the separation logic formalism facilitates abstractions through
inductive shape predicates expressed using separation logic formulas.
Furthermore we may leverage on a bi-abduction mechanism for pure properties
[135] to refine the resulting shape predicates with other relevant properties of
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interests.
2.4.3 Transformational Approach to Shape Predicates
Derivation. The set of assumptions above is not easily understood by
programmers. For example, it is non-trivial to figure that U is an acylic list, H
and G are full lists with at least one element and the second parameter of the
predicate G points to the last element. From the output of the shape analysis
presented in Figure 2-7, we shall now derive definition for each shape predicate.
The results are as follows:
H(x) ≡ x 7→node(q)∗U(q)
U(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→node(q)∗U(q)
G(x,res) ≡ x 7→node(NULL) ∧ res=x ∨ x 7→node(q)∗G(q,res)
Using them, the specification for the get last method can now be refined to:
requires x 7→node(q)∗U(q) ensures G(x, res) (3)
Specification (3) and predicate definitions inferred in this section are quite
precise, but are still less understandable than the user-supplied specification (1)
given in section 2.4.1. Such inferred specification and shape predicates would be
subjected to a normalization phase, as described next.
Normalization. To illustrate the important of the normalization, consider the
method append in Figure 2-8. This method allocates a new node and appends
it at the end of the input list. It employs the method get last to return the
last element. Assume that specification of the method get last at (3). Let us
examine a modular verification (like [13, 114, 90]) on the method append with
given specification at lines 2, 3 in Figure 2-8. At line 9, in order to ensure memory
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1. struc node∗ append (struc node∗ x)
2. requires lseg(x,NULL)
3. ensures ∃p · lseg(x,p) ∗p 7→node(NULL)
4. {
5. struc node∗tmp = (struc node∗) malloc(sizeof(struc node));
6. tmp->next = NULL;
7. if (x ! = NULL) {
8. struc node∗ last = get last(x);
/∗ α=G(x, last) ∗/
9. last->next=tmp;//fail here




Figure 2-8: Code of append Method.
safety of the pointer dereference, the state α must imply that the pointer last be
allocated. This means the following entailment must hold:
G(x, last) ⊢ ∃q · last 7→node(q) (4)
with G being the predicate inferred in the previous section. We believe that such
entailment is beyond the capability of existing entailment procedures in
separation logic. To overcome this problem, one solution is to transform the
definition of the predicate G such that the G explicitly expresses that pointer last
as a cutpoint that is allocated. In the following, we implement that solution
through a transformation.
First, we present a normal form which is based on the fragment of separation
logic with inductive predicates [76]. This form syntactically restricts to ensure
that each predicate describes heap region that is accessible via one root pointer.
Shape predicates with zero or more root pointers could be transformed into this
normalized form. Second, we present a semantic transformation via a lemma
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mechanism. We extend the lemma mechanism in [113] to support lemma synthesis:
lemma infer [U¯] LHS → RHS
lemma infer [U¯] LHS ← RHS
where [U¯] is a set of unknown shape predicates that are to be inferred. To infer
a lemma, we first make an assumption on the validity of the lemma. To support
inductive proof, this lemma itself would be considered as induction hypothesis.
After that, we make use of second-order bi-abductive mechanism to infer a set
of constraints that guarantee the validity of the entailment checks. Lastly, we
recursively invoke the transformation to derive shape predicate definition.
Our normalization mechanism comprises a set of three operations called:
useless parameter elimination, predicate splitting, and predicate reuse. We
illustrate these operations (predicate splitting, useless parameter elimination and
predicate reuse) through the normalization of the predicate G.
A root parameter is a parameter that is allocated or is equal to NULL in every
branch of predicate definition. (See section 2.2 for a formal definition of root
parameter). In the inferred definition of G, since two parameters x and res are
roots, the synthesized predicate G is not normalized. We are going to transform
that predicate into normal form through lemma synthesis. Based on the violation
of the restriction above, we propose to split the predicate G using the following
weakening lemma:
lemma infer [U1; U2] G(x,res)→ U1(x,res) ∗ U2(res,x)
where U1 and U2 are unknown predicates that need to be inferred.
Using shape analysis (e.g. in the previous section), we can infer the following
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definition:
U1(x,s) ≡ emp ∧ x=s ∨ x 7→node(q)∗U1(q,s)
U2(y,z) ≡ y 7→node(NULL)
After that, the second parameter of the predicate U2 is detected as a useless
parameter. This parameter is semantically eliminated through the following
lemma:
lemma infer [U3] U2(y,z)↔ U3(y)
whereby the predicate U3 is another unknown predicate and inferred as:
U3(y) ≡ y 7→node(NULL)
Finally, the predicate G is decomposed into two predicate U1 and U3. This split
is described in the synthesized lemma as follows:
lemma G(x,res)→ U1(x,res) ∗ U3(res)
Furthermore, to obtain an equivalent transformation, the following
strengthening lemma shall be proven to be valid:
lemma check G(x,res) ← U1(x,res) ∗ U3(res)
Once inferred, the definitions of U1 and U3 can be used to prove the validity of
the above strengthening lemma. With this result, the following equivalent lemma
can be confirmed:
lemma G(x,res) ↔ U1(x,res) ∗ U3(res)
Consequently, if the shape predicate lseg in section 2.4.1 is given in advance (as
library predicates), the reuse operation will match inferred U predicate in section
38
2.4.2 and inferred U1 predicate to form the following lemmas:
lemma U(x) ↔ lseg(x,NULL)
lemma U1(x,s) ↔ lseg(x,s)
Finally, we generate the following specification for the get last method:
requires x 7→node(q) ∗ lseg(x,NULL)
ensures lseg(x,last) ∗ last 7→node(NULL) ∧ res=last;
With this, let us now return to the entailment (4). Using the synthesized
lemma above, the predicate G of the entailment would be transformed as follows:
lseg(x,last) ∗ last 7→node(NULL) ⊢ ∃q · last 7→node(q)
The procedures of [13, 114, 90] can now process the above entailment and thus
verify memory safety property of the method append.
In the next three chapters, we present our main technical contributions in
order for enhancing the HIP/SLEEK system to an automated verification system






We present an error calculus to support a novel specification mechanism for
sound and/or complete safety properties that are to be given by users. With
such specifications, our calculus can form a foundation for both proving program
safety (nothing bad will happen) and/or discovering real errors (something bad
will happen). The basis of our calculus is an algebra with a lattice domain of four
abstract statuses (namely unreachability, validity, must-error and may-error) on
possible program states and four operators for this domain to calculate suitable
program status. We show how proof search and error localization can be
supported by our calculus. Our calculus can also be extended to separation logic
with support for user-defined predicates and lemmas. We have implemented our
calculus in an automated verification tool for pointer-based programs. Initial
experiments have confirmed that it can achieve the dual objectives, namely of
safety proving and bug finding, with modest overheads.
3.1 Complete Specifications
Traditionally, program specifications are given primarily for safety scenarios, i.e.
proving functional correctness and memory safety of programs, and are used to
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describe the states under which program execution would occur safely. When
successfully verified, such specifications are said to be sound for their specified
input scenarios. That is, a specification is said to be sound if it has identified
input scenarios (or preconditions) that are guaranteed to lead to safe program
execution. However, we are also interested in complete specifications that will
additionally verify the remaining input scenarios (that lead to bad execution,
execution failure) are invalid ones. Informally, a specification is said to be complete
if it has unambiguously identified both input scenarios that lead to safe code
execution, and input scenarios that lead to code execution failure.
Such complete specifications for programs are helpful for two reasons. Firstly,
they can be used to specify precisely (through weakest precondition1) when inputs
can be handled correctly by programs. Conversely, we are also able to precisely
identify when programs would fail to work properly (or safely). Secondly, the
specifications on erroneous inputs can be used to help pinpoint actual software
bugs in programs as they could be used to indicate where each given error occurs.
Though useful, the task of capturing complete specifications is very challenging,
and may not always be possible since the input scenarios under which failures could
occur may not be unambiguously specified and verified. In this paper, we shall
provide the basic mechanisms that can help specify complete specifications, where
possible. To achieve this goal, we propose a lattice domain of four abstract status
(namely unreachability, validity, must-error and may-error) and make use of the
validity (must-error) status for specifying safe (unsafe, resp.) execution scenarios.
Furthermore, when the complete requirements are hard (or impossible) to specify,
we have also provided approximation mechanisms that can help us specify near-
complete specifications through the use of may-error as opposed to must-error
1While it may be desirable to have weakest precondition that guarantee safety or correctness,
we also allow flexibility for users to specify a wider range of specifications that include those with
either stronger preconditions and/or weaker postconditions. Though weaker specifications give
fewer guarantees, often they can be verified more easily and may be enough to ensure reliability.
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classification in weakened postcondition.
Our motivation for developing complete specifications for programs was
further heightened by the VSTTE competition [1] that was held in November
2011. Out of five problems that the participants were asked to verify for safety
and correctness, there were two problems (problem 4 and problem 5) where more
complex specifications that satisfy completeness were requested. As complete
specifications must additionally address erroneous scenarios, we have recently
developed a comprehensive verification framework that could just as easily deal
with input scenarios that invoke errors, as it would with input scenarios that led
to safe program execution.
To efficiently support complex data structures in pointer-manipulating
programs, we make use of separation logic (see section 2.2). Our verification
system employs the entailment procedure presented in [114]. As presented in
section 2.3, this procedure follows UNFOLD/FOLD and MATCH paradigm to search a
proof for entailment check. To support such proof search, we extend the calculus
to a set of sound structural rules. Another difficulty is how to define negation for
inductive predicates on complex data structures for the completeness proving.
We provide a machinery for this by detecting contradiction at the predicate level
and through user-supplied lemmas. These lemmas, in turn, can be automatically
proven and applied.
Yet another benefit from our calculus is the capability of localizing program
statements relevant to errors. Existing approaches for error localization, e.g.
[65, 83], are typically separate from program verification system. Thus the error
localization component cannot exploit information, e.g. error trace conditions,
from program verifiers. Hence, such information may be constructed twice, one
for verification and another for error localization. In contrast, our system can
support a combination of program verification and error localization by first
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lFigure 3-1: Status on Program States.
extending the four-point lattice with error messages and then enhancing the
structural rules to support the localization. Indeed, our system can provide
concise localizations for both must and may errors, and thus help the user to
comprehend the reason for verification failures.
3.2 Motivation and Overview
3.2.1 An Algebra on Status of Program States
⊓ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
℧ ℧ ℧ ⊥ ⊥√ √ ⊥ √ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
⊔ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
℧ ⊤ ℧ ⊤ ℧√ ⊤ ⊤ √ √
⊥ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊗ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ℧ ⊤ ⊥
℧ ℧ ℧ ℧ ⊥√ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
⊕ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ √ ⊥
℧ ⊤ ℧ √ ⊥√ √ √ √ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Figure 3-2: An Algebra on Status of Program States.
The basis of our proposal is the identification of an algebra (E , F) in which
E is a lattice domain (see Fig. 3-1) with four points used to capture the status of
44
each program state, while F is a set of four binary operators (meet (⊓), join (⊔),
compose (⊗) and search (⊕)) to combine the status of program states.
The four points that are used for program status are as follows:
• ⊥: denotes an unreachable state.
•
√
: denotes a valid program state from normal program execution.
• ℧: denotes a state that corresponds to a must (or definite) error scenario.
• ⊤: denotes a state that corresponds to a may error or an unknown scenario.
That is, it could either be ⊥, or √ or ℧.
Note that the must error status (℧) subsumes the unreachable ⊥ status. Where
possible, we would also like to classify a satisfiable must error status that explicitly
excludes the ⊥ status. This is to help us identify input scenarios for real bugs that
are reachable, and can be achieved by confirming that the state at that program
point is provably satisfiable. The may error status (⊤) comes from imprecision
or from dependency on some unknown input. In our system, potential sources of
imprecision include imprecise specifications, imprecise invariants of complex data
structures and incomplete domains. Although we could separately identify those
kinds of imprecision, for simplicity we uniformly specify them with the ⊤ status
value. In the implementation, we distinguish them through different messages
with status (see Sec. 3.4.3).
Let  be a partial ordering relation on status whereby τ1  τ2 means status
τ1 is more precise than status τ2. The ⊔ and ⊓ operators denote the least upper
bound and the greatest lower bound, respectively, over the lattice domain. The
domain E and two operations ⊓, ⊔ form a complete lattice D = 〈E ,,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤〉
organized as shown in Fig. 3-1. This lattice forms a core part of the underlying
abstract semantics for our system. Furthermore, ⊥ is zero element of ⊗ and ⊕
operations; it means x ⊕ ⊥ = ⊥ and ⊥ ⊗ x = ⊥ for any values x. The remaining
45
calculations of ⊗ and ⊕ are illustrated in Fig. 3-2. The ⊗ operator is meant to
support conjunctive proving, and searches for failures from ℧ and ⊤ status . The
⊕ operator is meant to support proof search, and searches for √ status to succeed
in proving. Thus the priority order of the ⊗ operator is ℧, ⊤ and lastly √, and
the priority order of the ⊕ operator is √, ⊤ and lastly ℧. Contrast this with the
⊔ operator which doesn’t have any priority between √ and ℧. So it would simply
yield ⊤ when the two status are combined together.
3.2.2 Mechanism for Sound and Complete Specifications
To illustrate our new specification mechanism, we consider a method that returns
the data which its input points to, as shown below
int get data(node x)
case{ x 6=NULL→ requires x 7→node〈d, p〉 ensures (res=d) √;
x=NULL→ ensures (true ) ℧; }
where res is a reserved identifier denoting the method’s result and the data
structure node is declared as: data node { int val; node next }.
We would like to remind that each method is specified by pre- and
post-conditions (through separation logic formulas), denoted by requires and
ensures keyword, respectively. In the specification above, we also use structured
specifications [60] where disjoint conditions are expressed using case construct
for expressing both sound (with x 6=NULL condition) and complete (with x=NULL
condition) requirements, as can be seen for the above specification of get data
(with the
√
and ℧ status in postconditions, resp.). In comparison, if we are only
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interested in sound specification, we would just use the following instead:
int get data(node x)
requires x 7→node〈d, p〉 ensures (res=d) √;
Occasionally, it may be possible to automatically generate complete specification
by negating the input conditions of sound specification. However, this may not
always be feasible. Firstly, negation computation may be hard to implement in
complex domains. For example, it is unclear how to compute negation in
separation logic (which our system relies on). Secondly, not all methods have
clearly delineated boundary between sound and complete conditions, as an
example, consider the interactive schedule (ischedule) method in Fig. 3-3. With
prio=0 condition, this method’s status depends on the user input which is
unknown at verification time. Therefore, there exists a gap between soundness
and completeness that cannot be derived using just the negation operation.
For this example, we can instead provide a near-complete specification, as
shown in Fig. 3-3. Informally, a specification is said to be near-complete if it
captures all possible input conditions but contains either a ⊤ program status or an
ambiguous disjunction, comprising of both
√
and ℧ status, in its postconditions.
We note that our approach for proving the completeness of program is based
on the assumption that the user-supplied specification is complete; namely that it
covers all values of the input domain and that each error program state denotes an
input scenario where no valid output state is possible. Checking the completeness
of specifications is a challenging research direction that could be investigated in
the future.
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1. int ischedule(int prio){
2. if (prio>0)/*run it */ return 0;
3. else if (prio<0) abort();
4. else{
5. printf(”Allow this task to run? y or n”);
6. char c=getc();
7. if (c =′ y′)/*run it */ return 0;
8. else abort(); } }
Sound Specification:
l1. int ischedule(int prio)




l3. int ischedule(int prio)
l4. case { prio>0→ ensures (res=0)√;
l5. prio<0→ ensures (true )℧;
l6. prio=0→ ensures (true )⊤; }
Figure 3-3: Code and Specification of ischedule Method.
3.2.3 Essence of Error Calculus
To highlight how our calculus can be used to verify programs, consider the method
foo in Fig. 3-4. We shall verify the code of foo in a forward manner, and would
compute a program state for each of its program point. Each program state, Φ, is
a formula on the state of variables and heap. Each program state can be combined
with a status and is represented by (Φ, τ) where τ denotes a status value from
our lattice. As part of compositional verification, the precondition of each callee
is checked against the current calling context and the postcondition is checked at
the exit of the method’s body. In the example, we can identify four program states
of interests that correspond to four exits (L1, L2, L3 and L4) of the method. The
following illustrates how the statuses are decided at exits through proof obligations
discharged for postcondition checking with the help of the entailment procedure ⊢
that conforms to our error calculus. Given a program state πa and a post-condition
πc, we can determine the status s for such checking with the help of the following
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4 if (x<0) return −1; /∗L1∗/
5 else{
6 if (y>1) return 1; /∗L2∗/
7 else if (y<0) return −1; /∗L3∗/
8 else return y; /∗L4∗/
9 }}
Figure 3-4: Verifying foo Method with Error Calculus.
judgment: πa ⊢p πc ❀ s. The resulting statuses generated by the entailment
procedure are as follows:
L1 : x≥0 ∧ x<0 ∧ res=−1 ⊢ res>0❀ ⊥
L2 : x≥0 ∧ ¬(x<0) ∧ y>1 ∧ res=1 ⊢ res>0❀ √
L3 : x≥0 ∧ ¬(x<0) ∧ ¬(y>1) ∧ y<0 ∧ res=−1 ⊢ res>0❀ ℧
L4 : x≥0 ∧ ¬(x<0) ∧ ¬(y>1) ∧ ¬(y<0) ∧ res=y ⊢ res>0❀ ⊤
Each of the above proofs yields a status based on the outcome of its entailment.
This status can be added to program state for each of these program points. At
L1, the antecedent is unsatisfiable which corresponds to an unreachable scenario
(either infinite loop2 or dead code) that can be captured by (false ,⊥) with
false denoting contradiction at that program point. At L2, the consequent can
be directly proven using the antecedent. This yields a valid program state that can
be represented by (x≥0∧¬(x<0)∧y>1∧res=1,√). This program state indicates
that the method will exit safely at this location with res=1. At L3, the negation
of the consequent can be proven from its antecedent. The program state at L3 can
be computed to be a must error as (x≥0∧¬(x<0)∧y<0,℧). The sub-formula on
2Although we provide a mechanism to specify infinite loop, proving termination is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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result res=−1 is dropped since we have a must error outcome where the output
state is unimportant. At L4, the antecedent can neither prove the consequent
nor its negation. Hence, we would need to classify this program point as a may
error whose state is (x≥0∧¬(x<0)∧¬(y>1)∧¬(y<0)∧ res=y,⊤). A formula on
result res=y is still captured since the ⊤ status includes possibly safe output.
When an entailment checking fails, an error message is generated with relevant
information to help debugging process. For example, the error message at L3 is:
Verify method foo. Proving postcondition fails:
Failure (must):
(x≥0, 2) ∧ (¬(x<0), 5) ∧ (¬(y>1), 6) ∧ (y<0, 7) ∧ (res=−1, 7) ⊢ (res>0, 3)
where irrelevant formulas are sliced away and failures are localized by pairs of the
relevant failing formulas and their corresponding statement code or specification
line numbers.
3.3 Complete Specification Mechanism
Ψ ::= {Φ1, . . . ,Φn}




τ ::= ⊥ | ℧ | √ | ⊤
Figure 3-5: Complete Specification Language
In our extended specification, we add a status value to separation formula Φ′
(as defined in Fig.3-5) to help specify if we are expecting either valid or error
scenario. The status captured by (τ) can be from the 4-point lattice domain
introduced in section 3.2.1. This logic provided can be used to write Hoare-style
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(pre/post) specifications for each method of a program. Figure 3-6 provides a
syntactic description of our extended specification, an extension of the structured
specification presented [60]. Y denotes the (pre/post) specification while Φ denotes
the formulas that may be used for pre/post specifications, as well as for predicate
definitions. The requires keyword introduces a precondition. The postcondition
is captured after each ensures keyword, which must appear as a terminating
branch (or leaf) for the tree-like specification format. The postcondition may
then include explicit error scenarios represented by the formula Φ′.
Y ::= case{π1⇒Y1; . . . ; πn⇒Yn} case analysis
| requires Φ Y precond
| ensures Φ′ postcond
Figure 3-6: Complete Pre/Post Specifications
The extended specification mechanism will be further clarified through the
examples as follows.
We shall now look at how (and why) specifications with explicit error scenarios
can be written for pointer-based programs. Consider a simple example to sum up
some values from two pointer locations.
int hoo(node x, node y)
{ return x.val+ y.val; }
One simple specification for this method is the following:




Though sound, this safety specification cannot be used to help the error
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calculus evaluate must/may bugs; the given precondition does not satisfy the
dichotomy property, since there is another scenario with heap state
x7→node(a, )∧x=y that also lead to a valid √ outcome. If we wish to obtain a
complete safety precondition, we would have to add this extra valid scenario into
our specification, as follows:
case {
x=y → requires x 7→node(a, )
ensures (res=2 ∗ a)√;





With this more complete specification, all potential valid states are now
captured by its precondition. Any contradiction with the precondition of this
specification now represents a must error. However, specification with complete
safety precondition can only be proven, if there is a way (either automatic or
manual) to derive the negation of its precondition. As the negation operator are
undecidable in many domains, including separation logic, there is not a general
method for verifying that the code satisfies any given complete safety
specifications. Our solution to this problem is to encourage users to write a more
comprehensive specifications with explicit error scenarios. For our example, we
could provide the following specification that fully captures all valid and error
scenarios as shown in Figure 3-7.
3.4 A Calculus on Errors
In this section, we initially formalize the calculus with pure (without heap)
formulas π. The extension of the calculus to heap formulas will be presented in
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case {x=NULL∨y=NULL → ensures (true )℧;
x 6=NULL∧y 6=NULL→
case {
x=y → requires x 7→node(a, )
ensures (res=2 ∗ a)√;






Figure 3-7: Complete Specification Example.
the next section.
3.4.1 The Entailment Procedure
Given a program state πa and a postcondition state πc, we can determine the status
s for such checking with the help of the following judgment: πa ⊢p πc ❀ s. The
basic machinery for the judgment πa ⊢p πc ❀ s is captured by the following four
rules. We use underlying theorem solvers for answering sastifiability. Note that
unsat(π) denotes that π is unsatisfiable and sat(π) denotes that π is satisfiable .
[EC−[BOTTOM]]
unsat(πa)
πa ⊢p πc ❀ ⊥
[EC−[OK]]
unsat(πa ∧ ¬πc)
πa ⊢p πc ❀ √
[EC−[MUST−ERROR]]
unsat(πa ∧ πc)
πa ⊢p πc ❀ ℧
[EC−[MAY−ERROR]]
sat(πa ∧ ¬πc) sat(πa ∧ πc)
πa ⊢p πc ❀ ⊤
Two rules at the first line check the success of the entailment and classify it as
unreachable (⊥) or valid (√) as usual (checking unsat(πa ∧ ¬πc) is equivalent to
checking πa =⇒ πc). Next two rules at the second line check and classify the
must/may error scenarios. In the first rule, a must error (invalid) is identified
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when πa =⇒ ¬πc is provable. 3 Due to the imprecision, entailments which has not
been proven (as either valid or invalid) are marked with unknown status through
the second rule.
To illustrate this entailment procedure, let us consider a postcondition check,
x≥0, under four different program states, as shown below.
x≤−1∧x=0 ⊢p x≥0 ❀ ⊥
x>0 ⊢p x≥0 ❀ √
x≤−1 ⊢p x≥0 ❀ ℧
true ⊢p x≥0 ❀ ⊤
3.4.2 Structural Rules
We provide sound structural rules that would carry out the entailment proving
process. These rules support error localization, separation entailment procedure
and modular verification.
[PEC−[⊔ JOIN]]
π1 ⊢p π ❀ τ1
π2 ⊢p π ❀ τ2
π1∨π2 ⊢p π ❀ τ1⊔τ2
[PEC−[⊗ COMPOSE]]
π ⊢p π1 ❀ τ1
π ⊢p π2 ❀ τ2
π ⊢p π1∧π2 ❀ τ1⊗τ2
[PEC−[⊕ SEARCH]]
π ⊢p π1 ❀ τ1
π ⊢p π2 ❀ τ2
π ⊢p π1∨π2 ❀ τ1⊕τ2
These rules use the algebraic operations presented in Sec. 3.2 to combine the
results. The first rule decomposes disjunction on the antecedent, while the
second rule decomposes conjunction on the consequent. Both these rules can be
implemented without any loss of information. The third rule performs a search
over a disjunction in the consequent. This search returns a set of possible proofs
for the entailment. According to the ⊕ operator, if at least one √ status is found
in this solution set, the entailment succeeds.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the Structural Rules). Given an entailment π1⊢pπ2.
If the application of the structural rules [PEC−[...]] on the given antecedent π1 and
3Without loss of generality, we assume that the [EC−[BOTTOM]] rule has always been checked
before [EC−[MUST−ERROR]]. Thus, when the latter rule is checked, pia should be satisfiable.
54
consequent π2 returns the result τ , then the application of the [EC−[...]]rules on the
given antecedent π1 and consequent π2 returns the same result τ , namely
π1 ⊢p π2 ❀ τ .
Proof The proof is by an induction on structural rules [PEC−[...]] and a case
analysis on the returned result τ . As an illustration, suppose that the structural
rule [PEC−[⊗ COMPOSE]] using entailment ⊢ is applied on the antecedent π1 and the
consequent π′2 ∧ π′′2 returning ℧. According to the ⊗ operator rules, we can have
either π1 ⊢p π′2 ❀ ℧ or π1 ⊢p π′′2 ❀ ℧ or both are ℧. Assuming the former case is
taken, and then using the rule [EC−[MUST−ERROR]] we have (unsat(π1∧π′2)). Hence
we can deduce that unsat(π1∧π′2∧π′′2) is valid, and then using [EC−[MUST−ERROR]]
we get π1 ⊢p π′2 ∧ π′′2 ❀ ℧.
We present full proof of this theorem in Appendix .1.
3.4.3 Error Localization Extension to Calculus
τ [m] ::= ⊥[∅] | ℧[m] | √[m] | ⊤[m]
m ::= bm | m1⊔m2 | m1⊗m2|m1⊕m2
bm ::= π1 =⇒ π2 (valid)
| π1 =⇒ π2 (must error)
| π1 =⇒ π2 (may error)
τ1[m1] ⋄ τ2[m2] ⇒ (τ1⋄τ2)[m1⋄m2]
m ⋄ ∅ ⇒ m
∅ ⋄ m ⇒ m
⊥[m] ⇒ ⊥[∅]
Figure 3-8: Program State: Status and Message
To provide support for error localization, we must extend the four-point lattice
with messages that capture the reason for each success or failure (see the left of
Figure 3-8).
Status ⊥ does not carry any message which is denoted by ∅. When faced with
a message with error from m1⊔m2 and m1⊗m2, both of the two smaller messages
(with possible errors), denoted by m1 and m2, must be resolved, before the main
message is said to be resolved. When faced with a message with error of the form
m1⊕m2, only one of the messages with errors from either m1 or m2 needs to be
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resolved, before the main message m1⊕m2 is resolved. We may now modify the
three operators ⊔, ⊗ and ⊕, to propagate messages capturing the localizations
for successes and failures. Let us denote this using a generic name ⋄ for the three
operators. We propagate every message, where possible, as shown to the right
of Fig. 3-8. In case empty message ∅ is generated, we remove it from the main
message as shown in the second and third rules. In case the resulting status from
τ1⋄τ2 is ⊥, we remove its messages, as shown in the last rule.
3.5 Error Calculus for Separation Logic
While we have formulated a must/may error calculus for pure logic, we shall
now extend it to separation logic. In this section, we show how our calculus can
be used to support the reasoning of pointer-based programs via separation logic
[116]. Separation logic with user-defined predicates can provide concise and precise
notations for verifying programs with complex data structures. We show how our
calculus can be used to support the reasoning of pointer-based programs via the
fragment of separation logic presented in Chapter 2.
3.5.1 Separation Entailment with Proof Search
To support proof search, we enhance the entailment procedure for separation logic
presented in section 2.3 as follows:
Φ1 ⊢κV Φ2❀ (Ψ, τ)
whereby Ψ captures a set of residual program states with status information. We
use a set of program states (Ψ) since our entailment procedure may have to conduct
a proof search with the help of lemmas. The variable κ captures the current set
of heap nodes (and predicates) that have been consumed (or accounted) by the
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[EENT−EMP]
XPure(κ1∗κ)∧π1 ⊢p ∃V·π2 ❀ τ
κ1∧π1 ⊢κV π2❀ (κ1∗κ∧π1, τ)
[EENT−LEMMA]




1 ⊢κV Φi2❀ (Φi, τ i)
Φ1 ⊢κV Φ2❀ (⊕{Φ0; Φi},⊕{τ0; τ i})
[EENT−LHS−OR]
Φi ⊢κV Φ3❀ (Ψi, τi) i ∈ {1, 2}




Φ1 ⊢κV Φi❀ (Ψi, τi) i ∈ {2, 3}




[w/v]Φ1 ⊢κV Φ2❀ (Φi, τ)
fresh w
∃v · Φ1 ⊢κV Φ2❀ (Φi, τ)
[EENT−RHS−EX]
Φ1 ⊢κV ∪{w} ([w/v]Φ2)❀ (Φi, τ)
fresh w Φj=∃ w ·Φi
Φ1 ⊢κV (∃ v ·Φ2)❀ (Φj, τ)
Figure 3-9: Separation Entailment with Set Outcomes
entailment procedure, while V captures existential variables from the consequent
(that may be instantiated). If the antecedent semantically entails the consequent,
the entailment succeeds and we expect status τ to be set to
√
. Otherwise, the
entailment fails and we expect τ to be set to either ℧ or ⊤.
To simplify our presentation, only the five structural rules and a base case (or
non-recursive) rule, are shown in Figure 3-9. In addition, our algorithm also
performs matching of heap nodes (and predicates), unfolding (of a predicate in
the antecedent), or folding (of a predicate in the consequent with support for
variable instantiation). These steps are automatically applied, and are now
standard features for entailment procedures that are designed to support
automated program verification with user-defined predicates.
The final step prior to a successful entailment is the [EENT−EMP]-rule that
is only triggered when the consequent is just a pure formula. To support error
calculus, we must modify (or implement) this rule as described.Reduce entailment
checking on separation logic to implication checking on the first order-logic with
[EENT−EMP] rule. When the consequent remains empty heap, e.g. emp ∧ πc, the
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procedure employs [EENT−EMP] inference rule to decide the entailment result.
Firstly, this rules make use of the eXPure reduction to transform the combination
of remain heaps in the antecedent and footprints into the first order-logic formula
on the combination of pure domains, e.g. πa. Then it checks the implication
πa ⊢p πc.
Note that ⊕ is overloaded. When it is applied for a set of the status, it is
defined as ⊕{τ1, τ2, . . . , τn} = (. . . ((τ1 ⊕ τ2) ⊕ τ3) . . . τn);4 when it is applied for
a set of residual states, it will search for all successful states (and will remove all
the failed states). Finally,
∨
is a lifted disjunction operation and is defined as
Ψ1 ∨Ψ2 = {Φ1 ∨ Φ2|Φ1 ∈ Ψ1 ∧ Φ2 ∈ Ψ2}.
Furthermore, we must extend our entailment procedure in the following ways:
• The rule [EENT−LEMMA] illustrate how the calculus supports lemma
application [113]. This rule expresses the possibility of lemma application
in LHS and RHS. The status values of all possible lemma applications are
combined by the union operator (⊕) where ℧ takes priority over ⊤. Hence,
if a proof search attempt fails, we return a ℧ status, rather than a ⊤
status since the latter prevents a ℧ failure from being reported, even if
they can be confirmed by a different proof search.
• When our entailment procedure becomes stuck with a non-empty
consequent (comprising some heap predicates) we shall firstly determine a
pure approximation of the consequent for both heap and pure data. We
may then determine if there is any contradiction with the antecedent to
decide whether must or may failure is going to be reported.
4⊕ is the search operator as described in Sec. 3.2.1.
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3.5.2 Examples on Separation Entailment
Let us examine four simple examples to better understand how status outcome is
being determined by the entailment procedure of separation logic.
Example 1
x 7→node( , q) ∗ q 7→node( , NULL) ⊢ x 7→node( , p)
❀ (q 7→node( , NULL) ∧ p=q ∧ x 6=NULL,√)
This entailment yields a residue q 7→node( , NULL) and an instantiation p=q from
(implicit) existential variable p. It also carries a pure formula x 6=NULL from the
antecedent.
Example 2
x 7→node( , q) ∗ q 7→node( , NULL) ⊢ x 7→node( , NULL)
❀ (true ,℧)
This entailment yields a must failure, denoted by ℧. The consequent expects
q=NULL, but the antecedent had q 7→node( , NULL). This contradiction has caused
a ℧ failure to be raised. The residue captures the state when failure was detected.
Entailment 3
x 7→node( , q) ∗ q 7→node( , NULL) ⊢ x 7→node(3, p)
❀ (true ,⊤)
This entailment yields a may failure, denoted by ⊤. The consequent expects value
3 to be proven as the data field of x. However, the antecedent has no information
on that field position. Hence, a ⊤ failure was raised.
Entailment 4
x 7→node( , ) ∗ y 7→node( , ) ⊢ x=y
❀ (true ,℧)
This entailment yields a must failure. The consequent expects value x=y to be
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proven. However, the antecedent has x and y pointing to disjoint memory. This
contradiction has caused a ℧ failure to be raised.
To handle linked-list of arbitrary length, we could use the following list segment
predicate:
pred lseg〈root, n, p〉≡root=p∧n=0
∨ ∃ d, q · (root7→node〈d, q〉∗ lseg〈q, n−1, p〉)
inv n≥0
In addition, we declare plseg predicate that defines a list segment with only
positive integers:
pred plseg〈root, n, p〉≡
∃ d · (root7→node〈d, p〉∧n=1∧d>0)
∨ ∃ d, q · (root7→node〈d, q〉∗ plseg〈q, n−1, p〉∧d>0)
inv n≥1




⊢ x 7→node(a, y) ∗ y 7→node(b, q)∧a+b<0
After unfolding on the antecedent followed by a matching, the entailment is:
∃a′, z · plseg〈z, 1, NULL〉 ∧ x 6= NULL ∧ a′ = a ∧ z=y ∧ a′>0
⊢ y 7→node(b, q)∧a+b<0
Again we do unfold on the antecedent followed by a matching, causing a consequent
with no heap. We then apply the [EENT−EMP] rule, the following pure entailment
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is checked (for simplicity, we have omitted superfluous equalities):
x 6=NULL∧a>0 ∧ z=y∧y 6=NULL∧b>0∧q=NULL ⊢ a+b<0
Obtain pure over-approximation and applying the calculus on pure entailment,
the ℧ error is returned as follow:
a>0∧b>0 ⊢ a+b<0 ❀ ℧
Example 6:
plseg〈x, 2, NULL〉 ⊢ lseg〈x, 2, q〉
This entailment fails with mismatch error (τ0=℧). To improve our analysis, user
may provide the following lemma:
lemma “w1” plseg〈root, n, p〉 →lseg〈root, n, p〉
The procedure then applies the lemma w1 to weaken a plseg (to become a
lseg). With the help of the lemma w1, another possible solution for proof
search is to first apply the weakening lemma on x. It is then easy to prove
(τ1=
√
) by applying a matching ([ENT−PRED−MATCH] in Section 2.3) followed by
the [EENT−EMP] rule. Finally, we apply the [EENT−LEMMA] rule to combine the
program status and residue by the search (⊕) operator which results in program
status: τ=τ0⊕τ1=℧⊕√=√.
3.5.3 Entailment with Contradiction Lemma
In separation logic, it is not clear how to define negation for inductive predicates
of complex data structures. In this section, we address this by providing a new
mechanism to support the detection of must errors at the predicate level: we
propose a new scheme for entailment with contradiction lemmas. We allow users
to declare contradiction lemmas of the following form:
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LHS→ (RHS)℧
These lemmas can help detect contradiction at the predicate level. Semantically,
if the above contradiction lemma can be proven, we can confirm LHS =⇒ ¬(RHS).
Operationally, the contradiction lemma is proven through the following separation
logic entailment:
LHS ⊢ RHS ❀ (Φ)℧.
Application of this contradiction lemma causes a must error to be detected at
the predicate level. Our lemmas must be supplied by users, but will be
automatically proven and applied by our system.
For illustration, consider the plseg defined in the previous subsection, and its
negation nplseg, which contains at least one non-positive integer.
pred nplseg〈root, n, p〉≡ root=p∧n=0
∨ ∃ d, q · (root7→node〈d, q〉∗ lseg〈q, n−1, p〉∧d≤0)
∨ ∃ d, q · (root7→node〈d, q〉∗ nplseg〈q, n−1, p〉)
inv n≥0
To capture their relation, we provide the following contradiction lemma:
lemma “w2” nplseg〈root, n, p〉 →plseg〈root, n, p〉℧
When invoked, each application of such lemmas causes a must error to be
triggered for the particular branch of the entailment proof. For example,
consider the list sqrt aux procedure shown in Figure 3-10. The method
list sqrt aux is an auxilary method which helps to compute square roots of
numbers from a list. It computes square root of the current node y, if applicable,
by function sqrt at line 6 and inserts the result at the beginning of the
processed positive list segment x. We provide a specification to capture its
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1 node list sqrt aux(node x, node y)
2 requires plseg〈x, n, y〉 ∗ y 7→node〈v, p〉
3 case {
4 v>0→ ensures (plseg〈res, n+ 1, p〉) √;
5 v≤0→ ensures (true ) ℧;
}
{






Figure 3-10: Code of list sqrt aux Method.
correctness. Line 4 is for soundness of the method, while line 5 is for its
completeness, so as to capture the remaining cases. Intuitively, the two scenarios
in the specification correspond to two path traces of the conditional statement.
We focus on the (implicit) else path trace which leads to an error scenario. At
line 10, the condition of this trace is transformed to be a program state which is
checked against the specification. Its proof obligation is generated as follows:
y 7→node〈v, x〉 ∗ plseg〈x, n, p〉∧¬(v>0) ⊢ plseg〈y, n+ 1, p〉
Since v≤0, y cannot be matched in both sides and this entailment proof fails as a
must error. Therefore, the specification at line 5 cannot be properly proven.
To improve our analysis, we now apply the lemma w2 . With the help of the
lemma w2, another possible solution for proof search is to first apply the weakening
lemma on x. After that, y can now be folded to become a nplseg based on the
definition of the nplseg predicate. Lastly, applying the contradiction lemma on y
makes this entailment proof return a must error as (ideally) expected.
Nguyen et. al. [113] proposed a lemma mechanism to relate user-defined
predicates. While they focus on subsumed and equivalent relations, we focus on
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disjoint relations (contradiction). Nevertheless, both enhance the completeness of
program verification.
3.6 Modular Verification with Error Calculus
Code verification is typically formalised using Hoare triples of the form
{pre}c{post}, where pre, post are the initial and final states of program code c.
We would like to remind that to incorporate status into our program state, we
shall use disjunctive program state of form
∨
(Φ, τ), giving us a new Hoare triple
of the form {∨(Φ1, τ1)} c {∨(Φ1, τ1)}. To simplify our presentation, we shall use
(Φ, τ) instead of the more general disjunctive program state
∨
(Φ, τ) that had
been implemented.
Method Verification Rule. The verification requirement for methods can be
affected by progressively accumulating the preconditions from the structured
specification, prior to the verification of its method body. The forward
verification rules are presented in Figure 3-11. The verification for each method
is done by [FV−[METH]] rule. This rule uses a initial program state
∧
(v′ = v)∗
that the current values of program variables are the same as their original
parameters’ values. In the [FV−[M−CASE]] rule, each branch is processed
separately and their results are combined by join operations:
∨
(as defined in
previous section) for program states and ⊔ for status of program states. Finally,
verification process is terminated by [FV−[M−ENSURES]] rule. In this rule, the
status returned from the entailment proving of postcondition will be composed
(⊗) with the status of code verification to become τ4. τ4 is then matched (by inv
function) with τ . The function inv is implemented as follows: (1) if this is a
safety proving (τ =
√
), then inv returns τ4; (2) if this is an error verified (τ = ℧
or τ = ⊤), then inv returns √ in the cases of τ4 = ℧ (or τ4 = ⊤, respectively),
otherwise it returns ℧.
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⊢ {(Φ1,√)} {Y c} {Φ2, τ2}
⊢ t0 mn ([ref] t v)∗ Y {c}(Φ2, τ2)
[FV−[M−ENSURE]]
⊢ {(Φ1, τ1)} {c} {Φ2, τ2}
Φ2 ⊢κV Φ❀ (Φ3, τ3) τ4 = τ2 ⊗ τ3
⊢{(Φ1, τ1)}{ensures (Φ, τ) c}(Φ3, inv(τ, τ4))
[FV−[M−REQUIRES]]
⊢ {(Φ1 ∗ Φ, τ1)} {Y c} {Φ2, τ2}
⊢{(Φ1, τ1)}{requires Φ Yc}(Φ2, τ2)
[FV−[M−CASE]]




Figure 3-11: Forward Verification Rules.
its specifications. We encode its verification with the rule [FV−[CALL]]. Note that
(t v)∗ and (ref t u)∗ denote pass-by-value and pass-by-reference parameters,
respectively. Each method call mn(v∗, u∗) in our core language has only variables
as arguments. To avoid the need for argument substitutions, we assume that
each method declaration from Program has been suitably renamed so that actual
arguments are identical to the formal arguments.
[FV−[CALL]]
t0 mn ((t v)
∗, (ref t u)∗) Y {c} ∈ Program
Φ1 ⊢ Y ❀ (Φ2, τ2)
ΦR = if τ1=
√
then (∃v′∗·Φ2) else Φ1
{(Φ1, τ1)} mn ((t v)∗, (ref t u)∗){(ΦR, τ1 ⊗ τ2)}
The proof obligations are generated and verified at the second line, provided that
the incoming status τ1 is
√
. Furthermore, output states from proving entailment
are composed with status from pre-state at the third line. By default, if the caller
context contains errors, such errors are simply propagated to the next instruction
in a similar manner as exceptions. However, unlike exceptions, error states are
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never caught. To generate proof obligations for the extended specification, we
propose to extend the entailment procedure to handle specification with separation
formulas. The revised judgement has the form Φ1 ⊢ Y ❀ (Φ2, τ2), where Φ1 is
the current state, Y is the specification and (Φ2, τ2) is the residual state and
its status. Three syntax-directed rules are extended. They are used to prove
each precondition and assume its respective postcondition for the callee, as shown
below:
[FV−[C−REQUIRES]]
Φ1 ⊢ Φ ❀ (Φ2, τ2) (Φ2) ⊢ Y ❀ (Φ3, τ3)
Φ1 ⊢ requires Φ Y ❀ (Φ3, τ2⊗τ3)
[FV−[C−CASE]]
Φ∧πi ⊢ Yi ❀ (Φi, τi) i = 1 . . . n




Φ1 ⊢p true ❀ (Φ, τ1)
Φ1 ⊢ ensures (Φ2)τ2 ❀ (Φ1 ∗ Φ2, τ1⊗τ2)
3.7 Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented our error calculus inside a program verification system for
separation logic, called S2. We use S2 to verify C-based programs against
user-given specifications. The verification is performed compositionally for each
method, and loops are transformed to recursive methods. S2 eventually
translates separation logic proof obligations to pure formulas that can be
discharged by different theorem provers. Our system uses Omega [125], MONA
[85], Redlog [55] and Z3 [45] as underlying theorem provers for answering the
satisfiability and simplification queries. When program code is not successfully
verified against safety properties, S2 not only further classifies the failures into
the must or may errors but also localizes program statements and specifications
relevant to the errors.
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Programs Size #P Time(sec.) Invo.(#)
LOC LOS # wo w wo w
Linked list 327 50 26 0.44 0.46 2738 3202
Linked list 157 27 13 0.58 0.6 1520 1724
Sorted llist 98 11 6 0.46 0.49 955 1060
Doubly llist 186 23 13 0.34 0.34 1864 2083
Doubly llist 91 13 5 0.5 0.5 1309 1429
CompleteT 106 12 5 0.87 0.94 2149 2533
Heap trees 179 13 5 1.9 1.91 4540 4954
AVL 313 27 12 3.44 3.59 7863 8585
AVL2 152 37 7 2.83 3 6959 7876
BST 177 18 9 0.35 0.37 1883 2192
BST 153 12 6 0.3 0.31 1581 1836
RBT 508 48 19 3.32 3.38 13069 16687
Bubble sort 75 9 4 0.21 0.21 1092 1254
Quick sort 82 10 4 0.27 0.28 778 832
Merge sort 109 11 6 0.47 0.5 1035 1074
Quick sort - queue 127 4 2 4.25 5.27 13218 21139
Total 2840 325 142 20.53 22.15 62553 78460
Table 3.1: Verification Performance with (w) and without (wo) Error Calculus
3.7.1 Calculus Performance for Heap-Based Programs
To evaluate the overheads of error calculus, we executed our system S2 twice,
once with error calculus and a second time without, on a suite of bug-free pointer-
based programs. We stress that although the sizes of these programs are fairly
small, they deal with fairly complex heap-based data structures, such as linked
lists, doubly-linked lists and AVL-trees. Therefore, these programs can be used to
fully evaluate the performance of our calculus which has been embedded inside a
separation logic prover. The results are summarized in Table 3.1. The first column
contains the list of the verified programs and their proven properties while the
second, third and fourth columns describe number of lines of code (LOC), number
of lines of specification (LOS) and number of procedures in each program (#P).
On average, LOS is around 12% of LOC and specifications are complicated enough
to demonstrate the performance of our calculus. The fifth and sixth columns show
the total verification time (in seconds) for the system S2 without and with error
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Programs LOC LOS #P. #V. #F. ℧ ⊤1 ⊤2 LOE time(s)
tcas 173 48 9 41 48 31 14 3 3.48 3.06
schedule2 374 108 16 10 10 5 0 3 3 8.25
schedule1a 412 50 18 10 16 15 0 1 4.38 18.13
schedule1b 413 50 18 9 8 7 0 1 4.25 32.29
replace 564 73 21 24 24 18 0 6 4.21 17.89
print tokens2 570 64 19 10 10 7 0 1 4.88 20.42
print tokens 726 87 18 7 9 8 0 1 3.67 6.73
Total/(Avr.) 3232 480 119 111 125 91 14 16 (3.98) (15.25)
Table 3.2: Bugs finding & localizing with programs in the Siemens Test Suite
calculus, respectively. The last two columns capture the number of satisfiability
and simplification queries sent to the provers for each experiment.
In Table 3.1, the results show that the total overhead introduced by our error
calculus is around 1.62 seconds (8%). This overhead is proportional to the
number of extra satisfiability and simplification queries shown in the last two
columns. These experimental results have shown that must/may error calculus
with messages can be supported with modest overhead.
3.7.2 Calculus Usability
In order to show the usability of our error calculus on bugs finding and localizing,
we evaluated our system on the Siemens test suite [52] of programs. The test
suite contains programs with complex data structures (e.g. linked lists, queues),
arrays and loops. Each program in the suite has #P number of procedures, has
one non-faulty version, v0, and a number of seeded faulty versions (#V). column
in Table 3.2) from v1 to vn. Each of these faulty versions has one or more (seeded)
faults. Total number of faults is captured in #F column. These faulty versions
are suitable for checking the ability of tools in finding bugs and localizing errors
(as used in [83]).We provide specifications for each program such that S2 (1)
successfully verifies safety (sound or complete requirements) in the non-faulty
versions, and (2) captures potential must-bug errors that are complementary to the
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safety scenarios. We emphasize that these specifications were designed primarily
to verify safety scenarios without considering the faulty versions of each program.
Nevertheless, S2 is able to utilize the same specification to find and explain the
presence of bugs in the faulty versions, as elaborated below.
Table 3.2 shows the result of running our system on six programs from the suite.
The properties our tool proved include: (i) memory safety (all), (ii) size of data
structures (schedule1a, schedule1b and schedule2 program), (iii) array-related
properties (tcas, print token, print token2 and replace program), (iv) functional
arithmetic constraints between input and output (all). We are interested in finding
out all the errors in the programs and classifying them as must (℧), disjunctive
may (⊤1) or may (⊤2) errors. For instance, from 48 faults of program tcas,
S2 was able to detect all the errors in the program, and classified 31 of them as
must (℧) errors, 14 as disjunctive may (⊤1) errors and 3 as may (⊤2) errors. In
summary, S2 detected 97% of real bugs including 73%, 11% and 13% of ℧, ⊤1
and ⊤2 errors, respectively.
However, a few errors were not detected by our system, e.g. v4, v9 of
schedule2 and v1, v2 of print tokens2 were verified successfully by S2. Upon
careful examination, we found that the substituted statement in v9 is
semantically equivalent with the non-faulty one in v0. Hence, we consider it as a
bug in constructing the benchmark rather than a real program bug. For v1, v2
and v4, there were omitted statements that are related to the I/O systems. For
instance, the following statement is omitted in v1:
if(ch == EOF) fprintf(stdout, “It can not get character”);
This was not picked up by our system since the specification of I/O operations
were not being modelled. It would be interesting to see I/O operations being
modelled in future.
Our calculus further supports debugging in localizing the errors. The LOE
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column shows the average number of lines of program code and specification
relevant to the errors for each program. We are able to provide concise (between
3-5 lines) error locations for all the bugs in the suite. Such short but accurate
localizations make it easier for users to comprehend the discovered errors. The
last column shows the average time which S2 took for verifying a faulty version
of each program.
Purely from the system point of view and on the assumption that specifications
have already been provided, S2 took on average 16 seconds for safety proving, bug
finding and error localization on one faulty version of each program.
3.8 Discussions
Recent work in first order relational logic [54, 80, 136] also addresses the problem
of finding bugs in programs with pointers and linked data structures. The method
is based on under approximation for loops and heap, thus it only finds the must
bugs in the code. Furthermore since they consider only postcondition violation
as a must error, they do not report on the more common bugs that are due to
preconditions. The underlying assumption in [80] is that most bugs can be found in
the program with small scope (loop unrolling) and small heap size. Our approach
is more comprehensive since it treats error conditions as first class values that can
be specified and we use predicates based on separation logic to represent the heap.
Static analysis based bug finding is not new and already exists for languages
like Java [59]. As static analysis suffers from precision problem, there have been
attempts to use dynamic or hybrid analysis for safety and bug finding. Check ’n’
Crash [42] uses dynamic analysis techniques on the constraints produced by
ESC/Java [59] to generate concrete test cases that can expose the true bugs. An
approach based on dynamic analysis to infer likely invariants from code is
implemented in [58]. Invariants discovered can be used as method annotations or
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assumptions, which can aid the static checker to detect bugs in the code [43].
This hybrid analysis uses a combination of under approximation and over
approximation by doing different phases of analysis. In our approach we do not
rely on dynamic analysis as our complete lattice can symbolically capture a
richer set of possible program states. Our method integrates both bug-finding
and safety proving within a single calculus, without prejudice to working with
dynamic-based analyses for maybe error scenarios. Another approach based on
dual analysis was presented in [46]. In this work, the may and must queries
corresponds to safety and liveness properties. They require both over- and
under-approximation and their conditions are computed with respect to a finite
abstraction for each particular property. In comparison, the conditions for our
must/may error are captured in terms of symbolic (infinite) domain that relies
on only over-approximation mechanisms. Moreover, we have also shown how our
error calculus can handle data structures accurately with must aliasing through
a simple integration with separation logic. Lastly, the use of negation on
postconditions to characterize errors have been explored in [83, 65]. Our
proposal supports must bug checking for not only postconditions of method
implementation but also preconditions of their method calls.
For explaining failure, while Bug Assist [83] uses maximum satisfiability
query to localize the errors, authors in [65] use a bounded model checker for
verifying abnormal predicates which are constructed from counterexamples and
negated specifications. In the domain of program optimization, Daniel et. al.
[137] describe how to explain failures in program analysis by reasons. The
reasons computed by their system constitute necessary and sufficient conditions
for the failure. In contrast, minimum satisfying assignments are used to compute
abductions in [48] to support error diagnosis. They handle error report
classification using proof obligations and failure witness derived from abductive
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inference. We use structural entailment rules to provide precise and concise error
explanations.
Traditionally, the way to precisely derive the error conditions is via a
backwards precondition calculation which was used by ESC/Java [26, 59, 72].
Snugglebug [26] has looked at ways to practically infer the potential error
conditions in real programs by means of directed call graph construction to
support weakest precondition calculation. However, they can only support may
aliasing in their work which hampers the analysis of pointer-based programs.
Our specification mechanism for must errors allows us to integrate the validation
of bug with verification, within the separation logic framework, thus supporting
a richer set of pointer-based programs. Similarly, to generate error conditions,
Exorcise [72] is based on weakest liberal precondition. However, Exorcise only
verifies must error conditions. Our calculus is more expressive (with verifying
not only must error but safety and maybe error) with the help of new
specification mechanism with explicit error scenarios.
Manually writing functional specifications for methods is costly, potentially
inaccurate and time consuming. Thus, having a toolset to automatically develop
and maintain program specifications is crucial to support a rigorous development
paradigm for reliable software. In the context of heap-manipulating programs,
specification inference relies on shape synthesis. In the next two chapters, we





We present second-order bi-abduction mechanism in order to integrate inference
capability into a modular-based verification system. In the context of pointer-
based programs, we specialize our mechanism to inferring shape specifications.
This forms a novel approach to shape analysis via the second-order bi-abductive
mechanism in separation logic. 1
In this chapter, we will present an overall discussion on the specification
inference approach, but focus on shape domain. After that, we present a shape
analysis mechanism via second-order bi-abduction. More concretely, we propose
an entailment procedure of separation logic that is capable of abduction and
frame inference. Finally, we provide an extension of the second-order
bi-abduction to infer the complete specification. The output of the shape
analysis will be further refined with a transformation in the next chapter.
4.1 From Shape Analysis to Shape Synthesis
An important challenge for automatic program verifiers lies in inferring shapes
describing abstractions for data structures used by each method. In the context
1In separation logic, Calcagno et al. [20] introduced bi-abduction as a combination of
abduction with frame inference.
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of heap manipulating programs, determining the shape abstraction is crucial for
proving memory safety and is a precursor to supporting functional correctness.
However, discovering shape abstractions can be rather challenging, as linked
data structures span a wide variety of forms, from singly-linked lists,
doubly-linked lists, circular lists, to tree-like data structures. Previous shape
analysis proposals have made great progress in solving this problem. However,
the prevailing approach relies on using a predefined vocabulary of shape
definitions (typically limited to singly-linked list segments) and trying to
determine if any of the pre-defined shapes fit the data structures used. This
works well with programs that use simpler shapes, but would fail for programs
which use more intricate data structures. An example is the method below
(written in C and adapted from [76]) to build a tree whose leaf nodes are linked
as a list.
struct tree { struct tree∗ parent; struct tree∗ l;
struct tree∗ r; struct tree∗ next;
}






struct tree∗ lm = tll(x->r, x, t);
return tll(x->l, x, lm); }
}
Our approach to modular shape analysis would introduce an unknown
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pre-predicate H (as the pre-condition), and an unknown post-predicate G (as the
post-condition), as shown below, where res is the method’s result.
requires H(x, p, t) ensures G(x, p, res, t)
Using Hoare-style verification and a new second-order bi-abduction entailment
procedure, we would derive a set of relational assumptions for the two unknown
predicates. These derived assumptions are to ensure memory safety, and can
be systematically transformed into concise predicate definitions for the unknown
predicates, such as:
H(x,p,t) ≡ x 7→tree(Dp,Dl,r,Dn) ∧ r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(Dp,l,r,Dn)∗H(l,x,lm)∗H(r,x,t) ∧ r 6= NULL
G(x,p,res,t) ≡ x 7→tree(p,Dl,r,t) ∧ res=x∧r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(p,l,r,Dn)∗G(l,x,res,lm)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∧r 6=NULL
Figure 4-1: An example of G(x,p,res,t)
The derived pre-predicate H captures a binary tree-like shape that would be
traversed by the method. x7→tree(Dp,Dl,r,Dn) denotes that x refers to a tree
node with its parent, l, r and next fields being Dp, Dl, r and Dn, respectively. We
use dangling references, such as Dl,Dp,Dn, as generic markers that denote field
pointers that are not traversed by the method. Thus no assertion can be made on
any of the D pointers. The post-predicate G, illustrated in Fig 4-1, adds parent
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field links for all nodes, and next field links for just the leaves. 2
Current shape analysis mechanisms [13, 20, 57] are unable to infer pre/post
specifications that ensure memory-safety for such complex examples. In this
paper, we propose a fresh approach to shape analysis that can synthesize, from
scratch, a set of shape abstractions that ensure memory safety. The central
concept behind our proposal is the use of unknown predicates (or second-order
variables) as place holders for shape predicates that are to be synthesized
directly from proof obligations gathered by our verification process. Our
proposal is based on a novel bi-abductive entailment that supports second-order
variables. The core of the new entailment procedure generates a set of relational
assumptions on unknown predicates to ensure memory safety. These
assumptions are then refined into predicate definitions, by predicate derivation
and normalization steps.
By building the generation of the required relational assumptions over unknown
predicates directly into the new entailment checker, we were able to integrate
our shape analysis into an existing program verifier with changes made only to
the entailment process, rather than the program verification/analysis itself. Our
proposed shape analysis thus applies an almost standard set of Hoare rules in
constructing proof obligations which are discharged through the use of a new
second-order bi-abductive entailment.
To sum up, we present a new modular shape analysis that can synthesize
heap memory specification on a per method basis. We rely on a second-order bi-
abduction mechanism that can give interpretations to unknown shape predicates
by inferring relational assumptions on unknown predicates, before a predicate
derivation and normalization process. There are several novel features in our
shape analysis. Firstly, it is grounded on second-order abduction rather than
2Note that new links formed by the method are dashed and colored in red.
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deduction. Secondly we provide a heap guard mechanism to support more precise
preconditions for heap specification. Lastly, we provide a instantiation scheme to
guide the entailment procedure. Our approach has been proven sound and been
implemented on top of an existing automated verification system. We show its
versatility in synthesizing a wide range of intricate shape specifications.
Organization. We shall present the shape fragment of separation logic used
for the analysis in section 4.2. We introduce the second-order bi-abductive
mechanism in section 4.3. After that we describe the instantiation scheme and
formalism of the second-order bi-abduction in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents
Hoare rules and section 5.5 highlights the soundness. The two last sections show
our implementation and a comparative remark.
4.2 Logic Syntax for Shape Specification
We revise the fragment of specification logic in section 2.2. We outline below the
fragment underlying the proposed analysis:
Disj. formula Φ ::= ∆ | Φ1 ∨ Φ2
Guarded Disj. Φg ::= ∆ | (∆ @ (κ∧pi)) | Φg1 ∨ Φg2
Conj. formula ∆ ::= ∃v¯·(κ∧pi)
Spatial formula κ ::= emp | ⊤ | v 7→c(v¯) | P(v¯) | U(v¯) | κ1∗κ2
Pure formula pi ::= α | ¬α | pi1∧pi2
Var (Dis)Equality α ::= v|v1=v2|v=NULL|v1 6=v2|v 6=NULL
Pred. Defn. Pdef ::= P(v¯) ≡ Φg
Pred. Dict. Γ ::= {Pdef1 , . . . , Pdefn }
P ∈ Known Predicates U ∈ Unknown Predicates
c ∈ Data Nodes v ∈ Variables v¯ ≡ v1. . .vn
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We introduce ∆ @ (κ∧π), a special syntactic form called guarded heap that
capture a heap context κ∧π in which ∆ holds. Thus, ∆ @ (κ∧π) holds for heap
configurations that satisfy ∆ and that can be extended such that they satisfy
∆ ∗ κ∧π. In Sec.5.2 we will describe its use in allowing our shape inference to
incorporate path sensitive information in the synthesized predicates. The
assertion language is also extended with the following formula for describing
heaps: emp denoting the empty heap; ⊤ denoting an arbitrary heap (pointed by
dangling reference); points-to assertion, x 7→c(v¯), specifying the heap in which x
points to a data structure of type c whose fields contain the values v¯; known
predicate, P(v¯), which holds for heaps in which the shape of the memory
locations reachable from v¯ can be described by the P predicate; unknown
predicates, U(v¯), with no prior given definitions. Separation conjunction κ1∗κ2
holds for heaps that can be partitioned in two disjoint components satisfying κ1
and κ2, respectively. The pure formula captures only pointer equality and
disequality. We allow a special constant NULL to denote a pointer which does not
point to any heap location. Known predicates P(v¯) are defined inductively
through disjunctive formulas Φg . Their definitions are either user-given or
synthesised by our analysis. We will use Γ to denote the repository (or set) of
available predicate definitions. Through our analysis, we shall construct an
inductive definition for each unknown predicate, where possible. Unknown
predicates that have not been instantiated would not have any definition. They
denote data fields that are not accessed by their methods, and would be marked
as dangling pointers.
4.3 Overview of Shape Inference
Our approach on specification inference comprises three main steps: (i) inferring
relational assumptions for unknown predicates via Hoare-style verification, (ii)
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deriving predicates from relational assumptions, (iii) normalizing predicates. In
this chapter, we discuss the first step, the second-order bi-abduction mechanism.
The remain steps, step (ii) and step (iii), will be discussed in the next chapter.
For (i), a key machinery is the entailment procedure that must work with
second-order variables (unknown predicates). Previous bi-abduction entailment
proposals, pioneered by [20], would take an antecedent ∆ante and a consequent
∆conseq and return a frame residue ∆frame and the precondition ∆pre, such that
the following holds: ∆pre∗∆ante  ∆conseq∗∆frame . Here, all four components use
separation logic formulas based on known predicates with prior definitions.
Taking a different tact, we start with an existing entailment procedure for
separation logic with user-defined predicates, and extend it to accept formulas
with second-order variables such that given an antecedent ∆ante and a consequent
∆conseq the resulting entailment procedure infers both the frame residue ∆frame
and a set (or conjunction) of relational assumptions (on unknowns) of the form
R = ∧ni=1(∆i ⇒ Φg i) such that:
R ∧ ∆ante  ∆conseq∗∆frame
The inferred R ensures the entailment’s validity. We shall use the following
notation ∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame) for this second-order bi-abduction process.
There are two scenarios to consider for unknown predicates: (1) ∆ante contains
an unknown predicate instance that matched with a points-to or known predicate
in ∆conseq; (2) ∆conseq contains an unknown predicate instance. An example of the
first scenario is:
U(x) ⊢ x7→snode(n)❀ (U(x)⇒x7→snode(n)∗U0(n), U0(n))
Here, we generated a relational assumption to denote an unfolding (or
instantiation) for the unknown predicate U to a heap node snode followed by
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another unknown U0(n) predicate. The data structure snode is defined as
struct snode { struct snode∗ next}. A simple example of the second scenario is
shown next.
x7→snode(NULL)∗y7→snode(NULL) ⊢ U1(x)❀ (x7→snode(NULL)⇒U1(x), y7→snode(NULL))
The generated relational assumption depicts a folding process for unknown U1(x)
which captures a heap state traversed from the pointer x. Both folding and
unfolding of unknown predicates are crucial for second-order bi-abduction. To
make it work properly for unknown predicates with multiple parameters, we
shall later provide a novel #-annotation scheme to guide these processes. For the
moment, we shall use this annotation scheme implicitly. Consider the following
method which traverses a singly-linked list and converts it to a doubly-linked list
(let us ignore the states α1, .., α5 for now):
struct node { struct node∗ prev; struct node∗ next}
void sll2dll(struct node∗ x, struct node∗ q)
{(α1) if (x==NULL)
(α2) return;
(α3) x->prev = q;
(α4) sll2dll(x->next, x); (α5)
}
To synthesize the shape specification for this method, we introduce two
unknown predicates, H for the pre-condition and G for the post-condition, as
below.
requires H(x, q) ensures G(x, q)
We then apply code verification using these pre/post specifications with
unknown predicates and attempt to collect a set of relational assumptions (over
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(A1).H(x, q) ∧ x=NULL⇒ G(x,q)
(A2).H(x, q) ∧ x 6=NULL⇒
x 7→node(xp, xn)∗Hp(xp, q)∗Hn(xn, q)





(α3). x 7→node(xp,xn)∗Hp(xp,q)∗Hn(xn,q)∧x 6=NULL
(α4). x 7→node(q, xn)∗Hp(xp, q)∗Hn(xn, q)∧x 6=NULL
(α5). x 7→node(q, xn)∗Hp(xp, q)∗G(xn, x)∧x 6=NULL
(b)
Figure 4-2: Relational assumptions (a) and program states (b) for sll2dll
the unknown predicates) that must hold to ensure memory-safety. These
assumptions would also ensure that the pre-condition of each method call is
satisfied, and that the coresponding post-condition is ensured at the end of the
method body. For example, our analysis can infer four relational assumptions for
the sll2dll method as shown in Fig. 4-2(a).
These relational assumptions include two new unknown predicates, Hp and Hn,
created during the code verification process. All relational assumptions are of
the form ∆lhs⇒∆rhs, except for (A3) which has the form ∆lhs⇒∆rhs @∆g where
∆g denotes a heap guard condition. Such heap guard condition allows more
precise pre-conditions to be synthesized (e.g. Hn in (A3)), and is shorthand for
∆lhs∗∆g⇒∆rhs∗∆g.
Let us look at how relational assumptions are inferred. At the start of the
method, we have (α1), shown in Fig. 4-2 (b), as our program state. Upon exit
from the then branch, the verification requires that the postcondition G(x, q) be
established by the program state (α2), generating the relational assumption (A1)
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via the following entailment:
(α2) ⊢ G(x,q) ❀ (A1, emp ∧ x=NULL) (E1)
To get ready for the field access x->prev, the following entailment is invoked to
unfold the unknown H predicate to a heap node, generating the relational
assumption (A2):
H(x, q)∧x 6=NULL ⊢ x 7→node(xp,xn) ❀ (A2, Hp(xp,q)∗Hn(xn,q) ∧ x 6=NULL) (E2)
Two new unknown predicates Hp and Hn are added to capture the prev (xp) and
next (xn) fields of x (i.e. they represent heaps referred to by xp and xn respectively).
After binding, the verification now reaches the state (α3), which is then changed
to (α4) by the field update x->prev = q. Relational assumption (A3) is inferred
from proving the precondition H(xn,x) of the recursive call sll2dll(x->next, x) at
the program state (α4):
(α4) ⊢ H(xn, x) ❀ (A3, x 7→node(q,xn)∗Hp(xp,q)∧x 6=NULL) (E3)
Note that the heap guard x 7→node(q, xn) from (α4) is recorded in (A3), and is
crucial for predicate derivation. The program state at the end of the recursive call,
(α5), is required to establish the post-condition G(x, q), generating the relational
assumption (A4):
(α5) ⊢ G(x,q) ❀ (A4, Hp(xp,q)∧x 6=NULL) (E4)




(2).Hr(r,p,t) ∧ r 6=NULL @ x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)⇒ H(r,x,t)
(3).Hl(l,p,t)⇒ H(l,x,lm) @ (x 7→tree(p,l,r,n) ∧ r 6=NULL)
(4).Hl(l,p,t)∗Hr(r,p,t)∗x 7→tree(p,l,r,t)∧r=NULL∧res=x⇒ G(x,p,res,t)
(5).Hn(n,p,t) ∗ x 7→tree(p,l,r,n) ∗ G(r,x,lm,t) ∗ G(l,x,res,lm)∧
r 6=NULL⇒ G(x,p,res,t)
Figure 4-3: Relational assumptions for tll
The tll example. Let us revisit the tll example shown in section 4.1. To
synthesize the shape specification for this method, we introduce two unknown
predicates, H for the pre-condition and G for the post-condition, as mentioned
earlier.
requires H(x, p, t) ensures G(x, p, res, t)
We then apply code verification using these pre/post specifications with
unknown predicates and attempt to collect a set of relational assumptions (over
the unknown predicates) that must hold to ensure memory-safety. These
assumptions would also ensure that the pre-condition of each method call is
satisfied, and that the post-condition is ensured at the end of its method body.
For example, our analysis can infer the following five relational assumptions
for the tll method as in Figure 4-3.
Our relational assumptions include four new unknown predicates, Hp, Hl, Hr and
Hn, that were created during the code verification process.
Let us look at how relational assumptions are inferred. For illustration, we
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annotate program states into the tll example as follows:






(S4) struct tree∗ lm = tll(x->r, x, t);
(S5) return tll(x->l, x, lm); (S7) }
}
(S1). H(x,p,t)
(S2). x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗Hl(l,p,t)∗Hr(r,p,t)∗Hn(n,p,t)∗Hp(xP ,p,t)
(S3). x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗Hl(l,p,t)∗Hr(r,p,t)∗Hn(n,p,t)∧r=NULL
(S4). x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗Hl(l,p,t)∗Hr(r,p,t)∗Hn(n,p,t)∧r 6=NULL
(S5). x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗Hl(l,p,t)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∗Hn(n,p,t)∧r 6=NULL
(S6). x 7→tree(p,l,r,t)∗Hl(l,p,t)∗Hr(r,p,t)∧r=NULL∧res=x
(S7). x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗G(l,x,res,lm)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∗Hn(n,p,t)∧r 6=NULL
At the start of the method, we have (S1), shown above, as our program state.
Due to a field update, x->parent, relational assumption (1) was inferred which
lead to (S2). The conditional evaluation led to (S3) and (S4), as the program
states at the start of the then-branch and else-branch, respectively. Relational
assumption (2) was then inferred from proving pre-condition H(r, x, t) of
recursive call tll(x->r, x, t) under (S4), yielding program state (S5). Also, (3)
was inferred from proving pre-condition H(l, x, lm) of the second recursive call
tll(x->l, x, lm). When inferring (3), heap guard x 7→tree(p, l, r, n)∧r 6=NULL from
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the program state (S5) was used, since Hl(l, p, t)⇒H(l, x, lm), by itself, neither
capture a connected context r 6=NULL from the then-branch, nor properly
instantiate the back (parent) pointer x. The program state (S6) at the end of
then-branch was then used to prove post-condition G(x, p, res, t). This proving
lead to relational assumption (4). Similarly, program state (S7) at the end of the
else-branch, which assumed G(r,x,lm,t)∗G(l,x,res,lm) from the two recursive
calls, would infer (5) when proving the post-condition of the method itself.
These relational assumptions are inferred symbolically during code verification
with the help of second-order bi-abduction mechanism that we are proposing.
They are also being modularly inferred on a per method basis, using automatically
generated template pre/post conditions with unknown predicates.
Compared to some prior shape analyses, such as [57, 68], which requires the
entire program to be available for analysis, our approach can perform this task
modularly on a per method basis instead.
Our approach currently works only for shape abstractions of tree-like data
structures with forward and back pointers. We are unable to infer specifications
for graph-like or overlaid data structures yet. These abstractions are being inferred
modularly on a per method basis. The inferred preconditions are typically the
weakest ones that would ensure memory safety, and would be applicable to all
contexts of use. We shall next elaborate and formalise on our second-order bi-
abduction process.
4.4 Second-Order Bi-Abduction
We have seen the need for a bi-abductive entailment procedure to systematically
handle unknown predicates. To cater to predicates with multiple parameters, we
shall use an automatic #-annotation scheme to support both unfolding and
folding of unknown predicates. Consider a predicate U(v1, .., vn, w1#, .., wm#),
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where parameters v1, .., vn are unannotated and parameters w1, .., wm are
#-annotated. From the perspective of unfolding, we permit each variable from
v1, .., vn to be instantiated at most once (we call them instantiatable), while
variables w1, .., wm are disallowed from instantiation (we call them
non-instantiatable). This scheme ensures that each pointer is instantiated at
most once, and avoids formulas, like U3(y, y) or U2(r, y)∗U3(y, x#), from being
formed. Such formulas, where a variable may be repeatedly instantiated, may
cause a trivial false pre-condition to be inferred. Though sound, it is imprecise.
From the perspective of folding, we allow heap traversals to start from variables
v1, .., vn and would stop whenever references to w1, .., wm are encountered. This
allows us to properly infer segmented shape predicates and back pointers. Our
annotation scheme is fully automated, as we would infer the #-annotation of
pre-predicates based on which parameters could be field accessed; while
parameters of post-predicates are left unannotated. For our running example,
since q parameter is not field accessed (in its method’s body), our automatic
annotation scheme would start with the following pre/post specification:
requires H(x, q#) ensures G(x, q)
Unfold. The entailment below results in an unfolding of the unknown H
predicate. It is essentially (E2) in Sec 4.3, except that q is marked explicitly as
non-instantiatable.
H(x, q#)∧x 6=NULL ⊢ x 7→node(xp, xn)❀ (A2,∆1) (E2′)
With non-instantiatable variables explicitly annotated, the assumption (A2)
becomes:
A2 ≡ H(x, q#)∧x 6=NULL ⇒ x 7→node(xp, xn)∗Hp(xp, q#)∗Hn(xn, q#)
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As mentioned earlier, we generated a new unknown predicate for each pointer
field (Hp for xp, and Hn for xn), so as to allow the full recovery of the shape of the
data structure being traversed or built. Note that each x, xp, xn appears only once
in unannotated forms, while the annotated q# remains annotated throughout to
prevent the pointer from being instantiated. If we allow q to be instantiatable in
(E2′) above, we will instead obtain:
H(x, q)∧x 6=NULL ⊢ x 7→node(xp, xn)❀ (A2′,∆′1)
We get
A2′ ≡ H(x, q)∧x 6=NULL ⇒ x 7→node(xp, xn)∗Hp(xp, q#)∗Hn(xn, q#)∗U2(q, x#),
where the unfolding process creates extra unknown predicate U2(q, x#) to capture
shape for q.
Our proposal for instantiating unknown predicates is also applicable when
known predicates appear in the RHS. These known predicates may have
parameters that act as continuation fields for the data structure. An example is
the list segment lseg(x, p) predicate where the parameter p is a continuation
field.
ll(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→snode(n) ∗ ll(n)
lseg(x, p) ≡ emp∧x=p ∨ x 7→snode(n) ∗ lseg(n, p)
Where snode (defined in the previous section) denotes singly-linked list node. Note
that continuation fields play the same role as fields for data nodes. Therefore,
for such parameters, we also generate new unknown parameters to capture the
connected data structure that may have been traversed. We illustrate this with
two examples:
U(x) ⊢ ll(x)❀ (U(x)⇒ll(x), emp)
U(x) ⊢ lseg(x, p)❀ (U(x)⇒lseg(x, q)∗U2(q), U2(p))
The first predicate ll(x) did not have a continuation field. Hence, we did not
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generate any extra unknown predicate. The second predicate lseg(x, p) did have
a continuation field p, and we generated an extra unknown predicate U2(p) to
capture a possible extension of the data structure beyond this continuation field.
Fold. A second scenario that must be handled by second-order entailment
involves unknown predicates in the consequent. For each unknown predicate
U1(v¯, w¯#) in the consequent, a corresponding assumption ∆⇒U1(v¯, w¯#) @∆g is
inferred where ∆ contains unknown predicates with at least one instantiatable
parameters from v¯, or heaps reachable from v¯ (via either any data fields or
parameters of known predicates) but stopping at non-instantiatable variables w¯#;
a residual frame is also inferred from the antecedent (but added with pure
approximation of footprint heaps [33]). For example, consider the following
entailment:
x 7→snode(q)∗q 7→snode(NULL)∧q 6=NULL ⊢ U1(x, q#)❀ (Af1,∆1)
The output of this entailment is:
Af1 ≡ x 7→snode(q)∧q 6=NULL⇒U1(x, q#) ∆1 ≡ q 7→snode(NULL)∧x 6=NULL∧x 6=q
As a comparison, let us consider the scenario where q is unannotated, as follows:
x 7→snode(q)∗q 7→snode(NULL)∧q 6=NULL ⊢ U1(x, q)❀ (Af2,∆2)
In this case, the output of the entailment becomes:
Af2 ≡ x 7→snode(q)∗q 7→snode(NULL) ⇒ U1(x, q) ∆2 ≡ x 6=NULL∧q 6=NULL∧x 6=q
Moreover, the folding process also captures known heaps that are reachable from
#-parameters as heap guard conditions, e.g. x7→node(q, xn) in our running example
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(E3):
x 7→node(q,xn)∗Hp(xp,q#)∗Hn(xn,q#)∧x6=NULL ⊢ H(xn, x#)
❀ (Hn(xn, q#)⇒ H(xn, x#) @x 7→node(q, xn), x 7→node(q,xn)∗Hp(xp,q#)∧x6=NULL) (E3′)
Such heap guards help with capturing the relations of heap structures and
recovering those relationships when necessary (e.g. back-pointer x#).
Formalism. Bi-abductive unfold is formalized in Fig. 4-4. Here, project(w¯, π)
is an auxiliary function that existentially quantifies in π all free variables that
are not in the set w¯. Thus it eliminates from π all subformulas not related to
[SO-ENTAIL-UNFOLD]
κs ≡ r 7→c(p¯) or κs ≡ P(r, p¯)
κf = ∗pj∈p¯ Uj(pj , v¯i#, v¯n#) κr = Urem(v¯i, v¯n#, r#) where Ur, Uj : fresh preds
pia = project({r, v¯i, v¯n, p¯}, pi1) pic = project({p¯}, pi2)
σ ≡ (U(r, v¯i, v¯n#) ∧ pia ⇒ κs ∗κf ∗κr ∧ pic)
κ1 ∗ κf ∗κrem ∧ pi1 ⊢ κ2 ∧ pi2❀ (R,∆R)
U(r, v¯i, v¯n#)∗κ1∧pi1 ⊢ κs∗κ2∧pi2❀ (σ∧R,∆R)
Figure 4-4: Bi-Abductive Unfolding.
w¯ (e.g. project({x, q}, q=NULL∧y>3) returns q=NULL). In the first line, a RHS
assertion, either a points-to assertion r7→c(p¯) or a known predicate instance P(r, p¯)
is paired through the parameter r with the unknown predicate U. Second, the
unknown predicates Uj are generated for the data fields/parameters of κs. Third,
the unknown predicate Urem is generated for the instantiatable parameters v¯i of
U. The fourth and fifth lines compute relevant pure formulas and generate the
assumption, respectively. Finally, the unknown predicates κf and κr are combined
in the residue of LHS to continue discharging the remaining formula in RHS.
Bi-abductive fold is formalized in Fig. 4-5. The function reach(w¯, κ1∧pi1, z¯#)
extracts portions from the antecedent heap (κ1) that are (1) unknown predicates
containing at least one instantiatable parameter from w¯; or (2) point-to or
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known predicates reachable from w¯, but not reachable from z¯. In our running
example (the entailment (E3′) on last page), the function
reach({xn},x 7→node(q, xn)∗Hp(xp, q#)∗Hn(xn, q#)∧x 6=NULL,{x#}) is used to
obtain Hn(xn, q#). More detail on this function is in the report [89]. The
heaps(∆) function enumerates all known predicate instances (of the form P(v¯))
and points-to instances (of the form r 7→c(v¯))) in ∆. The function root(κ) is
defined as: root(r 7→c(v¯)))={r}, root(P(r, v¯)) = {r}. In the first line, heaps of LHS
are separated into the assumption κ11 and the residue κ12. Second, heap guards
[SO-ENTAIL-FOLD]
κ11=reach(w¯, κ1∧π1, z¯#) ∃κ12 · κ1=κ11∗κ12




σ ≡ (κ11∧project(w¯, π1) ⇒ Uc(w¯, z¯#) @κg∧project(r¯, π1))
κ12 ∧ π1 ⊢ κ2 ∧ π2❀ (R,∆R)
κ1 ∧ π1 ⊢ Uc(w¯, z¯#) ∗ κ2 ∧ π2❀ (σ∧R,∆R)
Figure 4-5: Bi-Abductive Folding.
(and their root pointers) are inferred based on κ12 and the #-annotated
parameters z¯. The assumption is generated in the third line and finally, the
residual heap is used to discharge the remaining heaps of RHS.
4.5 Hoare Rules for Shape Inference
By supporting relational assumptions in the entailment prover, we were able to
support shape analysis within an existing program verifier. We were able to
leverage on the arithmetic reasoning capability of the verifier presented in [33] to
move beyond purely shape analysis. Though we use C as our source language,
we translate it into a core imperative language that supports a mutable
heap-based data structures (datat) and a set of methods (meth). The language is
presented in Figure 4-6. A method declaration includes a prototype,
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Program ::= datat∗ meth∗
datat ::= data c { field∗ }
field ::= t v t ::= int | bool | void | c | . . .
meth ::= t mn (([ref] t v)∗) Φpr Φpo; {e}
e ::= NULL | kτ | v | v.f | v=e | v.f=e | new c(v∗)
| e1; e2 | t v; e | mn(v∗)| if v then e1 else e2
Figure 4-6: Core Imperative Language.
pre-/post-condition and its body code. Methods can have call-by-reference
parameters (prefixed with ref). Loops are included by transforming to
tail-recursive methods with ref parameters to capture mutable variables. Code
verification is formulated as a validity proof of a Hoare-style triple
⊢ {∆pre}e{∆post}, where ∆pre denotes a formula abstracting pre-states from
which program code e can safely run and ∆post denotes a formula abstraction of
all possible post states. To support shape analysis, we extend the formulation to:
⊢ {∆pre} e {R,∆post}
where R accumulates the set of relational assumptions generated by the
entailment procedure. To support inference, the specification may contain
unknown predicates in preconditions, where they are classified as pre-predicates,
or unknown predicates in postconditions, where they are classified as
post-predicates. For clarity, we occasionally denote pre-predicates using Uprei and
post-predicates using Uposti .
We list below the resulting verification rules for field access, method calls and
method declaration as shown in Figure 4-7. Note that the primed variable (e.g. x′)
denotes the latest value (of the program variable x). The formula ∆1∗¯v∆2 denotes
∃r¯ · ([r¯/v¯′]∆1) ∗ ([r¯/v¯]∆2) ([33]).
The key outcome is that if a solution for the set of relational assumptions R
can be found, the program is memory-safe and all the methods abide by their
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[SA-FLD-RD]
data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn} ∈ Program ∆1 ⊢ x′ 7→c(v1..vn)❀ (R,∆3)
∆4=∃v1..vn · (∆3∗x′ 7→c(v1..vn)∧res=vi)




(u′=u)∗} e {R1,∆1} ∆1 ⊢ Φpo❀ (R2,∆2)
Γ = solve(R1∪R2)
t0 mn ((t u)
∗) Φpr Φpo {e}
[SA-CALL]









pr = ρ(Φpr) W={v1, .., vm−1} V={vm, .., vn}




i = vi)) ∗V ∪W Φpo
⊢ {∆} mn(v1, .., vm−1, vm, .., vn) {R,∆3}
Figure 4-7: Hoare Rules for Shape Inference.
specifications. Furthermore, we propose a bottom-up verification process which
is able to incrementally build suitable predicate instantiations one method at a
time by solving the collected relational assumptions R progressively. Our main
procedure (solve) consists of two separate operations described in the next
chapter: predicate synthesis, pred syn, and predicate normalization, pred norm.
That is solve(R) = pred norm(pred syn(R)). After the method is successfully
verified, the resulting predicate definitions Γ provide an interpretation for the
unknown predicates appearing in the specifications such that memory safety is
guaranteed. By returning Γ, the method verification allows the inferred
definitions and specifications to be consistently reused in the verification of the
remaining methods.
4.6 Soundness of Bi-Abductive Entailment
For brevity, we introduce the notation R(Γ) to denote a set of predicate
instantiations Γ satisfying the set of assumptions R. That is, for all assumptions
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∆⇒ Φg ∈ R, (i) Γ contains a predicate instantiation for each unknown predicate
appearing in ∆ and Φg ; (ii) by interpreting all unknown predicates according to
Γ, then it is provable that ∆ implies Φg , written as Γ : ∆ ⊢ Φg
With respect to the abduction phase, soundness requires that if all the
relational assumptions generated are satisfiable, then the entailment is valid.
Lemma 1. Let R be the set of relational assumptions returned by our bi-abductive
entailment checker:
∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame)
If there exists Γ={U1(v¯1)≡∆1, ..Un(v¯n)≡∆n}, a set of instantiations for unknown
predicates such that R(Γ), then the following entailment holds:
Γ : ∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq ∗∆frame.
Proof See Appendix .2.1.
4.7 Implementation
We have implemented the proposed shape analysis within a separation logic
verification system. The resulting verifier, called S2, uses the CIL infrastructure
[112] to support heap-based C programs. Our translation converts each
C-program to an expression-oriented core language with heap allocation.
Stack-allocated data structures are mimicked as heap-allocations that are
disposed at the exit of their declaration block. This allow us to guarantee
memory safety for stack accesses too. Each loop is converted to a tail-recursive
method, with pass-by-reference semantics for variables that are being updated.
Our tool utilizes external provers, e.g. Omega [125] and Z3 [45], to discharge
pure proof obligations. Our analysis modularly infers the pre/post specification
for each method. It attempts to provide the weakest possible precondition to
ensure memory safety (from null dereferencing and memory leaks), and the
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strongest possible post-condition on heap usage pattern, where possible.
We have explored the generality and efficiency of the proposed analysis through
a number of small but challenging examples. We have evaluated programs which
manipulate a wide range of data structures. The evaluation showed that our
proposed shape analysis can handle recursive methods with an expressive fragment
of shape predicate including lists (singly-, doubly-linked, nested and skip variants),
trees (binary, rose and mcf) and combinations (e.g. tll: trees whose leaves are
chained in a linked list).
4.8 Discussion
A significant body of research has been devoted to shape analysis. Most proposals
are orthogonal to our work as they focus on determining shapes based on a fixed
set of shape domains. For instance, the analysis in [106] can infer shape and certain
numerical properties but is limited to the linked list domain. The analyses from
[9, 13, 51, 66, 100, 138] are tailored to variants of lists and a fixed family of list
interleavings. Likewise, Calcagno et al. [21] describe an analysis for determining
lock invariants with only linked lists. Lee et al. [94] presents a shape analysis
specifically tailored to overlaid data structures. In the matching logic framework,
a set of predicates is typically assumed for program verification [131]. The work
[5] extends this with specification inference. However, it currently does not deal
with the inference of inductive data structure abstractions.
The proposal by Magill et al. [106, 135] is able to infer numerical properties.
While the former is still parametric in the shape domain, the latter is not fully
automatic. Similarly, the separation logic bi-abduction described in [20, 70]
assumes a set of built-in or user-defined predicates. Xisa, a tool presented by
Rival et. al. [28], works on programs with more varied shapes as long as
structural invariant checkers, which play the role of shape definitions, are
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provided. A later extension [130] also considers shape summaries for procedures
with the additional help of global analysis. Other similarly parameterized
analysis includes [62]. In comparison, our approach is built upon the foundation
of second-order bi-abductive entailment, and is able to infer unknown predicates
from scratch or guided by user-supplied assertions. This set-up is therefore
highly flexible, as we could support a mix of inference and verification, due to
our integration into an existing verification system.
With respect to fully automatic analyses, there are [16], [68] and the Forester
system [73]. Although very expressive in terms of the inferred shape classes, the
analysis proposed by Guo et al. [68] relies on a heavy formalism and depends
wholly on the shape construction patterns being present in the code. They
describe a global analysis that requires program slicing techniques to shrink the
analyzed code and to avoid noise on the analysis. Furthermore, the soundness
of their inference could not be guaranteed; therefore a re-verification of the
inferred invariants is required. Brotherston and Gorogiannis [16] propose a novel
way to synthesize inductive predicates by ensuring both memory safety and
termination. However, their proposal is currently limited to a simple imperative
language without methods. A completely different approach is presented in the
Forrester system [73] where a fully automated shape synthesis is described in
terms of graph transformations over forest automata. Their approach is based on
learning techniques that can discover suitable forest automata by incrementally
constructing shape abstractions called boxes. However, their proposal is
currently restricted both in terms of the analysed programs, e.g. recursion is not
yet supported, and in terms of the inferred shapes, as recursive nested boxes
(needed by tll) are not supported.
In the TVLA tradition, [129] describes an interprocedural shape analysis for
cut-free programs. The approach explores the interaction between framing and
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the reachability-based representation. Other approaches to shape analysis include
grammar-based inference, e.g. [95] which relies on inferred grammars to define
the recursive backbone of the shape predicates. Although [95] is able to handle
various types of structures, e.g. trees and dlls, it is limited to structures with only
one argument for back pointers. [102] employs inductive logic programming (ILP)
to infer recursive pure predicates. While, it might be possible to apply a similar
approach to shape inference, there has not yet been any such effort. Furthermore,
we believe a targeted approach would be able to easily cater for the more intricate
shapes. Since ILP has been shown to effectively synthesize recursive predicates, it
would be interesting to explore an integration of ILP with our proposal for inferring
recursive predicates of both shape and pure properties. A recent work [64] that
aims to automatically construct verification tools has implemented various proof
rules for reachability and termination properties however it does not focus on
the synthesis of shape abstractions. In an orthogonal direction, [47] presents an
analysis for constructing precise and compact method summaries. Unfortunately,
both these works lack the ability to handle recursive data structures.
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Chapter 5
Derivation and Transformation of
Shape Predicates
Given a set of relational assumption on unknown shape predicates, we propose a
solver with a set of derivation rules to infer sound definitions to the shape
predicates. To distinguish unknown pre-predicates in pre-conditions from
unknown post-predicates in post-condition, we invoke a sound mechanism to split
relational assumptions at shared base formulas. For a precise synthesis of
pre-predicates, we presented a heap guard mechanism to capture spatial context
while generating relational assumptions, we now show how to derive context of
predicate definitions, and to employ such context of the definitions during
performing inline. The proposed shape solver will be presented in section 5.2.
As shape analysis typically follows the structure of programs, it may produce
overtly complicated result and occasionally can not be immediately used by
verification systems. In our framework, the shape solver above may produce a
set of inductive predicate definitions that are beyond the capability of entailment
procedures. Especially, in a modular shape analysis, shape predicates inferred for
specifications of callees may involve in proof obligations generated to prove the
correctness of callers. Such obligations may contain different shape predicates.
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However, reasoning with different shape predicates have not been well supported
by existing entailment procedures of separation logic. A direct solution to handle
such reasoning requires capability of induction proving, like cyclic proof
presented in [17]. But the cyclic technique has not been extended to infer heap
frame. And thus, it can not be deployed in the modular reasoning. Instead of
enhancing decision procedure with such a hard requirement, we propose an
indirect solution to match predicates which have different syntactical names but
are semantically equivalent. More concretely, we propose a transformational
approach to classify shape predicates into equivalent sets. This helps to minimize
the requirement of proving among different predicates. The proposed approach
has been implemented through two phases. In the first phase, it simplifies shape
predicates by eliminating predicate without definition and eliminating useless
parameters of predicates to increase the opportunity of predicate matching. In
the second phase, it semantically matches predicates via a new lemma
mechanism. As expected, inferred specifications are more concise with smaller
number of equivalent sets of predicates. The proposed transformation will be
presented in section 5.4.
5.1 Illustration
We would like to remind that our approach on specification inference comprises
three main steps: (i) inferring relational assumptions for unknown predicates via
Hoare-style verification, (ii) deriving predicates from relational assumptions, (iii)
normalizing predicates. We discussed the first step, the second-order bi-abduction
mechanism, in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we discuss step (ii) and step
(iii), a transformation of the output from step (i). The transformation takes a set
of relational assumptions over unknown predicates as input, then it will (ii) derive
predicates from relational assumptions, (iii) normalize predicates.
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5.1.1 The sll2dll Example
With the set of relational assumptions inferred by the shape analysis in Figure
4-2, we proceed to transform them as follows. For (ii), we employ a predicate
derivation procedure to transform (by either equivalence-preserving or abductive
steps) the set of relational assumptions into a set of predicate definitions. Sec. 5.2
gives more details on predicate derivation. For our sll2dll example, we initially
derive the following predicate definitions (for H and G):
H(x, q) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→node(xp, xn) ∗ Hp(xp, q) ∗ H(xn, x)
G(x, q) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨x 7→node(q, xn) ∗ G(xn, x)
Although the definition of the shape predicate H is sound, it is not easy to realize
that H is a full singly-linked list. Thus we proceed to the last step, step (iii), for a
further simplification.
In the last step, we use a normalization procedure to simplify the definition of
predicate H. Since Hp is discovered as a dangling predicate, the special variable Dp
corresponds to a dangling reference introduced:
H(x, q) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→node(Dp, xn) ∗ H(xn, x).
Furthermore, we can synthesize a more concise H2 from H by eliminating its useless
q parameter:
H(x, q) ≡ H2(x)
H2(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→node(Dp, xn) ∗ H2(xn)
As can be seen, the predicate H2 is a singly-linked list and H is equivalent to H2.
If singly-linked list (named sll) and doubly-linked list (named dll) predicates
are provided in advance, the predicates H, H2 and G would be matched as:
H(x, q) ≡ sll(x) H2(x) ≡ sll(x) G(x,q) ≡ dll(x,q)
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5.1.2 The tll Example
Similarly, with the set of relational assumptions inferred by the shape analysis in
Figure 4-3, we proceed to transform them in this chapter. The tll example will
be used as a running example to highlight our derivation and normalization in
this chapter. For a summary, at the end our transformation can synthesize the
following predicate definitions (for H and G):
H(x,p,t) ≡ x 7→tree(Dp,Dl,r,Dn)∧r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(Dp,l,r,Dn)∗H(l,x,lm)∗H(r,x,t) ∧ r 6= NULL
G(x,p,res,t) ≡ x 7→tree(p,Dl,r,t) ∧ res=x∧r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(p,l,r,Dn)∗G(l,x,res,lm)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∧r 6=NULL
The variables Dl, Dp and Dn correspond to dangling predicates that have not been
field accessed. Note that for memory safety, the input tree x must contain at
least one node and that x->l must be non-null when x->r is non-null. These
requirements are captured by our synthesized pre-predicate.
5.2 Deriving Shape Predicates
Given a set of the relational assumptions, we proceed to split them into two
sets: a set of relational assumptions of pre-predicates and another set of relational
assumptions of post-predicates. We then apply a series of refinement steps in order
to derive predicate definitions for each pre- and post-predicate.
5.2.1 Algorithm Outline
Fig. 5-1 outlines our strategy for applying the refinement steps. We use the
[Syn-∗] notation for refinement rules that are described in later sub-sections.
First, assumptions on pre-predicates from those on post-predicates are separated
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function pred syn( R)
Γ← ∅
R ← exhaustively apply [Syn-Base] on R
Rpre,Rpost ← sort-group(R)
while Rpre 6=∅ do
Upre, σ ← pick unknown and select related assumptions in Rpre
U
pre
def← apply [Syn-Case], [Syn-Group-Pre],[Syn-Pre-Def] on σ
Rpre,Rpost ← inline Upredef in (Rpre \ σ) and Rpost
Γ← Γ ∪ {Upredef}
end while
while Rpost 6=∅ do
Upost, σ ← pick unknown and select related assumptions in Rpost
U
post
def ← apply [Syn-Group-Post], [Syn-Post-Def] on σ
discharge Upost obligations




Figure 5-1: Shape Derivation Outline
by splitting base-case constraints in relational assumptions with both types of
predicates.
5.2.2 Base Splitting of Pre/Post-Predicates
[Syn-base]
σ : Upre(x¯)∗κ∧pi ⇒ Upost(y¯)
σ1 : U
pre(x¯)∧project(x¯, pi)⇒emp σ2 : κ∧pi ⇒ Upost(y¯)
κg=∗{κ1 | κ1∈heaps(κ)∧pars(κ1)∩x¯6=∅} w¯=
⋃{pars(κ1) | κ1∈κg}
σ3 : U
pre(x¯)⇒Ufr(x¯) @κg∧project(x¯∪w¯, pi) σ4 : Ufr(x¯) ⇒ ⊤
if is base(x¯, pi)=true then (σ1∧σ2) else (σ∧σ3∧σ4)
Figure 5-2: Shape Predicate Derivation: Base Splitting Rule
We first deal with relational assumptions of the form Upre(. . .)∗∆ ⇒ Upost(. . .),
which capture constraints on both a pre-predicate and a post-predicate. To allow
greater flexibility in applying specialized techniques for pre-predicates or post-
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predicates, we split the assumption into two assumptions such that pre-predicate
Upre is separated from post-predicate Upost. Base splitting can be formalized as in
Figure 5-2. The premise contains an assumption (σ) which could be split. The
conclusion captures the new relational assumptions. There are two scenarios:
(1) The first scenario takes place when the test is base(x¯, pi) holds. It signifies that
pi contains a base case formula for some pointer(s) in x¯. Note that is base(x¯, pi)
holds if and only if (∃ v∈x¯. pi ⊢ v=NULL) or (∃v1,v2∈x¯.pi ⊢ v1=v2). In such a situation,
the assumption σ is split into σ1 and σ2. This reflects the observation that a pre-
predicate guard will likely constrain the pre-predicate to a base-case with empty
heap. This scenario happens in our running example where the assumption (A1)
is split to:
(A1a). H(x, q) ∧ x=NULL⇒ emp (A1b). emp ∧ x=NULL⇒ G(x,q)
(2) If the test is base(x¯, pi) fails, there is no base case information available for us
to instantiate Upre(x¯). The assumption σ is not split and kept in the result. To
have a more precise derivation, we would also record the fact that Upre(x¯) has no
instantiation under the current context. To do this, in the second line we record
in κg such a heap context (related to x¯), extract in w¯ related pointers from the
context, and introduce a fresh unknown predicate Ufr as the instantiation for Upre,
as indicated by the assumption σ3 in the third line. Note the heap guard specifies
the context under which such an assumption holds. We also add σ4 into the
result, where the new predicate Ufr is instantiated to the afore-mentioned memory
locations (encapsulated by ⊤). Assumptions of the form Ufr(p)⇒ ⊤ are being used
to denote dangling pointers. We also note that introducing the dangling predicate
Ufr into the guarded assumption σ3 is essential to help relate non-traversed pointer
fields between the pre-predicate Upre and the post-predicate Upost. The function
pars(κ) (the 2nd line) retrieves parameters: pars(r7→c(v¯))) = v¯, pars(P(r, v¯)) = v¯.




The test is base({p}, n=NULL) fails. In addition to (σ5), the splitting returns also
(σ6) : U
pre(p)⇒ Ufr(p) @ (x 7→node(p,n)∧n=NULL) (σ7) : Ufr(p)⇒ ⊤
For the tll example in Sec 4.3, the [Syn-base] transformation can be applied to
assumption (4) yielding the following three new assumptions:
(4a) res 7→tree(p,l,r,t)∗Hl(l,p,t)∧r=NULL∧res=x⇒ G(x,p,res,t)
(4b) Hr(r, p, t) ∧ r=NULL⇒ emp
(4c) Hl(l,p,t)⇒ Hfl(l,p,t) @ (res7→tree(p,l,r,t)∧r=NULL)
(4d) Hfl(l,p,t)⇒ ⊤
Pre-predicate Hr captures r=NULL as its base-case split. Pre-predicate Hl uses a
heap guard for its base context, and ⊤ to denote an un-accessed dangling heap
residue encapsulated in Hfl.
5.2.3 Assumption Sorting and Partitioning
In order to allow for a convenient instantiation order, we sort and group together
each set of relational assumptions pertaining to the same predicate, through sort-
group(R). Intuitively, the call to sort-group(R) will sort assumptions relevant to
each predicate according to the following pattern:
1. H(. . .) ∧ π ⇒ H2(. . .) @∆
2. H(. . .)⇒ H2(. . .)
3. H(. . .) ∗∆⇒ H2(. . .)
4. H(. . .)⇒ ∆
5. H(. . .) ∧ π ⇒ ∆
6. ∆⇒ G(. . .)
The first four forms could be used directly for in-lining if they are not
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self-recursive. Guarded assumptions (even if disjunctive but not self-recursive)
are given high priority to facilitate their early removal by inlining. The fifth form
leads to disjunctive recursive formula, and is not inlined for conciseness reason.
As mentioned, post-predicates are only processed after all the pre-predicates
have been synthesized. In order to decrease the number of assumptions that need
to be considered during the derivation, we will try to partition the assumptions
relevant to a predicate into assumptions that will used in the synthesise proces
and assumptions that will be treated as proof obligations to be discharged after
the predicate synthesis. As a simple example, the relational assumptions
generated for the tll structure would be ordered and partitioned into: (i)
assumptions to be used in pre-predicate synthesis [(3), (2), (4b), (4c), (4d), (1)],
(ii) assumptions denoting outstanding proof obligations related to pre-predicates
∅, (iii) assumptions to be used in post-predicate synthesis [(4a), (5)], (iv)
post-predicate obligations ∅. Note that we order pre-predicates before
post-predicates, and would synthesize the simpler Hl and Hr predicates, before
the H predicate. Also, the processing of post-obligation for a post-predicate is
done after the synthesis of the respective post-predicate. This could generate
extra assumptions for other un-sythesised predicates.
5.2.4 Deriving Pre-Predicates
[Syn-Case]
U(x¯)∧π1⇒∆1 @∆1g U(x¯)∧π2⇒∆2 @∆2g π1∧π2 6=⇒ false
∆1∧∆2⇒x¯∧∆3 ∆1g∧∆2g⇒x¯∧∆3g sat(∆3g)
U(x¯)∧π1∧¬π2⇒∆1 @∆3g U(x¯)∧π2∧¬π1⇒∆2 @∆3g
U(x¯)∧π1∧π2⇒∆3 @∆3g
Figure 5-3: Shape Predicate Derivation: Case Split on Pre-Predicates Rule




In order to derive definitions for these pre-predicates, the first step is to transform
the relational assumptions that overlap on their guards by forcing an explicit case
analysis that generates a set of relational assumptions disjoint on their guard
conditions as in Figure 5-3. For brevity, we assume a renaming of free variables
to allow x¯ to be used as arguments in both assumptions. Furthermore, we use the
⇒x¯∧ operator to denote a normalization of overlapping conjunction, ∆1∧∆2 [127].
Informally, in order for ∆1∧∆2 to hold, it is necessary that the shapes described by
∆1 and ∆2 agree when describing the same memory locations. Normalization thus
determines the overlapping locations, ∆c such that ∆1=∆c∗∆′1 and ∆2=∆c∗∆′2
and returns ∆c∗∆′1∗∆′2. We defer formal definition of⇒x¯∧ to Section 5.3.1.Once all
the relational assumptions for a given pre-predicate have been transformed such
that the pure guards do not overlap, we may proceed to combine them as follows:
[Syn-Group-Pre]
U(x¯)∧π1 ⇒ Φg1 U(x¯)∧π2 ⇒ Φg2 π1∧π2 ⇒ false
U(x¯) ∧ (π1∨π2) ⇒ Φg1∧π1 ∨ Φg2∧π2
We shall perform this exhaustively until a single relational assumption for U is
derived. If the assumption RHS is independent of any post-predicate it becomes








d (x¯) ≡ ∆1 @ (κ1∧π1) ∨ . . . ∨∆n @ (κn∧πn)
Upre(x¯)∧πa ⇒ (Upred (x¯) ∗ κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg)
S1 = {∆i∗∆r∗κi | κ∧π ⊢ κi∧πi❀ (∅,∆r)}





Figure 5-4: Shape Predicate Derivation: Inline Rule.
For the tll example, by the above rules, (2) and (4b) yield:
(6). Hr(r,p,t) ≡ H(r,x,t)∧r 6=NULL @ x 7→tree(p,l,r,n) ∨ emp∧r=NULL
Similarly, (3) and (4c) derives Hl:.
(7). Hl(l,p,t) ≡ H(l,x,lm) @ x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∧r 6=NULL
∨ Hfl(l,p,t) @ x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∧r=NULL
This conversion of each derived relational assumption into a definition for its
pre-predicate is done without any weakening. As the derived predicate may
contain heap guards, we may remove them by inlining predicate occurrences with
the relevant heap context. For example, relational assumption (1) for unknown
predicate H contains a heap context that would allow Hr and Hl to be safely
inlined, giving:
H(x,p,t) ≡ x 7→tree(xp,l,r,xn)∗H(l,x,lm)∗H(r,x,t)∗Hp(xp,p,t)∗Hn(xn,p,t)∧r 6=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(xp,l,r,xn)∗Hfl(l,x,t)∗Hp(xp,p,t)∗Hn(xn,p,t)∧r=NULL
Formally, such predicate inlining can be carried out as shown in Figure 5-4.
Inlining serves two purposes: (i) allow instantiation of back pointers with the use
of heap guards; (ii) minimize the number of predicates a definition relies on. As
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an eager optimization, the inlining discards infeasible disjuncts in which the
context contradicts the guard and also drops the guard where it is already
satisfied.
5.2.5 Deriving Post-Predicates
We start the derivation for a post-predicate after all pre-predicates have been
derived. We can incrementally group each pair of relational assumptions on a
post-predicate, as follows:
[Syn-Group-Post]
∆a ⇒ Upost(x¯) ∆b ⇒ Upost(x¯)
∆a ∨∆b ⇒ Upost(x¯)
By exhaustively applying the above reduction all assumptions relating to predicate
Upost get condensed into an assumption of the form: ∆1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∆n ⇒ Upost(x¯).
This may then be used to confirm the post-predicate by generating the following
predicate definition:
[Syn-Post-Def]
∆1 ∨ . . . ∨∆n ⇒ Upost(x¯)
Upost(x¯) ≡ ∆1 ∨ . . . ∨∆n
Using this, we can combine (4a) and (5) to give:
G(x,p,res,t) ≡ x 7→tree(p,l,r,t)∗Hl(l,xh,th) ∧ res=x∧r=NULL
∨x 7→tree(p,l,r,n)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∗G(l,x,res,lm)∗Hn(n,xh,th)∧r 6=NULL
5.2.6 Obligation for Post-Predicates
Memory locations abstracted by post-predicates may be further accessed after a
recursive call. This may lead to relational assumptions of the following form.
Upost(. . .) ∧ π ⇒ ∆
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We regard this as an obligation that has to be proven, and at the same time it could
also be used to infer the definition of unknown post-predicates that were generated.
As an example, consider the following post-predicate relational obligation:
G(r, x)∧x 6=NULL⇒ r 7→node(rv, rn) ∗ Gr(rn, x#)∗Gx(x, r#)
This obligation introduces two extra unknown post-predicates Gr and Gx. In order
to synthesize definitions for them, it is possible to leverage on earlier synthesized
definitions for G. Thus, if such a definition exists, say:
G(r, x) ≡ x 7→node(v, NULL) ∧ r = x
∨ x 7→node(xv, xn) ∗ Gx(xn, r) ∗ r 7→node( , NULL)
We can re-use our second-order entailment to prove the earlier post-predicate
obligation, which generates the following set of relational assumptions on Gr and
Gx.
r=NULL ⇒ Gr(r, )
x=r ∧ x 6=NULL ⇒ Gx(x, r)
x 7→node( , xn) ∗ Gx(xn, r) ⇒ Gx(x, r)
Subjecting them to synthesis for post-predicate yields:
Gr(r, ) ≡ r=NULL
Gx(x, r) ≡ x=r ∧ x 6=NULL ∨ x 7→node( , xn) ∗ Gx(xn, r)
More formally,
[Syn-Post-Obl]
Upost(v¯)∧π ⇒ ∆ (Upost(v¯)≡∆Upost) ∈ Γ ∆Upost∧π ⊢ ∆❀ (R,∆f)
R
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π ∧∆⇒v¯∧ (∆ ∧ π, { }) ∆ ∧ π ⇒v¯∧ (∆ ∧ π, { })
∆1 ∧∆3 ⇒v¯∧ (∆5,S1) ∆2 ∧∆4 ⇒v¯∧ (∆6,S2)
(∆1 ∨∆2) ∧ (∆3 ∨∆4)⇒v¯∧ (∆5 ∨∆6,S1 ∪ S2)
P is known x∈v¯ y¯ ∩ v¯ = ∅ ρ=[y¯ 7→ z¯]
∆1 ∧ ρ ∆2 ⇒v¯∪z¯∧ (∆3,S)
P(x, z¯) ∗∆1 ∧ P(x, y¯) ∗∆2 ⇒v¯∧ (P(x, z¯) ∗∆3,S)
U1, U2 are dangling x ∈ v¯ ρ = [y¯ 7→ z¯] y¯ ∩ v¯ = ∅
∆1 ∧ ρ ∆2 ⇒v¯∪z¯∧ (∆3,S) S1 = S∪{U1≡U2}
U1(x, z¯)∗∆1 ∧ U2(x, y¯)∗∆2 ⇒v¯∧ (U1(x, z¯)∗∆3,S1)
x∈v¯ ρ = [y¯ 7→ z¯] y¯∩v¯=∅ ∆1 ∧ ρ ∆2 ⇒v¯∪z¯∧ (∆3,S)
x 7→c(z¯) ∗∆1 ∧ x 7→c(y¯) ∗∆2 ⇒v¯∧ (x 7→c(z¯) ∗∆3,S)
Figure 5-5: Conjunctive Unification Rules.
5.3 Unification
5.3.1 Conjunctive Unification
When describing the pre-predicate derivation, we observed that there is a need
for a normalization operation for formulas ∆1 ∧∆2 to ensure the result is within
the logic fragment described in Sec. 4.2. We obtain this normalization through a
conjunctive unification step, ⇒v¯∧. Informally, in order for ∆1∧∆2 to be satisfiable,
to describe at least one feasible heap, it is necessary that the shapes described
by ∆1 and ∆2 agree when describing the same memory locations. Based on this
observation, it is possible to construct a possibly stronger approximation for ∆1 ∧
∆2 expressed in our logic fragment by unifying the common heap locations as
presented in Figure 5-5. To streamline the unification process, the ⇒∧ operation
is parameterized with a set of variables v¯ which denotes the set of possibly common
memory locations. We seed this parameter initially with the set of arguments of
the predicate under construction.
In the process of unifying predicate instances or heap nodes, the
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transformation on one hand modifies the formulas by applying a substitution of
the arguments, and on the other constructs extra constraints on dangling
predicates, thus strengthening the result. We observe however that this does not
affect the soundness of the result as this strengthening is restricted to
pre-condition predicate definitions. By imposing an equality constraint on
dangling predicates the resulting definitions become more concise, with fewer
extra predicates being synthesized.
Naturally, this strengtheningmay lead to a contradiction which we will consider
as a failure of shape analysis, due to contradictory scenarios. An example is
illustrated below:
x=NULL ∧ x 7→node(p, n)⇒x∧ (false , { })
The formula above is contradicted since it is required that the pointer x both
equals to NULL and points to an allocated object.
Conjunctive unification may also lead to a satisfiable program state, but it is
allowed to impose some equivalent constraints on the unknown predicates. This is
helpful for obtaining more concise specification with fewer synthesized predicates.
5.3.2 Disjunctive Unification
We propose to apply disjunctive unification to derive more concise definitions for
post-predicate. The aim here is to factor out common constraints on disjunctive
branches of a given post-predicate:




x 7→c(y¯)∗R(x, a¯, y¯)⇒ U(x, a¯)
∆1 ∨∆2 ⇒ R(x, a¯, y¯)
so that common heap terms in disjunct can be abstracted.
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5.4 Normalizing Shape Predicates
In this chapter, we propose a preliminary investigation into normalizing inferred
shape predicates. Our primary aims is to reduce the complexity of the inferred
predicates.
Shape predicates are either provided by programmers or derived by shape
analysis (like in Chapter 4). Before feeding those to program verification, we
propose to apply normalization to transform each predicate definition to its most
concise form. Given a set of shape predicates Γ, our current method uses four key
steps:
function pred norm(Γ)
Γ1 ← process-dangling-and-unused-preds Γ
Γ2 ← eliminate-useless-parameters Γ1
Γ3 ← perform-predicate splitting on Γ2
return reuse-predicates Γ3
end function
5.4.1 Detecting and Eliminating Dangling Predicates
We have seen how relational assumptions are soundly transformed into predicate
definitions. However, it is still possible for some pre-predicates not to have any
definition. As mentioned in Section, 4.3, these dangling predicates denote fields
that were not accessed. Though it is safe to drop such predicates (by frame rule),
we keep them to capture linking information between pre- and post-conditions.
In this predicate normalization step, we associate each dangling predicate
U(x, ..) encapsulating a pointer that is instantiated and not an argument of the
current method, with a logical variable DU denoting such a predicate instance.
With this extra notation, in effect, we are making explicit that the addresses
pointed to by such fields have neither been read nor written to during the
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execution of its method. Thus, these logical variables appear in the precondition,
and after the execution, may also appear in the postcondition. For example, in
Section 5.2 we showed how definitions for H, G, Hn and Hp can be obtained. Since
Hfl, Hn and Hp are dangling predicates, we can further refine the definitions for H,
G as follows:
H(x,p,t) ≡ x 7→tree(Dp,Dl,r,Dn) ∧ r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(Dp,l,r,Dn)∗H(l,x,lm)∗H(r,x,t)∧r 6=NULL
G(x,p,res,t) ≡ x 7→tree(p,Dl,r,t)∧res=x∧r=NULL
∨x 7→tree(p,l,r,Dn)∗G(l,x,res,lm)∗G(r,x,lm,t)∧r 6=NULL
Notice that the marking of pointers as dangling is guided by the context and thus
reflects the access patterns. For example the left field in both H and G predicates,
in the branch with NULL right subtree, are marked as dangling since the method
does not accessed any of these left fields, thus imposing no constraints over these
subtrees. Similarly, in the post predicate G the next field is dangling for nodes
that are not leaves as those fields have not been accessed. We can formalize these
steps as follows:
U(y¯) ≡ (Ud(x, v¯)∗κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg) ∨ Φg x 6∈ y¯ Ud(x, v¯) ≡ ⊤
fresh DUd δ={(DUd/x)}
U(y¯) ≡ ((κ∧π)[δ]) @ (κg∧πg) ∨ Φg
This step consists of (a) identifying each unknown predicate with no
definition (i.e. Ud(x, v¯) ≡ ⊤); (b) associating the field with a unique logical
variable denoting the set of all possible values for that field (i.e. fresh DUd); (c)
substituting each predicate instance with the logical variable. These steps denote
equivalent-preserving transformations.
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5.4.2 Eliminating Useless Parameters
We observe that there are cases in which predicate arguments are not used in
the synthesized definitions. For example, the last two parameters of our derived
pre-predicate for tll are redundant.
In order to simplify the definitions and improve predicate reuse, we propose
to detect and eliminate such arguments. For a given predicate definition, P(x¯) ≡
∆, we can discover if any constraint in the predicate body involves a parameter
through a standard, but sound flow analysis. Once a set of candidate arguments, z¯,
has been identified, we construct a new unknown predicate Uz(x¯
′) where x¯′ = x¯\ z¯
which can then be instantiated by running the bi-abductive entailment check on
the following entailment where P′(x¯) ≡ ∃z¯.∆:
P′(x¯) ⊢ Uz(x¯′)
This would gather the necessary set of assumptions on Uz that can provide a
definition for the new predicate without the useless argument(s). This could be
followed by an equivalent check that with the inferred definition Uz(x¯)⊢P′(x¯). Thus,
ideally, the resulting definitions should be:
P(x¯) ≡ Uz(x¯′) Uz(x¯′) ≡ ∆′
Using this step, we can obtain a much simpler pre-predicate for tll:
H(x,p,t) ≡ Hf(x)
Hf(x) ≡ x 7→tree(Dp,Dl,r,Dn) ∧ r=NULL
∨ x 7→tree(Dp,l,r,Dn)∗Hf(l)∗Hf(r) ∧ r 6= NULL
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5.4.3 Reusing Predicates
In order to derive more concise predicate definitions, we propose an equivalence
detection step that would try to match a newly inferred definition with a
predicate definition previously provided or inferred. We leverage on our
second-order entailment prover to perform this task, but limit its folding steps to
syntactically matching of predicates that are possibly equivalent. We also use an
analysis to pre-determine those predicates that are unlikely to be equivalent, or
have already been processed as such. For any two synthesized predicates U1(v¯)
and U2(w¯), we first align their parameters, and then prove two entailments
unfold[U1(v¯)] ⊢ U2(w¯) and unfold[U2(w¯)] ⊢ U1(v¯). (Each unfold replaces a
predicate instance by its definition. It ensures that our inductive proof is
well-founded.) If both entailments fail, we assert the pair of predicates to be
disequal. If only one of the entailments succeeds, we assert that a predicate
subsumption has been detected. If both succeeded, we may return a further set
of possibly equivalence pairs, from with we must prove the equivalence. When no
more pairs of possibly equivalent predicates are found, we assert U1(v¯) ↔ U2(v¯)
to indicate the equivalence of the sets of pairs of predicates that we have just
proven. For our running tll example, we can detect the following subsumption:
G(x,res,t) → H(x). While this is not an equivalence, the newly discovered
implication could serve as a lemma that may be automatically utilized by the
entailment process.
5.4.4 Predicate Splitting
We illustrate our proposal through the zip method presented in Figure 5-6. The
zip example is to sum up the corresponding integers from two lists. The two lists
are of the same length, otherwise the program aborts.
The zip method has three return points at lines 4, 5, and 9. While the
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1. struc node { int val; struc node ∗next};
2. struc node∗ zip (struc node ∗x, struc node ∗y) {
3. if (x==NULL)
4. if (y!=NULL) abort;
5. else return x;
6. else {
7. x->val = x->val+y->val;




Figure 5-6: Split Predicates: Code of zip Method.
returns at lines 5 and 9 describe normal execution, the return at line 4 captures
an abnormal execution.
We classify the former execution as good scenarios and the latter execution
as bad scenario such that users want to specify their requirements and verify
its implementation against the specification. For the good scenarios, the shape
analysis presented in section 5.2 can infer the following shape specification that
guarantees memory safety for the method:
requires twosame(x, y) ensures twosame(x, y)∧res=x
with the following predicate for the safety of the above program:
twosame(x, y) ≡ x=NULL ∧ y=NULL
∨ x 7→node( , q)∗y 7→node( , r)∗twosame(q, r)
Inspired by a decidable fragment of separation logic with inductive predicates
presented in [76], we restrict that each predicate expresses heap region accessible
via one root pointer. In the example, the pointers x and y in synthesized
predicate twosame are both roots and thus twosame is not normalized. We are
going to transform that predicate into normal form through a mechanism of
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lemma synthesis. Our lemma notations are adopted from [113].
With the predicate twosame given above , we illustrate a split-predicate tactic
to derive, where possible, lemmas of the following form:
lemma infer [U1; U2] twosame(x, y)→ U1(x)∗U2(y)
with U1 and U2 are unknown predicates that need to be inferred. The lemma above
denotes known facts about valid implication over heap formula that can be used
by the entailment checker. To explore such splitting, we can follow the example
of useless parameter elimination where our second-order bi-abductive entailment
is again used to infer definitions for unknown predicates, U1 and U2. Once these
definitions are derived, we can even use the same entailment check to determine if
the converse implication twosame(x, y) ← U1(x)∗U2(y) holds. For this example,
Using shape analysis (e.g. in the previous section), we can infer the following
definition:
twosame(x, y) → U1(x)∗U2(y)
U1(x) ≡ x=NULL ∨ x 7→node( , n) ∗ U1(n)
U2(x) ≡ x=NULL ∨ x 7→node( , n) ∗ U2(n)
Furthermore, to obtain an equivalent transformation, the strengthening lemma has
to be valid:
lemma check twosame(x, y) ← U1(x)∗U2(y)
However, those inferred definitions of HP1 and HP2 above can not be used to
prove the validity of the strengthening lemma.
We only derive a weakening lemma that can be applied to post-condition, but
not to pre-condition. For safely splitting pre-condition of twosame which captures
two lists of the same length, we will need to extend our inference to capture size
properties on lists.
To assure its validity, we must first detect that size property of the predicates
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should be captured. We extend U1 and U2 predicates with size property by using
predicate extension mechanism presented in [135]
U1(x,n) ≡ (x=NULL∧n=0) ∨ (x 7→node( ,p) ∗ U1(p,n−1))
U2(x,n) ≡ (x=NULL∧n=0) ∨ (x 7→node( , p) ∗ U2(p,n−1))
After that, we invoke the following strengthening lemma synthesis:
lemma infer [P] H(x, y) ← U1(x, m) ∗ U2(y, n) ∧ P(m,n)
with P is unknown predicate on pure properties that needs to be inferred
Using pure bi-abduction mechanism [135], the lemma above is valid when the
following set of constraints has a solution:
P(m,n) ⇒ m=0 ∧ n=0
P(m,n) ⇒ m1=m−1 ∧ n1=n−1 ∧ P(m1,n1)
By invoking a fixpoint computation (e.g. [124]), we obtain
P(m,n) ≡ m=n
Finally, we synthesize the following lemma:
lemma H(root,y) ↔ U1(root,m) ∗ U1(y,n) ∧ m=n
Using these newly synthesized predicates U1 and U2, we have more opportunity
to match/reuse them with given library predicates. For example, using technique
in section 5.4.3, we can match U1 and U2 with the lln, a linked list with length
property. Finally, we generate the following specification for the zip method:
117
requires lln(x,m)∗ lln(y,n)∧m=n ensures lln(x,m)∗ lln(y,n)∧m=n∧res=x
5.5 Soundness of Derivation and Normalization
Here we briefly outline several key soundness results, and leave some of the proof
details to Appendix .2. For brevity, we introduce the notation R(Γ) to denote a
set of predicate instantiations Γ satisfying the set of assumptions R. That is, for
all assumptions ∆⇒ Φg ∈ R, (i) Γ contains a predicate instantiation for each
unknown predicate appearing in ∆ and Φg ; (ii) by interpreting all unknown
predicates according to Γ, then it is provable that ∆ implies Φg , written
as Γ : ∆ ⊢ Φg
In order to prove the synthesis step sound we need to prove that if a set of
predicate definitions is constructed then those definitions satisfy the initial set
of assumptions. Since the synthesis consists of assumption refinement, predicate
generation and predicate normalization, we will argue (i) assumption refinement
does not introduce spurious satisfying instantiations, (ii) the generated predicates
satisfy the refined assumptions, and (iii) normalization is meaning preserving.
Lemma 2. Given a set of relational assumptions R, let R′ be the assumption
set obtained by applying any of the refinement steps [Syn-Base], [Syn-Case],
[Syn-Group-Pre], [Syn-Inline], or [Syn-Group-Post], then for any Γ such that R′(Γ), we
have R(Γ).
Proof See Appendix .2.2.
Lemma 3. Given a set of relational assumptions R with only one pre-assumption,
Upre(v¯)⇒Φg , on a predicate Upre, if a final solution Γ is produced by our algorithm,
then (Upre(v¯)≡Φg)∈ Γ. Similarly, given a set of relational assumptions R with
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only one post-assumption on Upost⇒Φg , if a final solution Γ is produced, then
(Upost(v¯)≡Φg)∈ Γ.
Proof See Appendix .2.3.
While the above lemmas state that the constructed definitions satisfy the
constraints used to construct them, it must also be shown that all assumptions
have been considered.
Lemma 4. Given a set of assumptions R, if the pred syn(R) produces a set of
instantiations Γ then R(Γ).
Proof Sketch : By case analysis on the assumption structure we show that all
assumptions have either been proven or incorporated into predicate definitions.
The full proof is presented in Appendix .2.4. ✷
Lastly, it is needed to show that for a given set of assumptions, R, and a
set of instantiations Γ that satisfies R, the normalization of Γ produces a set of
instantiations that still satisfies R.
Lemma 5. Given a set of assumptions R and a predicate instantiation Γ such that
R(Γ), let Γ′ be the set of predicate instantiations such that Γ′ = pred norm(Γ), then
R(Γ′).
Proof Sketch : We show that by construction the normalization steps are
meaning preserving. See Appendix .2.5 for the full proof. ✷
Theorem 5.5.1 (Soundness). Given two separation logic formulas with unknown
predicates ∆ante and ∆conseq, if
∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame) and Γ=pred norm(pred syn(R))
then Γ : ∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq ∗∆frame
Proof It follows from the structure of pred syn, pred norm and Lemmas 1 to
5.
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5.6 Towards Complete Specification Inference
We are beginning to work towards complete specification inference. In this section,
we give a preliminary discussion on extending the shape analysis to this research
direction.
5.6.1 Enhancing Second-order Bi-Abduction
The [SO-ENTAIL-UNFOLD] rule, presented in section 4.4, infers missing information
that is safe to establish pointer field accesses. To support specification inference
for both safe and erroneous scenarios, we need to revise this rule to infer additional
information that causes memory errors on those field accesses. More concretely,
we need to enhance the abduction to infer missing guards that is either consistent
with heaps of RHS (for safety) or inconsistent with heaps of RHS (for error). As a
result, the revised [SO-ENTAIL-UNFOLD] is able to generate relational assumptions
for both safety and errors.
Computing the guards above relies on a reduction, called eXPure, from a
separation logic formula to a first-order logic formula. To implement this
reduction, we make use of the decision procedure presented in [18] to compute
shape predicate invariants. That procedure provides an algorithm to compute fix
points (as exact pure formula) of a separation logic formula with inductive shape
predicates. With the fragment of separation logic in section 4.2 which consists of
heaps and only (dis)equality pure constraints, this computation is sound,
complete and terminating. We illustrate the reduction through the two following
examples:
eXPure(x 7→snode(NULL) ∧ z=NULL) ❀ x 6=NULL ∧ z=NULL
eXPure(x 7→snode(y)∗y 7→snode(NULL)) ❀ x 6=NULL∧y 6=NULL∧x 6=y
With this eXPure reduction, we now give two entailment checks to illustrate
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the extension of the [SO-ENTAIL-FOLD] as discussed above.
Example 1.
H(x) ⊢ x 7→snode(p)
In this entailment, we propose to perform bi-abduction to get either a valid or
an invalid result. For a valid check, we infer a guard condition that is necessary
for the unknown predicate H to establish the RHS. We make use of error status
values presented in Chapter 3 to explicitly express status of states
√
for safety and
℧ for errors. For example, from x 7→snode(p) of RHS, we can infer a guard that
is consistent with the RHS as follows: πg ≡ eXPure(x 7→snode(p)). That yields
πg≡x 6=NULL. Like the present mechanism, we can infer the following relational
assumption:
σs ≡ H(x) ⇒ x 7→snode(p)∗Hp(p) √
and the residue is ∆s=x 7→snode(p)∗Hp(p)∧x 6=NULL √.
For an invalid check, we infer a guard condition that is unsatisfiable for the
unknown predicate H to establish the RHS. For example, from x 7→snode(p) of
RHS, we can infer a guard as the negation of πg that is inconsistent with the RHS.
With this guard, we can infer the following relational assumption:
σe ≡ H(x) ⇒ emp∧x=NULL √
and the residue is ∆e=emp ∧ x=NULL ℧.
Finally, the output of the entailment check is the set of the two above states,
as follows: {(∆s, σs), (∆e, σe)}.
Example 2.
H(x)∧x 6=NULL ⊢ x 7→snode(p)
Compared to the entailment 1, this entailment already has the pure constraint
x6=NULL in its LHS. This constraint contradicts with the guard condition of the
invalid case (x=NULL) and prevents to generate the relational assumption for invalid
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result. More concrete, the result for invalid scenario is as follows:
σe ≡ H(x)∧x 6=NULL ⇒ emp∧x=NULL √
and the residue is ∆e=emp∧x 6=NULL∧x=NULL ℧. The state ∆e is unreachable and
will be eliminated. Therefore, the output of this entailment check contains only
the state of the valid scenario: {(∆s, σ′s)}, whereby
σ′s ≡ H(x)∧x 6=NULL ⇒ x 7→snode(p)∗Hp(p)
√
5.6.2 Enhancing Transformation
For complete specification inference, we extend the shape analysis to collect set
of states generated by the new second-order bi-abductive entailment procedure.
This set includes states with
√
status for safety specification as well as states
with ℧ status for error specification. From these states, we collect their relational
assumptions to construct multiple specifications. We illustrate this enhancing
shape analysis over the following examples.
foo Example.
struct snode∗ foo(struct snode∗ x){
return x->next;
}
The foo example returns the next pointer of the input x. At the starting point,
our analysis will generate the following specification with two unknown predicates
H1 and G1 that are need to be inferred:
requires H1(x) ensures G1(x, res);
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At the field access, our analysis generates the following proof obligation:
H1(x) ⊢ x 7→snode(p)
Similar to the Example 1, the enhancing second-order bi-abduction produces
a set of two states {(∆s, σs), (∆e, σe)}. Assumptions of these states are collected
for specification inference. Only safe states (i.e. {(∆s, σs)) will be forwarded to
analyse the rest of program. At the exit point, our shape analysis will generate
the following proof obligations:
1. x 7→snode(p)∗Hp(p)∧x 6=NULL∧res=p √ ⊢ G1(x, res)
2. emp ∧ x=NULL ℧ ⊢ G1(x, res)
The enhancing second-order bi-abduction produces one state for each
entailment check above. Their assumptions are as follows:
σs2 ≡ x 7→snode(p)∗Hp(p)∧x 6=NULL∧res=p √ ⇒ G1(x, res)
σe2 ≡ emp ∧ x=NULL ℧ ⇒ G1(x, res)
Finally, our shape analysis collects these four relational assumptions, and hands
them to the transformation engine. This engine will generate the definition for H1
and G1 as follows:
H1(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL√ ∨ x 7→snode(DP) √
G1(x, res) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ℧ ∨ x 7→snode(DP)∧res=DP√
Based on these predicate definitions, the analysis will generate the following
multiple specifications:
requires x=NULL ensures (true ) ℧
requires x 7→snode(DP) ensures x 7→snode(DP) ∧ res=DP √;
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Finally, we may need to enhance the normalization to transform these multiple
specifications into complete specification. The expected complete specification we
would like to infer is:
case { x=NULL → ensures (true ) ℧;
x 6=NULL →
requires x 7→snode(DP)
ensures x 7→snode(DP) ∧ res=DP √;
}
goo Example.
struct snode∗ goo(struct snode∗ x){
return x->next->next;
}
The goo example returns the pointer at the second next fields of the input pointer.
Our analysis will generate the following specification with two unknown predicates
H2 and G2 that are need to be inferred:
requires H2(x) ensures G2(x, res);
The shape analysis of the first field access is similar to the one in example foo. For
example, it returns a set of two states: one for safety and another for error.While
the latter will not be forwarded, the former will be used to analyzed the second
field access. Similarly, this analysis also generates two more states, one for safety
another for error. Therefore, there are three states at the exit point, two for errors
and one for safety. The proving for postcondition is similar to the foo example.
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Our approach would infer the following definitions for H2 and G2
H2(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL√ ∨x 7→snode(NULL)√ ∨ x 7→snode(p)∗p 7→snode(DP)√
G2(x, res) ≡ emp∧x=NULL℧ ∨ x 7→snode(NULL)℧∨
x 7→snode(p)∗p 7→snode(DP)∧res=DP√
Based on these predicate definitions, the analysis will generate the following
multiple specifications:
1. requires x=NULL ensures (true ) ℧
2. requires x 7→snode(NULL) ensures true ℧;
3. requires x 7→snode(p) ∗ p 7→snode(DP)
ensures x 7→snode(p) ∗ p 7→snode(DP) ∧ res=DP √;
Finally, the expected complete specification we would like to infer for the goo
example is:
case {
x=NULL → ensures (true ) ℧;
x 6=NULL → requiresx 7→snode(p)
case {
p=NULL → ensures (true ) ℧;
p 6=NULL →
requires p 7→snode(DP)
ensures p 7→snode(DP) ∧ res=DP √;
}
The get last Example.
Running shape analysis on the motivating example get last in Figure 2-5, we
obtains the set of relational assumptions as shown in Figure 5-7.
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relational assumptions for safety
s1. H(x) ⇒ x 7→node(q)∗U(q) √
s2. U(q)∧q 6=NULL ⇒ H(q) √
s3. x 7→node(q)∗G(q, res)∧q 6=NULL ⇒ G(x, res) √
s4. x 7→node(q)∗U(q)∧q=NULL∧res=x ⇒ G(x, res) √
relational assumptions for errors
e1. H(x) ⇒ emp∧x=NULL √
e2. emp∧x=NULL ℧ ⇒ G(x)
Figure 5-7: Relational Assumptions for Safety and Errors.
For this set of relational assumptions, we invoke the transformation steps
(derivation and normalization) in this chapter to synthesize predicate definition
for each unknown predicate. One possible result of the transformation would be
as follows:
H(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL√ ∨ x 7→node(q)∗U(q) √
U(x) ≡ (emp∧x=NULL ∨ x 7→node(q)∗U(q))√
G(x) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ℧ ∨ U2(x,q)∗q 7→node(NULL)√
U2(x,s) ≡ (emp∧x=s ∨ x 7→node(q)∗U2(q,s))√
with U2 is a new predicate introduced during the normalization.
This extension enables us to infer the complete specification of the get last
method as in Figure 5-8.
case {
x=NULL → ensures (true ) ℧;
x 6=NULL →
requires x 7→node(q) ∗ U(q)
ensures U2(x,last) ∗ last 7→node(NULL) ∧ res=last √;
}
Figure 5-8: Complete Specification Inferred for get last Method.
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5.7 Implementation and Experimental Results
We have implemented the proposal as a separate features of S2: derivation and
normalization. Those features can be used to refined the output of the shape
analysis in chapter 4 or in [16]. In the rest of this chapter, we evaluated each
feature on the output of shape analysis in chapter 4.
5.7.1 Two More Examples
We provide further illustrations of our proposal through two examples to highlight
key features of our shape inference mechanism.
struct dnode { struct dnode∗ prev struct dnode∗ next};
void append(struct dnode ∗ x, struct dnode ∗ y)
requires H(x, y#) ensures G(x, y#)
{






Figure 5-9: Code of append Method.
The append method shown in Figure 5-9 joins two doubly-linked lists. To
guide the shape synthesis, the initial stub specification is pre-analysed with #
annotations. Thus, by the same process described in the previous sections the
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following relational assumptions are inferred:
1 H(x,y#)⇒ x 7→dnode(xp,xn)∗Hp(xp,y#)∗Hn(xn,y#)∗Hy(y,x#)
2 Hn(xn,y#)∗Hy(y,x#)∧xn 6=NULL⇒ H(xn,y#)
3 Hy(y,x#)⇒ y 7→dnode(yp,yn)∗Hyp(yp,x#)∗Hyn(yn,x#)
4 Hn(xn,y#)∧xn=NULL⇒ emp
5 Hp(xp,y#)∗x 7→dnode(xp,xn)∗G(xn,y#)∧xn 6=NULL⇒ G(x,y#)
6 x 7→dnode(xp,y)∗y 7→dnode(x,yn)∗Hyn(yn,x#)∗Hp(xp,y#)⇒G(x,y#)
We can then synthesize the following predicate definitions:
H(x, y)≡x 7→dnode(Dp, xn)∗Hn(xn)∗y 7→dnode(Dyp,Dyn)
Hn(xn)≡emp∧xn=NULL ∨ xn 7→dnode(Dp, xnn)∗Hn(xnn)
G(x, y)≡x 7→dnode(Dp, y)∗y 7→dnode(x,Dyn)
∨ x 7→dnode(Dp, xn)∗G(xn, y)∧xn 6=NULL
Our shape inference mechanism manages to infer a precise (weak) pre-condition
which only requires a singly-linked list for the first parameter, and a single node for
the second parameter without enforcing unnecessary constraints on the rest of the
locations reachable from the second parameter. Furthermore, the derived post-
predicate describes a non-empty recursive list segment joined with the structure
described by the second parameter. Through the use of dangling references, the
derived specification permits cyclic data structures for the second parameter, and
moreover guarantees that only its first node is being changed. This more precise
pre/post specification subsumes the specification which uses two doubly-linked
lists for the two parameters.
To illustrate a more complex data structure, consider the mutual-recursive
methods shown in Figure 5-10. Those procedures validate a rose tree, whose
children are linked via a doubly-linked list with parent pointers. The rose tree is
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defined as follows:
struct mtree {int val; struct mtree∗ children; }
struct mnode { struct mtree∗ child; struct mnode∗ prev;
struct mnode∗ next; struct mnode∗ parent; }
This checker code is special in that we are using it to validate some expected data
bool c tree (struct mtree∗ t)
requires H1(t) ensures G1(t) ∧ res;
{
struct mnode∗ n=NULL;
if (t->children == null) return true;
else return c child(t->children, NULL, t);
}
bool c child(struct mnode∗ l, struct mnode∗ prv,struct mtree∗ par)
requires H2(l, prv, par) ensures G2(l, prv, par) ∧ res;
{
if (l == null) return true;
else
if (l->parent == par && l->prev == prv)
return c child(l->next, l, par) && c tree(l->child);
else return false;
}
Figure 5-10: Example on trees on benchmark 181.mcf from SPEC2000.
structure. We use it here primarily for evaluating the precision of our synthesis
method. Notice the use of mixed constraints e.g. G1(t) ∧ res, which requires
both inference and verification to work together. This comes naturally from our
integration of second-order bi-abduction into an existing separation logic verifier
with proving capability. Essentially, this code is checking that each tree node
contains a pointer to a null-terminated doubly-linked list, with pointers to parent
node. Our approach is able to derive the following precise and concise predicate
definitions. We achieve this feat by using normalization techniques which unify
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Example size Syn. Veri.
SLL (delete) 9 0.23 0.2
SLL (reverse) 20 0.2 0.18
SLL (insert) 13 0.21 0.21
SLL (setTail) 7 0.18 0.18
SLL (get-last) 20 0.24 0.22
SLL-sorted (check) 8 0.26 0.23
SLL (bubblesort) 13 0.26 0.31
SLL (insertsort) 15 0.26 0.25
SLL (zip) 12 0.31 0.36
SLL-zip-leq 10 0.3 0.32
SLL + head (check) 9 0.23 0.2
SLL + tail (check) 9 0.25 0.23
skip-list2 (check) 11 0.3 0.27
skip-list3 (check) 17 0.45 0.45
SLL of 0/1 SLLs 8 0.24 0.25
CSLL (check) 8 0.23 0.22
Table 5.1: Experimental Results for Shape Analysis
disjuncts and semantically-equivalent predicates, where possible.
H1(t)≡t 7→mtree(v,c)∗H2(c,NULL,t)
H2(l,b,p) ≡ emp∧l=NULL
∨ H2(nl,l,p)∗l 7→mnode(cl,b,nl,p)∗cl 7→mtree(v,c)∗H2(c,NULL,cl)
G1(t) ≡ H1(t)
G2(l, b, p) ≡ H2(l, b, p)
5.7.2 Expressivity
In this experiment, we evaluated the expressiveness of our inference system. For
each method, we employed the shape analysis in chapter 4 to infer shape
abstraction for memory safety and further derived definition for each unknown
predicate in pre- and post-condition of the method. The experiments were
performed on a machine with the Intel i7-960 (3.2GHz) processor and 16 GB of
RAM. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 presents our experimental results. For each test,
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Example size Syn. Veri.
CSLL (traverse) 8 0.23 0.33
CSLL of CSLLs (check) 18 0.31 0.31
SLL2DLL 8 0.19 0.19
DLL (check) 8 0.2 0.2
DLL (append) 23 0.18 0.19
CDLL (check) 9 0.25 0.23
CDLL of 5CSLLs 29 0.69 118
CDLL of CSLLs2 33 0.44 0.51
tree (search) 11 0.25 0.24
tree-parent (traverse) 14 0.22 0.27
rose-tree (check) 9 0.22 0.23
swl (traverse) 19 0.39 1
mcf (check) 28 0.31 0.26
tll (traverse) 18 0.19 0.23
tll (check) 39 0.21 0.29
tll-parent (check) 19 0.24 0.29
Table 5.2: Experimental Results for Shape Analysis (cont.)
we list the name of the manipulated data structure and the effect of the verified
code under the Example column. We use SLL for singly-linked lists, DLL for
doubly-linked lists, CLL for cyclic-singly linked-lists, CDLL for cyclic-doubly
linked-lists. SLL + head (tail) stands for a SLL where each element points to the
head (tail) of the SLL. For nested lists, SLL of 0/1 SLLs stands for a SLL nested
by a SLL of size 0 or 1, CSLL of CSLLs for CSLL nested by CSLL, CDLL of
5CSLLs for CDLL where each node is a source of five CSLL, and CDLL of
CSLLs2 for CDLL where each node is a nested CSLL. The skip lists subscript
denotes the number of skip pointers. The swl procedure implements list traversal
following the DeutschSchorr-Waite style. rose-trees are trees with nodes that
are allowed to have variable number of children, typically stored as linked lists,
and mcf trees [68] are rose-tree variants where children are stored in
doubly-linked lists with sibling and parent pointers. The size column shows the
number of conjuncts in the synthesized shapes. The Syn. column describes the
synthesis times in seconds. In order to evaluate the performance of our shape
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synthesis, we re-verified the source programs against the inferred specifications.
The verification time (in seconds) is captured in the Veri. column. All the
inference times and most of the verification times are took under one second
each. This was due to Omega taking a long time for several large proof
obligations that were generated for that example. When we replace the
underlying prover by Z3, the same example took about 1s to verify.
The experiments showed that our tool can handle fairly complex recursive
methods, like the recursive method operating over a tll structure. It can
synthesize shape abstractions for a large variety of data structures; from list and
tree variants to combinations. Furthermore, the tool can infer shapes with
mutual-recursive definitions, like the rose-trees, trees with nodes that are
allowed to have variable number of children, typically stored in linked lists, and
mcf trees which are rose-tree variants where children are stored in doubly-linked
lists with sibling and parent pointers.
5.7.3 Experimental Results on Normalization
The normalization phase aims to reduce the complexity of inferred shape
predicates. To evaluate its effectiveness, we further employ normalization feature
to refine the result of the analysis in Section 5.7.2. Now, we have a synthesis on
two scenarios: without (w/o) (in Section 5.7.2) and with (w) normalization. The
number of conjuncts in the synthesized shapes is captured with size column in
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. This experiment showed that the normalization reduces
68% (169/533) the size of synthesized predicates with an overhead of 27%
(8.37s/10.62s). It is able to detect and eliminate useless parameters, to split the
predicate and to match with existing predicates.
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Example
w/o norm. w/ norm.
Veri.
size Syn. size Syn.
SLL (delete) 9 0.23 2 0.23 0.29
SLL (reverse) 20 0.2 8 0.23 0.22
SLL (insert) 13 0.21 11 0.21 0.21
SLL (setTail) 7 0.18 2 0.19 0.18
SLL (get-last) 20 0.24 17 0.24 0.75
SLL-sorted (check) 8 0.26 2 0.27 0.27
SLL (bubblesort) 13 0.26 9 0.29 0.36
SLL (insertsort) 15 0.26 11 0.26 0.3
SLL (zip) 12 0.31 2 0.31 0.32
SLL-zip-leq 10 0.3 2 0.3 0.27
SLL + head (check) 9 0.23 2 0.25 0.2
SLL + tail (check) 9 0.25 2 0.26 0.18
skip-list2 (check) 11 0.3 1 0.29 0.25
skip-list3 (check) 17 0.45 1 0.46 0.3
SLL of 0/1 SLLs 8 0.24 1 0.24 0.23
CSLL (check) 8 0.23 2 0.2 0.21
Table 5.3: Experimental Results for Transformation Approach
5.7.4 Larger Experiments
We have evaluated S2 on real source code from the Glib open source library
[2]. Glib is a cross-platform C library including non-GUI code from the GTK+
toolkit and the GNOME desktop environment. Due to our focus, we restrict our
experiments to only those files which implemented heap data structures, such
as SLL (gslist.c), DLL (glist.c), balanced binary trees (gtree.c) and N-ary trees
(gnode.c). Our experimental results are presented in Table 5.5. LOC reports
the number lines of code (exclusive of comment), #Proc (#Loop) captures the
number of procedures (number of while/for loops) in each file. Also, #
√
column
reports the number of procedures and loops for which S2 inferred specifications
that guarantee memory safety. S2 can infer specifications that guarantee memory
safety for 90% of procedures and loops (200/223) 1. To show limitation of our
current proposal, we highlight a example i.e the g tree insert internal presented
1Our current implementation does not support array data structures. Hence, procedures like
g tree insert internal cannot be verified too.
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Example
w/o norm. w/ norm.
Veri.
size Syn. size Syn.
CSLL (traverse) 8 0.23 5 0.23 0.24
CSLL of CSLLs (check) 18 0.24 4 0.23 0.22
SLL2DLL 18 0.19 2 0.2 0.18
DLL (check) 8 0.21 2 0.23 0.19
DLL (append) 11 0.2 8 0.2 0.2
CDLL (check) 23 0.22 8 0.26 0.21
CDLL of 5CSLLs 28 0.39 4 0.66 1.3
CDLL of CSLLs2 29 0.33 4 0.44 0.29
tree (search) 33 0.23 2 0.24 0.23
tree-parent (traverse) 11 0.23 2 0.29 0.24
rose-tree (check) 14 0.28 14 0.3 0.23
swl (traverse) 19 0.23 13 0.27 22
mcf (check) 19 0.26 17 0.28 0.26
tll (traverse) 21 0.23 2 0.25 0.21
tll (check) 21 0.29 2 0.32 0.19
tll-parent (check) 39 0.24 2 0.35 0.24
Table 5.4: Experimental Results for Transformation Approach (cont.)
LOC #Proc #Loop #
√
Syn. (second)
gslist.c 863 44 19 59 3.45
glist.c 957 29 19 43 6.41
gtree.c 1334 36 14 43 5.26
gnode.c 1131 37 25 55 9.17
Table 5.5: Experimental Results on Glib Programs
in Figure 5-11, where we are currently unable to prove memory safety. In this
example, the lists l1 and l2 are actually from overlapping heap memory since
they are computed from the same list, list. Our current modular procedure
infers two disjoint lists as pre-condition of the loop, with l1 being longer than l2
through a composite predicate (similar to the zip example). Precondition of this
loop cannot be currently proven inside g slist sort real. To analyse this example
successfully, our current tool would have to be extended to infer immutability and
size property of heap data structure, so that certain heap overlaps can be handled.
In particular, we would need to infer the following more precise specification:
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struct GSList∗
g slist sort real(struct GSList∗ list, ...) {
struct GSList ∗l1, ∗l2;
if (!list) return NULL;
if(!list->next) return list;
l1 = list; l2=list->next;
while ((l2=l2->next) 6= NULL){
if ((l2=l2->next) == NULL) break;
l1=l1->next; } //failed precondition
l2=l1->next;
...}
Figure 5-11: Code of g tree insert internal Method (Glib).
requires (lseg(l2,NULL,n)@L∧lseg(l1,q,n−1)@L)∧n>0
ensures l′2=NULL∧l′1=q
Here, list segments of l1 and l2 of lengths n and n−1 are overlapping but accessed
in read-mode via the @L annotation. l′1 and l
′
2 captures the updated variables
at exit of loop. Furthermore, there are other examples which rely on both shape
and pure properties (e.g. sortedness or size) for memory safety. These failures
motivate us to explore S2 to infer immutability and pure properties in the near
future. We discuss a preliminary step in this direction next.
5.7.5 Extension to numerical properties
While outside the focus of the current proposal, we confirm that our shape
synthesis system can be extended to analyse data structures with deeper
numerical invariant properties, such as sorted lists. We achieved this by a small
extension that generates unknown predicates for numerical fields. As a simple
example, consider the singly-linked list node with a numerical field val, with
code snippet presented in Figure 5-12. In the verification process, our extension
provides support for the following bi-abductive entailment:
H(x, v:int) ⊢ x7→node(a, b)❀ (H(x, v) ⇒
x7→node(n, q)∗H2(q, v)∗R(n, v), H2(b, v)∗R(a, v))
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bool check sorted(struct node∗ x, int v)
requires H(x, v) ensures G(x, v)∧res;
{
if (x==NULL) return true ;
else
return (v≤x->val) && check sorted(x->next,x->val);
}
Figure 5-12: Code of check sorted Method.
which generates R(v, n), an unknown predicate over two numerical parameters. By
solving the generated constraints, our system can synthesize a new heap predicate
over sorted linked-lists, as follows:
H(x, v) ≡ emp∧x=NULL ∨ x7→node(n, q)∗H(q, n)∧v≤n
5.8 Discussions
Typically, shape analysis infers invariants and post-abstractions for pointers of
programs based on predefined shape abstractions. As shape analysis follows the
structure of programs, it may produce an overtly complex and less understandable
results. Furthermore, due to unbounded data structures, computing fix point of
shape analysis may be not terminating. Hence, shape analysis typically introduces
an abstract post operator to obtain fix points and produce suitable results.
In separation logic, for the termination of fix point computation, shape
analysis typically introduces a finite ”canonical abstraction”, which is a fragment
of separation logic with a set of predefined shape predicates. For example, the
canonical abstraction of the shape analyses presented in [9, 28, 51, 138] limits to
variants of list data structure. To transform the results of shape analysis into the
canonical abstraction, those analyses made use of abstract post operators, i.e.
widening [51] and join [28, 138], with a set of rewrite rules. Compared to those
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analyses, our proposal analyzes shapes for pointers of both pre- and
post-condition at the same time. Hence, our analysis needs additional step to
distinguish abstractions of pre-predicates from abstractions of post-predicates.
After that the analysis applies appropriate rewrite rules for each set of
abstractions. For a combination of shape and numerical domain, authors in [104]
propose a analysis based on symbolic execution mechanism. This analysis also
introduces a set of rewrite rules for an attempt to find fix points.
The closest to our system is the shape analysis Caber presented in [16].
Caber infers a set of assumptions for both safety and termination of
heap-manipulating programs. While our transformation attempts to derive a
concise, understandable and usable definition for each shape predicate, the post
operator of Caber only checks and removes inconsistent assumptions [18]. Thus,





In this thesis, we have proposed new mechanisms to specify, verify and
synthesize complete specification of programs using complex heap-based data
structures. Complete specifications capture functional properties, for both safety
and error scenarios, of programs.
Foundation of the complete specification mechanism is the error calculus.
Instead of using exception mechanism, we have proposed a lattice domain with
four-point status values that explicitly captures erroneous (and safe) program
states. To integrate reasoning on errors into verification systems, we have
introduced a calculus on these status values. We have also carefully re-designed
an entailment procedure of separation logic to support reasoning on both safety
and errors in the presence of data structures with sophisticated invariant, via
user-defined predicates and lemmas. Furthermore, through the calculus we can
provide a fairly precise and concise explanation when the verification fails to
either prove safety or validate errors.
We have also developed an inference methodology that centers on a second-
order bi-abduction that can synthesize arbitrary shape predicates, from scratch,
needed to ensure memory safety. Second-order variables are place-holders for
unknown predicates that can be synthesized from proof obligations gathered by
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Hoare-style verification. The soundness of our inference is based on the soundness
of the entailment procedure itself, and is not subjected to a re-verification process.
Our proposal for shape analysis has been structured into two key stages:
1. Gathering of relational assumptions on unknown shape predicates.
2. Synthesis of predicate definitions via derivation and normalization steps to
provide concise, understandable and usable shape definitions.
As shown in Appendix .2, our analysis has been proven sound. Compared to
state-of-the-art work [13, 20, 132], our work is capable of synthesizing shape
predicates for preconditions (and can directly work with recursive methods). We
have discussed a preliminary extension of the second-order bi-abduction to
complete specification. The key point of this extension is an abduction
mechanism to disprove proof obligations. We believe that this work is
particularly useful for automatically discovering effective formal specifications
required by automated verification systems.
We have designed and implemented a prototype system of the proposed
verification system within an existing verification infrastructure for C language
and conducted experiments with medium-sized programs manipulating complex
data structures. Our initial experiments suggest that our complete specification
language is expressive enough to capture functional properties of programs with
both safe and erroneous scenarios. Moreover, our verification system can provide
concise error explanations with modest overheads. The experimental results also
showed that the inference system can synthesize non-trivial shape predicates
definitions that could not be inferred before. Lastly, our framework can support
a mix of verification and inference through partial specifications. It will be




One possible future direction is to enhance the second-order bi-abductive
mechanism to infer both complete and concise specification.
To enhance completeness, our second-order bi-abduction may be extended to
support safety and errors as well as combined domains inference. We have
discussed an extension of the second-order bi-abduction to capture preconditions
that lead to implicit (memory) error execution. It is also useful to carry out an
analysis that is able to capture specifications that lead to explicit abnormal
execution, such as abort statements (e.g. the method zip in Figure 5-6) or
negative returns in Linux kernel API [67, 87]). Our second-order bi-abduction
mechanism was formulated for shape domain and did not fully consider
information from pure domain. A recent work [135] proposed a semi-automatic
mechanism based on unknown pure predicates to extend shape predicates with
pure properties (numerical and bag domains). To further enhance on
completeness, it is interesting to extend the mechanism to a combination of
shape and pure domains.
David et. al. [44] pointed out that it is more concise, precise and efficient when
specification logic captures immutability information. To enhance conciseness, we
would like to infer specification with immutability annotation. To do that, we
need to investigate mechanisms to infer immutability information.
Another possible future work is to develop our S2 tool further into a more
robust and scalable verification system, targeting on real-world software such as
API of Linux kernel. As this work requires significant engineering efforts, we have
left this topic to be explored in the future.
With these extensions, we hope that the new analysis can automatically verify
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.1 Proof of the Soundness of the Structural
Rules for ⊢p
We prove Theorem 1 inductively on the structural rules through ⊔ operator, ⊗
operator and ⊕ operator.
.1.1 JOIN (⊔) Operator
[EC−[⊔ JOIN]]
π1 ⊢p π ❀ τ1
π2 ⊢p π ❀ τ2
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ τ and τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ
We prove Theorem 1 by the case analysis on the returned τ .
Case τ = ⊥.
Based on the lattice of program status, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = ⊥ if τ1 = ⊥ and τ2 = ⊥. It means
τ1 ⊔ τ2 = ⊥ if π1 ⊢p π ❀ ⊥ and π2 ⊢p π ❀ ⊥.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have πi ⊢p π ❀ ⊥ infers that unsat(πi)
with i ∈ {1, 2}.
We have:
unsat(π1) ∧ unsat(π2)
≡ ¬π1 ∧ ¬π2
≡ ¬(π1 ∨ π2)
≡ unsat(π1 ∨ π2)
Again, follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ ⊥


















, it means π1 ⊢p π ❀ √. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π1 ∧ ¬π) (1.a.1)
Similarly, with τ2 =
√
, we have:
unsat(π2 ∧ ¬π) (1.a.2)
From (1.a.1) and (1.a.2), we have:
¬ (π1 ∧ ¬π) ∧ ¬ (π2 ∧ ¬π)
≡ (¬π1 ∨ π) ∧ (¬π2 ∨ π)
≡ ≡ (¬π1 ∧ ¬π2) ∨ π
≡ ¬(π1 ∨ π2) ∨ π
≡ ¬((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ ¬π)
≡ unsat(π1 ∨ π2) ∧ ¬ π) (1.1)
From (1.1), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude:
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ √.
So, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
Case τ1 = ⊥ and τ2 = √
It means π1 ⊢p π ❀ ⊥ and π2 ⊢p π ❀ √.
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Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π1)∧ (1.b.1)
unsat(π2 ∧ ¬π) (1.b.2)
From unsat(π1), we have pi1 =⇒ pi.
Moreover, with pi1 =⇒ pi and pi2 =⇒ pi, follow the same proof leading to





(pi1 ∨ pi2) =⇒ pi (1.3)
From (1.3), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude:
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ √.
Therefore, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ℧.
Based on the lattice of program status, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = ℧ if
1. τ1 = ℧ and τ2 = ℧. Or
2. One of them is ⊥ and another is ℧. We assume τ1 = ⊥ and τ2 = ℧
Case τ1 = ℧ and τ2 = ℧
τ1 = ℧, it means π1 ⊢p π ❀ ℧. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π1 ∧ π) (1.c.1)
Similarly, with τ2 = ℧, we have:
unsat(π2 ∧ π) (1.c.2)
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From (1.c.1) and (1.c.2), we have:
unsat(π1 ∧ π) ∧ unsat(π2 ∧ π)
≡ ¬(π1 ∧ π) ∧ ¬(π2 ∧ π)
≡ (¬π1 ∨ ¬π) ∧ (¬π2 ∨ ¬π)
≡ (¬π1 ∧ ¬π2) ∨ ¬π
≡ ¬(π1 ∨ π2) ∨ ¬π
≡ ¬((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π)
≡ unsat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π) (1.4)
From (1.4), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude:
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ ℧.
So, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
Case τ1 = ⊥ and τ2 = ℧
τ1 = ⊥, it means π1 ⊢p π ❀ ⊥. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π1) (1.d.1)
τ2 = ℧, it means π2 ⊢p π ❀ ℧. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π2 ∧ π) (1.d.2)
From (1.d.1) we have:
unsat(π1)
≡ ¬π1
⇒ ¬π1 ∨ ¬π (1.d.3)
From (1.d.2) we have:
unsat(π2 ∧ π)
≡ ¬(π2 ∧ π)
≡ ¬π2 ∨ ¬π (1.d.4)
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From (1.d.3) and (1.d.4) we have:
(¬π1 ∨ ¬π) ∧ (¬π2 ∨ ¬π)
≡ (¬π1 ∧ ¬π2) ∨ ¬π
≡ ¬(π1 ∨ π2) ∨ ¬π
≡ ¬((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π)
≡ unsat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π) (1.5)
From (1.5), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude:
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ ℧.
Therefore, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ⊤.
Based on the lattice of program status, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = ⊤ if
1. Either τ1 or τ2 is ⊤. Assume τ1 = ⊤. Or
2. τ1 = ℧ and τ2 =
√
.
Case τ1 = ⊤
τ1 = ⊤, it means π1 ⊢p π ❀ ⊤.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
sat(π1 ∧ ¬π)∧ (1.e.1)
sat(π1 ∧ π) (1.e.2)
From (1.e.1) we have:
sat(π1 ∧ ¬π)
⇒ sat((π1 ∧ ¬π) ∨ (π2 ∧ ¬π))
≡ sat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ ¬π) (1.6)
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From (1.e.2) we have:
sat(π1 ∧ π)
⇒ sat((π1 ∧ π) ∨ (π2 ∧ π))
≡ sat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π) (1.7)
From (1.6), (1.7) and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π1 ∨
π2 ⊢p π ❀ ⊤.
Therefore, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
Case τ1 = ℧ and τ2 =
√
τ1 = ℧, it means π1 ⊢p π ❀ ℧. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π1 ∧ π) (1.f.1)
τ2 =
√
, it means π2 ⊢p π ❀ √. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π2 ∧ ¬π) (1.f.2)
We prove sat(pi2 ∧ pi) by contradiction. Assume that unsat(pi2 ∧ pi).
unsat(π2 ∧ π)
≡ ¬(π2 ∧ π)
≡ ¬π2 ∨ ¬πCombined with (1.f.2), we have:
(¬π2 ∨ ¬π) ∧ (¬π2 ∨ π)
≡ ¬π2 ∧ (¬π ∨ π)
≡ ¬π2 contradict with (1.f.2)
Hence, we conclude sat(pi2 ∧ pi).
sat(π2 ∧ π)
⇒ sat((π1 ∧ π) ∨ (π2 ∧ π))
≡ sat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ π) (1.8)
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Similarly, we can prove that
sat((π1 ∨ π2) ∧ ¬π) (1.9)
From (1.8), (1.9) and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude:
π1 ∨ π2 ⊢p π ❀ ⊤.
Therefore, τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ .
.1.2 COMPOSE (⊗) Operator
[EC−[⊗ COMPOSE]]
π ⊢p π1 ❀ τ1
π ⊢p π2 ❀ τ2
π ⊢p π1 ∧ π2 ❀ τ and τ1 ⊗ τ2 = τ
We prove Theorem 1 by the case analysis on the returned τ .
Case τ = ⊥.
Based on ⊗ operator, the result of τ1 ⊗ τ2 is ⊥ if either τ1 or τ2 is ⊥. Assume
τ1 = ⊥. It means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ⊥.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we infer: unsat(π1).
Again, follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude π ⊢p π1 ∧ π2 ❀ ⊥




Based on ⊗ operator, the result of τ1 ⊗ τ2 is √ if both τ1 and τ2 are √. It means
π ⊢p π1 ❀ √ and π ⊢p π2 ❀ √.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π ∧ ¬π1) ∧ (2.a.1)
unsat(π ∧ ¬π2) (2.a.2)
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From (2.a.1) and (2.a.2), we have:
unsat(π ∧ ¬π1) ∧ unsat(π ∧ ¬π2)
⇒ (¬π ∨ π1) ∧ (¬π ∨ π2)
≡ ¬π ∨ (π1 ∧ π2)
≡ unsat(π ∧ ¬(π1 ∧ π2)) (2.1)
From (2.1), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π ⊢p π1 ∧
π2 ❀
√
Therefore, τ1 ⊗ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ℧.
Based on ⊗ operator, the result of τ1 ⊗ τ2 is ℧ if one of them (τ1, τ2) is ℧, and
another is not ⊥. Assumme τ1 = ℧ and τ2 6= ⊥.
τ1 = ℧ means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ℧. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π ∧ π1) (2.b.1)
From (2.b.1), we have:
unsat(π ∧ π1)
⇒ unsat(π ∧ π1 ∧ π2) (2.2)
From (2.2) and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π ⊢p π1 ∧
π2 ❀ ℧
Therefore, τ1 ⊗ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ⊤.
Based on ⊗ operator, τ1 ⊗ τ2 = ⊤ if
1. τ1=⊤ and τ2 = ⊤. Or
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2. One of them (τ1, τ2) is ⊤, another is √. Assume τ1=⊤ and τ2 = √.
Case τ1=⊤ and τ2 = ⊤
τ1=⊤ means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ⊤. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
sat(π ∧ π1) (2.c.1)
Similary, with τ2=⊤, we have:
sat(π ∧ π2) (2.c.2)
We prove sat(pi ∧ pi1 ∧ pi2) by contradiction. Assume ¬(pi ∧ pi1 ∧ pi2).
¬(pi ∧ pi1 ∧ pi2)
≡ ¬((π ∧ π1) ∧ (π ∧ π2))
≡ ¬(π ∧ π1) ∨ ¬(π ∧ π2) (2.c.3)
(2.c.3) contradicts with both (2.c.1) and (2.c.2). Hence, we conclude:
sat(π ∧ π1 ∧ π2) (2.3)
From (2.3), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π ⊢p π1 ∧
π2 ❀ ⊤
Therefore, τ1 ⊗ τ2 = τ .
Case τ1 = ⊤ and τ2 = √
τ1=⊤ means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ⊤. Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
sat(π ∧ π1) (2.d.1)
τ2=
√
means π ⊢p π2 ❀ √.
unsat(π ∧ ¬π2) (2.d.2)
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We prove sat(pi ∧ pi1 ∧ pi2) by contradiction. Assume ¬(pi ∧ pi1 ∧ pi2).
¬(π ∧ π1 ∧ π2)
≡ ¬(π ∧ π1) ∨ ¬π2)
Combined with (2.d.2), we have:
¬(π ∧ π1) ∨ ¬π2) ∧ (¬π ∨ π2)
⇒ ¬π
This contradicts with (2.d.1).
Hence, we conclude:
sat(π ∧ π1 ∧ π2) (2.4)
From (2.4), and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude: π ⊢p π1 ∧
π2 ❀ ⊤
Therefore, τ1 ⊗ τ2 = τ .
.1.3 UNION (⊕) Operator
[EC−[⊕ UNION]]
π ⊢p π1 ❀ τ1
π ⊢p π2 ❀ τ2
π ⊢p π1 ∨ π2 ❀ τ and τ1 ⊕ τ2 = τ
We prove Theorem 1 by the case analysis on the returned τ .
Case τ = ⊥.
Based on ⊕ operator, the result of τ1 ⊕ τ2 is ⊥ if either τ1 or τ2 is ⊥. Assume
τ1 = ⊥. It means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ⊥.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we infer: unsat(π1).
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Again, follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude π ⊢p π1 ∨ π2 ❀ ⊥.




Based on ⊕ operator, the result of τ1 ⊕ τ2 is √ if either (τ1 or τ2) is √. Assume
τ1 =
√
. It means π ⊢p π1 ❀ √.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π ∧ ¬π1) (3.a.1)
From (3.a.1), we have:
unsat(π ∧ ¬π1)
⇒ (¬π ∨ π1) ∨ π2
≡ ¬π ∨ (π1 ∨ π2)
≡ unsat(π ∧ ¬(π1 ∨ π2)) (3.1)




Therefore, τ1 ⊕ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ℧.
Based on ⊕ operator, the result of τ1 ⊕ τ2 is ℧ if both τ1 and τ2 are ℧.
τ1 = ℧ means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ℧.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
unsat(π ∧ π1) (3.b.1)
Similarly, with τ1 = ℧ we have:
unsat(π ∧ π2) (3.b.2)
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From (3.b.1) and (3.b.2), we have:
unsat(π ∧ π1) ∧ unsat(π ∧ π2)
⇒ (¬π ∨ ¬π1) ∧ (¬π ∨ ¬π2)
≡ ¬π ∨ (¬π1 ∧ ¬π2)
≡ ¬π ∨ ¬(π1 ∨ π2)
≡ ¬(π ∧ (π1 ∨ π2))
≡ unsat(π ∧ (π1 ∨ π2)) (3.2)
From (3.2) and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude π ⊢p π1 ∨
π2 ❀ ℧. Therefore, τ1 ⊕ τ2 = τ .
Case τ = ⊤.
Based on ⊕ operator, the result of τ1 ⊕ τ2 is ℧ if one of them (τ1, τ2) is ⊤, and
another is neither ⊥ nor √. We assume τ1 = ⊤ and τ2 is neither ⊥ nor √.
τ1 = ⊤ means π ⊢p π1 ❀ ⊤.
Follow the entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
sat(π ∧ π1) (3.c.1)
τ2 is neither ⊥ nor √, then π ⊢p π1 ❀ t and t 6= ⊥ ∧ t 6= √. Follow the
entailment procedure ⊢p, we have:
sat(π ∧ ¬π2) (3.c.2)
From (3.c.1), we have:
sat(π ∧ π1)
⇒ sat((π ∧ π1) ∨ (π ∧ π2))
≡ sat((π ∧ (π1 ∨ π2)) (3.3)
From (3.3) and follow the entailment procedure ⊢p we conclude π ⊢p π1 ∨
π2 ❀ ⊤. Therefore, τ1 ⊕ τ2 = τ .
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.2 Expanded Soundness of Shape Synthesis
.2.1 Proof for Lemma 1
We will show that for all ∆ante and ∆conseq such that
∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame)
and Γ={U1(v¯1)≡∆1, ..Un(v¯n)≡∆n}, a set of instantiations for unknown predicates
such that R(Γ) then the entailment Γ:∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq∗∆frame holds. We will show
by structural induction on ∆conseq.
Due to the construction of the ∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame) procedure as an
extension of an existing entailment procedure with frame inference, for all ∆ante
and ∆conseq not involving unknown predicates R = true and
Γ:∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq∗∆frame.
Bellow we consider the cases that actually involve unknown predicates. These
cases fall under two categories:
• ∆ante = U(r, v¯i, v¯n#)∗κ1∧π1 and ∆conseq = κs∗κ2∧π2 where κs ≡ r 7→c(d¯, p¯)
or κs ≡ P(r, d¯, p¯). By hypothesis ∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame). Then, as
described in Sec. 4.6 the [SO-ENTAIL-UNFOLD] step must hold ensuring the
following assertion holds:
κ1∗∆dangl∗∆rem∧π1 ⊢ κ2∧π2❀ (R′, ∆frame)
where R = R′ ∧ (U(r, v¯i, v¯n#) ∧ πa ⇒ κs ∗∆dangl ∗∆rem ∧ πc) It follows from
the structural induction hypothesis that:
Γ:κ1∗∆dangl∗∆rem∧π1 ⊢ (κ2∧π2) ∗ ∆frame (1)
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From R(Γ) it follows that
Γ:U(r,v¯i,v¯n#)∧πa⊢κs∗∆dangl∗∆rem∧πc (2)
From equations 1 and 2 it follows that Γ:∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq ∗∆frame.
• ∆ante=κ1∧π1 and ∆conseq=Uc(w¯,z¯#)∗κ2∧π2.
Let πr = project(r¯, π1) and πw = project(w¯, π1). By hypothesis
∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq❀ (R,∆frame). Then, as described in Sec.4.6 the
[SO-ENTAIL-FOLD] step must hold ensuring the following assertions hold:
– κ1 = κ11∗κ12
– κ12 ∧ π1 ⊢ κ2 ∧ π2❀ (R′, ∆frame) which by structural induction leads to
Γ:κ12 ∧ π1 ⊢ (κ2 ∧ π2) ∗ ∆frame
– R=(κ11∧πw⇒Uc(w¯, z¯#) @κg∧πr) ∧R′ which by R(Γ) leads to:
Γ:κ11∧πw ⊢ Uc(w¯, z¯#) @κg∧πr Note that by the definition in Sec.2.2 for
guarded assumptions, it follows that ∆ @ (κg∧πr) ∗ κg∧πr is equivalent
with ∆ ∗ (κg∧πr).
From the above three assertions it follows that Γ:∆ante ⊢ ∆conseq ∗∆frame
.2.2 Proof for Lemma 2
We will show that given a set of relational assumptions R and one of the synthesis
rules is applied to obtain R′ then if exists Γ such that R′(Γ) then R(Γ).
• If [Syn-Base] was applied to R ∧ (Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π⇒Upost(y¯)) then the resulting
assumptions are either:
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1. R′=R∧ (Upre(x¯)∧π′⇒emp) ∧ (κ∧π ⇒ Upost(y¯))
OR
2. R′=R∧ (Ufr(x¯) ⇒ ⊤) ∧ (Upre(x¯)⇒Ufr(x¯) @ (κg∧πg))∧
(Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π ⇒ Upost(y¯)) where Ufr is a fresh unknown predicate
If there exists Γ such thatR′(Γ) then by definition, using the Γ interpretation
for the unknown predicates then either:
1. Γ:Upre(x¯)∧π′ ⊢ emp and Γ:κ∧π ⊢ Upost(y¯) and since by construction π⊢π′
it follows that Γ:Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π ⊢ Upost(y¯) thus R(Γ).
2. Γ:Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π ⊢ Upost(y¯) and Γ:Upre(x¯) ⊢ Ufr(x¯) @ (κg∧πg) and
Γ:Ufr(x¯) ⊢ ⊤ leading to Γ:Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π ⊢ Upost(y¯) ∗ ⊤ @ (κg∧πg) which
by construction of κg∧πg and σ2 leads to Γ:Upre(x¯)∗κ∧π ⊢ Upost(y¯) and
thus R(Γ).
• If [Syn-Case] was applied to:
R∧ (U(x¯)∧π1⇒∆1 @ ∆1g)∧(U(x¯)∧π2⇒∆2 @ ∆2g)
To generate:
R′ = R∧ (U(x¯)∧π1∧¬π2⇒∆1 @ ∆3g)∧
(U(x¯)∧π2∧¬π1⇒∆2 @ ∆3g) ∧ (U(x¯)∧π1∧π2⇒∆3 @ ∆3g)
with π1∧π2 6=⇒ false and ∆1∧∆2⇒x¯∧∆3 and ∆1g∧∆2g⇒x¯∧∆3g and exists a Γ
such that R′(Γ). From R′(Γ) it follows that:
Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧¬π2 ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆3g Γ:U(x¯)∧π2∧¬π1 ⊢ ∆2 @ ∆3g
Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧π2 ⊢ ∆3 @ ∆3g
We need to show that:
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Γ:U(x¯)∧π1 ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆1g and Γ:U(x¯)∧π2 ⊢ ∆2 @ ∆2g.
Note that by the definition of the conjunctive unification, it follows that if
∆1∧∆2⇒x¯∧∆3 then Γ:∆3 ⊢ ∆1 and Γ:∆3 ⊢ ∆2. Thus from
Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧π2 ⊢ ∆3 @ ∆3g and follows that:
Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧π2 ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆3g and Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧π2 ⊢ ∆2 @ ∆3g Thus it follows:
Γ:U(x¯)∧π1∧(¬π2 ∨ π2) ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆3g which simplifies to Γ:U(x¯)∧π1 ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆3g
which by the construction of ∆3g leads to Γ:U(x¯)∧π1 ⊢ ∆1 @ ∆1g. Similarly we
obtain: Γ:U(x¯)∧π2 ⊢ ∆2 @ ∆2g.
• [Syn-Group-Pre] The proof obligation reduces to: if there exists Γ such that
Γ:U(v¯) ∧ (π1∨π2) ⊢ Φg1∧π1 ∨ Φg2∧π2 and π1∧π2 ⊢ false then
Γ:U(v¯)∧π1 ⊢ Φg1 and Γ:U(v¯)∧π2 ⊢ Φg2. It follows that
Γ:U(v¯)∧π1 ⊢ Φg1∧π1∨Φg2∧π2 and
Γ:U(v¯)∧π2 ⊢ Φg1∧π1∨Φg2∧π2. And since π1∧π2 ⊢ false it follows that
Γ:U(v¯)∧π1 ⊢ Φg1∧π1 and Γ:U(v¯)∧π2 ⊢ Φg2∧π2.
• [Syn-Group-Post] It follows trivially that Γ:∆a ⊢ Upost(v¯) and Γ:∆b ⊢ Upost(v¯)
from Γ:∆a ∨ ∆b ⊢ Upost(v¯).
• if [Syn-Inline] was applied to :
R∧(Upre(x¯)∧πa ⇒ (Upred (x¯) ∗ κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg))









d (x¯) ≡ ∆1 @ (κ1∧π1) ∨ . . . ∨ ∆n @ (κn∧πn)
S1 = {∆i∗∆r∗κi | κ∧π ⊢ κi∧πi❀ (∅, ∆r)}
S2 = {κ∗∆i∧π @ (κi∧πi) | SAT(κ∧κi∧π∧πi), κ∧π 6⊢κi∧πi}
We need to prove that if exists Γ such that R′(Γ) then, R(Γ). That is:
Γ:Upre(x¯)∧πa ⊢ (Upred (x¯) ∗ κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg). Which by using the Upred definition




((∆i @ (κi∧πi) ∗ κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg))





We will show that:
∨
∆i∈S1∪S2
(((κ∧π)∗∆i) @ (κg∧πg)) ≡
∨
i∈1...n(∆i @ (κi∧πi) ∗ κ∧π) @ (κg∧πg)
Observe that by the definition of the guard assertion, a RHS disjunction
(∆i @ (κi∧πi) ∗ κ∧π) where the guard κi∧πi contradicts the context κ∧π is
equivalent to false and thus can be discarded, leaving only disjuncts that
do not contradict the context. Note that by construction, S1 ∪ S2 denotes
exactly that set. Furthermore, by the definition of the guarded assumption,
assertions (∆i @ (κi∧πi) ∗ κ∧π) in which κ∧π ⊢ κi∧πi can be reduced to
∆i ∗ κ∧π. Observe that the result of the application of the above two
equivalence preserving simplification steps on the RHS is identical to the
LHS. Thus the required disjunction equivalence holds.
171
.2.3 Proof for Lemma 3
Follows from the observation that there are only two rules generating predicate
definitions: [Syn-Pre-Def] and [Syn-Post-Def]. Each applicable only if there exists only
one assumption corresponding to the predicate that is currently being derived.
Each rule generates exactly the predicate definition that would satisfy the unique
assumption.
.2.4 Proof for Lemma 4
We observe that the algorithm in Fig.5-1 finishes only when all assumptions have
been catered for: assumptions used for synthesis have been reduced to a unique
assumption which becomes the predicate definition; assumptions not included in
the synthesis are discharged by an entailment step. Thus by the previous lemmas
and the soundness of the underlying entailment checker the resulting definitions
satisfy all the initial assumptions.
.2.5 Proof for Lemma 5
We will show that all normalization steps are meaning preserving:
• Dangling elimination: We need to show that if Ud(x, v¯) ≡ ⊤ and x 6∈ y¯ then:
U(y¯) ≡ ([x7→DUd ](κ∧pi)) @ (κg∧pig) ∨ Φg
is equivalent to:
U(y¯) ≡ (Ud(x, v¯)∗κ∧pi) @ (κg∧pig) ∨ Φg
We first observe that variables local to the predicate definition, not part of
the predicate arguments, are implicitly existentially quantified.As
mentioned, we use the DUd notation as a visual aid, to identify an instance
of the predicate Ud whose root pointer x is reachable but has been neither
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read nor written to. By expanding the notation, the equivalence to be
proven becomes:
∃x.(Ud(x, v¯)∗κ∧pi)≡∃fv.[DUd 7→ fv]([x7→DUd ](κ∧pi))∗Ud(fv2, . . .)
By applying the predicate definitions:
∃x.(⊤∗κ∧pi)≡∃fv.[DUd 7→ fv]([x7→DUd ](κ∧pi))∗⊤
Which holds trivially.
• Eliminating useless parameters: We need to show that if at this step a
predicate P(x¯) ≡ ∆1 is distilled into Q(x¯′) ≡ ∆2 then P ′(x¯) ≡ Q(x¯′) that is,
∆1 holds iff ∆2 holds. By construction x¯
′ = x¯ \ z¯ and ∃z¯.∆1 ⊢ ∆2 and also
∆2 ⊢ ∃z¯.∆1 which leads to ∆2 ≡ ∃z¯.∆1 and by the soundness of the flow
analysis used to detect that variables z¯ are not used in ∆1 it follows that
∆1 ≡ ∃z¯.∆1.
• Re-using predicates: We need to show that if at this step a predicate
P(x¯) ≡ ∆1 is found to be equivalent with Q(x¯′) ≡ ∆2 then ∆1 holds iff ∆2
holds. By the premise of this normalization step, ∆1 ⊢ Q(x¯′) and also
∆2 ⊢ P(x¯) which leads to ∆2 ≡ ∆1.
• Predicate splitting: Soundness follows from the construction. Given a
predicate P(x¯) we need to show that if the bi-abduction succeeds in
discovering definitions for U1(x¯) and U2(x¯) such that P(x¯) ⊢ U1(x¯) ∗ U2(x¯)
and if the derived predicate definitions can be used to prove
P(x¯) ≡ U1(x¯) ∗ U2(x¯) which follows from the soundness of the bi-abduction
and of the entailment methods.
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